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Civilisation shaped by forests,water and elephants
Every civilisation is remembered not only for the monuments it built, but also for the landscapes it chose to preserve.
Sri Lanka’s ancient reservoirs, majestic stupas and remarkable irrigation systems continue to inspire admiration centuries after they were constructed. Equally remarkable, though often overlooked, is another inheritance that has endured alongside them.
Across the country’s dry-zone forests, elephant herds still move through landscapes that have sustained both wildlife and human communities for millennia, reminding us that Sri Lanka’s history has always been inseparable from the natural world.
Long before ecology became a recognised scientific discipline, the architects of Sri Lanka’s ancient hydraulic civilisation understood a truth that modern environmental science has since reaffirmed: forests, water and human prosperity are intimately connected. The vast network of reservoirs and canals that transformed the dry zone into one of the world’s greatest agricultural civilisations depended upon healthy forested catchments to regulate rainfall, protect watersheds and replenish water supplies. Those same forests were home to elephants, whose movements helped shape dynamic ecosystems, long before the rise of Anuradhapura.
The relationship between people and elephants was never without challenges, but for centuries both occupied the same broad landscapes. Seasonal cultivation, extensive forest cover and relatively low human population densities created conditions that allowed coexistence to evolve naturally. The lesson from history is not that conflict never existed, but that healthy landscapes made coexistence possible.
Against this historical backdrop, World Elephant Day, on 12 August, should become more than an annual observance. It should invite the nation to reflect upon the future of the landscapes that have shaped both its civilisation and its wildlife.
The future of the Sri Lankan elephant is not merely a wildlife issue.
It is a question about the future of the nation itself.
The Sri Lankan elephant (Elephas maximus maximus ) is one of the island’s most distinctive natural treasures. Found nowhere else in the world, this endemic subspecies represents a unique evolutionary lineage that has adapted to Sri Lanka’s diverse landscapes over thousands of years. It is also one of the country’s most important keystone species, playing a vital ecological role that extends far beyond its own survival.
As elephants move through forests and scrublands, they disperse seeds, create natural clearings, maintain grasslands and shape habitats that support countless other plants and animals. Their presence helps sustain ecological processes upon which healthy forests depend. Protecting elephants, therefore, means protecting entire ecosystems.
Those ecosystems provide benefits that reach every citizen, whether they live in a rural village or an urban centre. Forests occupied by elephants regulate river flows, protect reservoirs, reduce soil erosion, store carbon and strengthen resilience against climate change. They safeguard biodiversity while supporting agriculture, tourism and water security.
Seen in this context, elephant conservation is not simply about preserving a charismatic species.
It is about protecting the natural infrastructure that sustains Sri Lanka’s economy and society.
Yet this relationship has become increasingly fragile.
Human-Elephant Conflict has emerged as one of Sri Lanka’s most complex environmental and rural development challenges. Every year, lives are lost, crops are destroyed and hundreds of elephants die through preventable causes. Behind these statistics lie profound social and economic consequences for farming communities living at the interface between people and wildlife.
Scientific research has transformed our understanding of this conflict. Around 70 percent of Sri Lanka’s wild elephants live outside formally protected areas, occupying landscapes that include secondary forests, scrublands and traditional agricultural areas. This is not evidence that elephants have abandoned protected areas. Rather, it reflects the long-standing ecological reality that elephants have always depended upon wider landscapes extending beyond national parks.
The challenge, therefore, is not simply to protect elephants within isolated reserves.
It is to manage shared landscapes more intelligently.
This requires a fundamental shift in thinking. Instead of viewing Human-Elephant Conflict solely as a wildlife problem, Sri Lanka must recognise it as a challenge of landscape planning, governance and sustainable development. The question is no longer how to separate people from elephants completely, but how to design landscapes where both can thrive safely.
That shift in thinking forms the foundation of a new conservation philosophy, one that offers Sri Lanka an extraordinary opportunity to become a global leader in human-elephant coexistence. It is a vision rooted in the island’s own history, strengthened by modern science and guided by the belief that conserving elephants ultimately means conserving the landscapes that sustain us all.
A new conservation philosophy for a changing Sri Lanka
For much of the past century, the conservation of elephants has been shaped by a philosophy of separation. National parks were established, electric fences erected and elephants translocated or driven away from areas where conflict occurred.
While these measures have often been necessary to protect both people and wildlife, experience has shown that they cannot, by themselves, provide a lasting solution.
Human-Elephant Conflict is not fundamentally a problem of elephant behaviour. It is a consequence of how landscapes are planned, managed and transformed.
Elephants are intelligent, highly adaptable animals with extensive home ranges that have evolved over centuries. They continue to move along traditional routes in search of food, water and shelter, regardless of administrative boundaries. As forests become fragmented by settlements, roads, commercial agriculture and other forms of development, these ancient pathways increasingly intersect with human activities, creating conflict that neither elephants nor rural communities seek.
This understanding has prompted a profound shift in conservation thinking.
Instead of asking how elephants can be confined within protected areas, scientists are increasingly asking how landscapes can be managed to accommodate both people and wildlife safely. This approach, known as landscape-scale conservation, recognises that biodiversity cannot be sustained within isolated protected areas alone. It depends upon maintaining ecological connectivity across wider landscapes where forests, agriculture, water resources and human settlements coexist.
Every landscape that can sustain elephants is also a landscape capable of sustaining people. Sri Lanka is uniquely positioned to embrace this approach.
Unlike many elephant-range countries, the majority of Sri Lanka’s wild elephants live outside protected areas, occupying secondary forests, scrublands, village commons and traditional agricultural landscapes. Rather than viewing this as a conservation failure, it should be recognised as evidence of the remarkable adaptability of the Sri Lankan elephant and the island’s long history of coexistence.
This adaptability may prove to be one of Sri Lanka’s greatest conservation advantages.
At the same time, Sri Lanka is undergoing a demographic transition that distinguishes it from much of Asia. Population growth has slowed significantly and is expected to stabilise before gradually declining during the coming decades. While pressures on land will remain considerable, the country has a unique opportunity to plan future landscapes more strategically than nations facing continuing rapid population growth.
With enlightened land-use planning and science-based conservation, Sri Lanka could become one of the world’s foremost examples of long-term coexistence between people and free-ranging Asian elephants.
A key element of this emerging philosophy is the concept of Elephant Managed Ranges.
Rather than attempting to exclude elephants from every human-modified landscape, Elephant Managed Ranges recognise that many areas outside protected forests have supported elephants for generations and can continue to do so under appropriate management. The objective is neither unrestricted elephant movement nor unrestricted human expansion. It is the careful management of shared landscapes to minimise conflict while maintaining ecological integrity.
Within these landscapes, community-managed electric fencing can protect villages and cultivated land without unnecessarily restricting elephant movements through surrounding habitats. Habitat restoration, ecological corridors and better land-use planning can further reduce conflict while allowing wildlife to continue performing its vital ecological functions.
This approach places local communities at the centre of conservation.
Farmers are not simply victims of Human-Elephant Conflict. They possess generations of practical knowledge about elephant movements, seasonal patterns and local landscapes. Their experience, combined with scientific research, should guide future conservation strategies.
Conservation succeeds when rural communities become active partners rather than passive recipients of government interventions.
Modern technology can further strengthen this partnership.
Satellite imagery now enables continuous monitoring of forests and land-use change. GPS telemetry provides detailed information on elephant movements and habitat use. Artificial intelligence can analyse large ecological datasets to identify emerging conflict hotspots and improve early-warning systems. Drone technology and remote sensing can assist Wildlife officers in monitoring inaccessible areas and responding more efficiently to incidents.
Technology alone, however, is not the solution.
Its value lies in supporting informed decision-making, based upon reliable scientific evidence. Effective conservation still depends upon strong institutions, interdisciplinary collaboration and the willingness to integrate research into public policy.
Climate change adds another dimension to this challenge.
Sri Lanka is already experiencing more frequent climatic extremes, including prolonged droughts, intense rainfall, floods and increasingly variable seasonal weather influenced by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, the Indian Ocean Dipole and fluctuations in the monsoon systems. These changes affect water availability, agricultural productivity and wildlife distribution across the island.
Healthy forests provide one of the country’s most effective natural defences against these impacts. They protect watersheds, regulate streamflow, reduce soil erosion and maintain ecological resilience during periods of climatic stress. The same forests that sustain elephants also safeguard reservoirs, rivers and agricultural systems upon which millions of Sri Lankans depend.
Protecting elephant landscapes, therefore, strengthens the country’s resilience to climate change while conserving biodiversity and securing essential ecosystem services.
The future of the Sri Lankan elephant will not be secured through fences alone.
It will depend upon whether Sri Lanka has the wisdom to manage its landscapes as interconnected living systems, where forests, water, wildlife and people are recognised as partners in a shared future.
From conservation to national vision
The future of the Sri Lankan elephant will ultimately be determined not by wildlife management alone, but by the choices Sri Lanka makes about its own future.
Around the world, governments are beginning to recognise that nature is not simply something to be protected. It is an essential component of national wealth. Forests, wetlands, rivers and biodiversity are increasingly understood as natural capital that supports economic growth, food security, public health and climate resilience.
The Sri Lankan elephant is one of the country’s most valuable natural assets.
Its importance extends far beyond wildlife tourism or cultural symbolism. The landscapes that sustain elephants also regulate water supplies, protect watersheds, conserve biodiversity, store carbon and strengthen the resilience of ecosystems upon which millions of people depend. Healthy elephant landscapes underpin agriculture, reduce the impacts of floods and droughts and contribute directly to the nation’s environmental security.
Conservation should, therefore, no longer be viewed simply as a public expenditure.
It is a long-term investment in Sri Lanka’s prosperity.
Nations that conserve their natural capital strengthen their economic capital. The two are increasingly inseparable.
Every healthy elephant landscape generates ecological, economic and social benefits that far exceed the cost of protecting it. Increasingly, these landscapes will also become valuable within emerging international mechanisms for biodiversity finance, ecosystem restoration and climate adaptation.
Protecting elephants, therefore, is also an investment in Sri Lanka’s future competitiveness.
A whole-of-government responsibility
No single institution can resolve the Human-Elephant Conflict.
The Department of Wildlife Conservation has a central role, but the future of elephants is equally influenced by decisions made in agriculture, forestry, irrigation, transport, tourism, finance, rural development and land-use planning.
This is why elephant conservation should become a whole-of-government responsibility.
Sri Lanka now has an opportunity to establish a Presidential Initiative for Human-Elephant Coexistence and National Elephant Conservation, bringing together all relevant ministries and institutions under a shared national vision.
Working through the Presidential Secretariat, such an initiative should coordinate the efforts of the Ministries responsible for Environment, Wildlife, Forest Conservation, Agriculture, Irrigation, Tourism, Finance, Digital Technology and Rural Development. Provincial Councils, Local Authorities, universities, research institutions, conservation organisations, farming communities and the private sector should all become partners in implementing practical, science-based solutions.
This should not be viewed as another environmental programme.
It should be recognised as a national development initiative that strengthens biodiversity, water security, climate resilience and sustainable rural livelihoods simultaneously.
Successful conservation depends upon collaboration rather than institutional fragmentation.
Meaningful conservation cannot be planned within five-year political cycles.
Elephants live for six or seven decades. Forest restoration takes generations. Climate change will continue to reshape landscapes throughout this century.
Sri Lanka, therefore, requires a long-term national framework that extends beyond successive governments.
A National Elephant Conservation and Management Master Plan (2027–2057) would provide that continuity.
The Master Plan should establish a clear national vision, supported by measurable objectives, regular independent scientific review and adaptive management, based upon emerging research.
It should identify priority elephant landscapes, strengthen ecological corridors and integrate Elephant Managed Rangesinto national land-use planning. Habitat restoration, community-managed fencing, improved compensation mechanisms, biodiversity finance and conservation education should become central components of the strategy.
Modern technologies must also become integral to conservation management. Satellite monitoring, GPS telemetry, artificial intelligence, remote sensing and predictive modelling can transform the way Sri Lanka understands elephant movements, anticipates conflict and manages landscapes. Used responsibly, these tools will enable conservation decisions to become increasingly proactive rather than reactive.
Above all, the Master Plan should ensure continuity.
The national commitment to conserving elephants and the landscapes they inhabit should remain constant.
Few countries possess the combination of advantages that Sri Lanka enjoys.
The island supports one of the world’s highest densities of wild Asian elephants and the endemic Sri Lankan elephant (Elephas maximus maximus), found nowhere else on Earth. It possesses internationally respected conservation scientists, a long history of coexistence between people and elephants and a demographic transition that creates opportunities for long-term landscape planning unavailable to many other elephant-range countries.
These are strategic national assets.
If managed wisely, they place Sri Lanka in a unique position to become the world’s leading example of landscape-scale coexistence between people and free-ranging Asian elephants.
The international community is searching for successful conservation models that reconcile biodiversity protection with human development.
Sri Lanka has the opportunity not merely to participate in that conversation, but to lead it.
By integrating science, public policy and community participation, the country can demonstrate that conservation and development are not competing objectives. They are mutually reinforcing.
Such leadership would strengthen Sri Lanka’s international reputation while contributing meaningfully to global biodiversity conservation and climate resilience.
World Elephant Day should mark more than an annual celebration of one of the world’s most remarkable animals.
It should become a national reminder that the future of the Sri Lankan elephant is inseparable from the future of the country’s forests, watersheds and rural landscapes.
The conservation expertise already exists.
The policy foundations are increasingly well established.
What remains is the national leadership required to unite these strengths within a shared long-term vision.
History teaches us that great civilisations endure because they understand the relationship between people and the natural systems that sustain them. Sri Lanka’s ancient hydraulic civilisation flourished because forests protected water and water sustained society. Modern science has reaffirmed the same principle.
The forests that shelter elephants also safeguard rivers, reservoirs, biodiversity and the resilience of communities facing an increasingly uncertain climate.
To conserve those landscapes is to invest in the country’s future.
World Elephant Day should, therefore, become more than an occasion for reflection.
It should become the moment when Sri Lanka commits itself to a new national covenant: one that recognises elephant conservation as an integral part of environmental security, sustainable development and responsible stewardship of the nation’s natural heritage.
For, in the end, the future of the Sri Lankan elephant is not simply about ensuring the survival of an endangered species. It is about whether Sri Lanka possesses the wisdom to preserve the living landscapes that shaped its civilisation, the foresight to restore those that have been diminished, and the vision to entrust this enduring natural legacy to generations yet unborn.
(Dilum Alagiyawanna is a telecommunications engineer turned environmental and wildlife conservationist, citizen scientist and wildlife documentary filmmaker. He is an environmental policy researcher and writer whose work integrates science, public policy and sustainable development to advance wildlife conservation, climate resilience and landscape-scale environmental management, with particular emphasis on the long-term conservation of Sri Lanka’s elephants and other threatened species.)
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A leaked US diplomatic cable, dated July 15, 2009, signed by the then Geneva-based US Ambassador, Clint Williamson, cleared the Sri Lankan Army of crimes against humanity during the Vanni offensive. The cable, addressed to the US State Department, was based on a confidential conversation Ambassador Williamson had with the then ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacque de Maio, on July 9, 2009. Ambassador Williamson wrote: “The army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at an increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it didn’t amount to genocide. He (Maio) could cite examples of where the army had stopped shelling when the ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths. He concluded, however, by asserting that the GoSL failed to recognize its obligation to protect civilians, in spite of its approach resulting in higher military casualties.”
Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam recently declared, in New Delhi, that their biggest challenge was to convince the BJP government to take a much bigger interest in the question of accountability and on the question of a political solution.
The Tamil Guardian quoted Ponnambalam as having said: “They’re both two sides of the same coin.” The Island reproduced the Tamil Guardian report in its 6 Nov. edition (https://island.lk/sri-lanka-sees-tamil-nationhood-as-a-threat-to-buddhism-ponnambalam-tells-delhi-conference/)
This coming from Gajendrakumar, who, along with his late father Kumar Ponnambalam and grandfather, the legendary G.G. Ponnambalam, longtime residents of Colombo, with substantial wealth here and abroad, especially in owning prime real estate, even to this day, have no shame in wooing for a separatist Eelam, most probably to hoodwink the gullible Tamil masses to vote for him as their hero at future elections.
Several readers expressed serious concerns over the views expressed by the Jaffna District lawmaker. Retired Maj. Gen. Chagie Gallage, one of the notable battlefield strategists and outspoken Gajaba regiment veteran, was among them. “The country couldn’t turn a blind eye to this sort of propaganda,” Gallage declared, emphasising the responsibility on the part of those who benefited from the eradication of the LTTE to counter such lies. “An end to forcible conscription of children is sufficient to justify the eradication of the group,” he said, alleging none of those shedding crocodile tears today bothered to ask the LTTE to give up innocent human shields.
TNPF is not represented in Parliament. Ponnambalam contested the last parliamentary election on the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) ticket. He is the only ACTC lawmaker in the current Parliament. The Tamil nationhood, MP Ponnambalam had referred to at the onset of the fiery speech, spanned across some parts of the world, Tamil Nadu included. The so-called Tamil nationhood is not exclusively tied to Sri Lanka.
The late J.N. Dixit, one-time Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (1985 to 1989), pointed out in his memoirs ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun to Yashwant Sinha’ the late Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi feared the emergence of Tamil separatism in India if she refused to support, what Dixit called, aspirations of Sri Lanka Tamils (Chapter: An Indo-centric practitioner of realpolitik/p 147).
The involvement of the Australian Tamil Congress and the United States Tamil Action Group in the New Delhi conference revealed the despicable overall strategy of those who believed in the LTTE’s capacity to force the battlefield stalemate to their advantage.
The Norway-led almost one-sided peace process, during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s presidency, gave the LTTE an ample opportunity to advance its separatist agenda, thanks to the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s utterly irresponsible blind approach to a negotiated settlement. The LTTE quit the negotiating table in April 2003. That move made the war inevitable. It would be pertinent to remind that Ponnambalam had been a Jaffna district MP at the time the LTTE quit the negotiating table, while safely living in Colombo much of the time, as was the case with most Tamil leaders, including M.A. Sumanthiran, a resident of Wellawatte. So while maligning Sri Lanka with highly exaggerated claims, like existence of mass graves at every available opportunity, especially when they are abroad, those same Lankan Tamil leaders, however, still feel quite safe here and not India. And we must say we are proud to have them living among us as our brothers, despite all the nasty things they accuse us of. Even if we grant that some of their animosity is justified, there is no necessity to kill each other to settle issues, other than to work things out peacefully for the benefit of us all. Both Sinhalese and Tamils, especially the latter, must decide whether we want the permanent chaos, that is India with its innumerable caste/race/religious divisions, or do we bury the hatchet between the two major races to settle problems that beset us here, albeit without external interference.
Ponnambalam represented the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) that had recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people and thereby backed Velupillai Prabhakaran’s initiative. The ITAK parliamentary group consisted of 15 MPs, including one National List member. However, those who entered Parliament on the ITAK ticket were recognised as members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) consisting of ex-Indian sponsored terrorist groups and the ITAK.
The LTTE advanced its terror campaign in the run-up to the 2004 parliamentary poll. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, the LTTE actions directly benefited the TNA. The LTTE undermined other political parties in the fray. Their objective was clear. They wanted the largest possible ITAK group in Parliament to back the war effort. Twenty-two were elected on the ITAK ticket at the parliamentary polls held in early April 2004. That effort was successful with the LTTE stuffing ballot boxes for ITAK candidates as was clearly observed by EU election monitors in their post-election report. Ponnambalam was among the elected group. Throughout the Eelam War IV (Aug. 2006 to May 2009), ITAK/TNA fiercely backed the LTTE. They remained loyal to the LTTE as its units gradually retreated until the group suffered a humiliating defeat at Anandapuram, in April 2009, before the total collapse several weeks later.
Against the backdrop of the devastating split in the LTTE, caused by its Eastern Commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka Karuna Amman, rebelling against their supreme leader Prabhakaran, alleging discrimination against Easterners, in 2004, ahead of the parliamentary polls, ITAK/TNA remained committed to the LTTE macabre cause. After the armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion, Ponnambalam quit the TNA. He formed the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) in 2010. The TNPF fielded candidates at the 2010 and 2015 parliamentary polls but couldn’t even secure a single seat. Ponnambalam returned to Parliament again in Aug 2020.
Qualified as a Barrister-at-Law, in the UK, in 1997, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam received Sri Lanka qualification as an Attorney-at-Law, two years later, before entering active politics, in the wake of his father Kumar Ponnambalam’s assassination, in early January 2000.
Ponnambalam conveniently forgot the responsibility on the part of India, as well as the Tamil community, for the crimes committed in Sri Lanka and India. Tamil Guardian report on Ponnambalam’s speech, made no reference to the Indian military intervention, deaths of over 1,200 Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka, thousands of Tamils, both LTTE and civilians, killed by the foreign army, elimination of Tamil political leadership by the LTTE and the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991, just over a year after India ended its disastrous military mission here.
The BJP wouldn’t be deceived by unfounded claims, such as Ponnambalam’s Delhi declaration that the Sri Lankan State considered the very potential of Tamil nationhood as a threat to Buddhism and was hell-bent on dismantling it.
BJP leader and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, having repeatedly paid tribute to Indian officers and men who perished in Sri Lanka and twice paid floral tributes to the Indian military memorial near Parliament, would be averse to anti-Sri Lanka rhetoric. Unfortunately, some Tamil politicians have sought to depict a bleak picture of the country, though the Northern and Eastern Provinces achieved impressive post-war success. After Modi assumed the premiership, in 2014, India gradually changed its Sri Lanka strategy and New Delhi’s overall approach cannot be discussed, forgetting the role they played in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2022 and the facilitation of the JVP/NPP victory at the presidential and parliamentary polls in Sept. and Nov., 2024, respectively.
No one will be able to entice New Delhi by propagating that the Sri Lankan State was pursuing a hostile attitude towards Tamil Hindus. Much to the discomfort of those seeking to arouse communal feelings, the Tamil community in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, for the first time in post-independence history, voted overwhelmingly for the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) at the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024.
The emergence of the NPP as the dominant power in the predominantly Tamil speaking regions has troubled ITAK and other Tamil parties. The deterioration of ITAK/TNA began after the eradication of the LTTE. Once the dominant political power that worked with the LTTE gradually declined and was reduced to eight seats at the last parliamentary poll.
The Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA), consisting of parties that broke away from the ITAK-led TNA, won a seat with Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) leader Selvam Adaikkalanathan winning in Vanni.
Independent candidate Dr Ramanathan Archuna won a seat in Jaffna, probably at the expense of M.A. Sumanthiran, PC, who could have made a significant contribution in Parliament. Archuna has caused chaos with repeated declarations, both in and outside Parliament, that the Tamil Diaspora funded the NPP campaign. The influence of the Tamil Diaspora, too, has deteriorated over the years, though European political parties bent backwards to appease the voters of Sri Lankan origin. But, foreign governments, to a certain extent, have lost interest in accountability issues, though on and off statements are made and concerns expressed over the delay in addressing long standing issues. However, accountability issues are no longer a priority as repeatedly indicated by India. The post- Aragalaya Indo-Sri Lanka relationship/partnership underscored by seven MoUs finalised in April 2025, including one on defence, followed by three defence MoUs signed in Sept, this year, as well as transfer of Colombo Dockyard Ltd. (CDL) controlling shares to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), affiliated with the Indian Defence Ministry, marked a fundamental shift towards New Delhi.
With the NPP emerging as the dominant political power in the Northern and Eastern regions, the Tamil parties seemed to be on the back foot. Lawmaker Ponnambalam’s recent bid to cause concern among the Indian establishment over perceived Sinhala Buddhist threat to Tamil Hindus seemed a desperate move that failed to convince their own.
Ponnambalam returned to Parliament in August 2020, as the leader of Ahila Ilankai Thamil Congress. The party also secured one National List slot. Ponnambalam accommodated Selvarasa Gajenthiran, who quit the TNA, along with him, in 2010, on the National List.
Ponnambalam attacked the wartime political leadership and the war-winning armed forces. Alleging that the Tamil community had been subjected to genocide, Ponnambalam demanded international accountability. The MP dismissed whatever proposals meant to address the issues through domestic mechanisms.
Ponnambalam attacked President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s policy statement. The lawmaker targeted the following section in particular: “It is equally important to precisely interpret the mandate given by the people. We respect the trust that the people have placed in me and the Prime Minister and the newly elected people’s representatives. We have a clear understanding of the expectations with which the people gave such a powerful mandate to the government. We will leave no room for such expectations to be dashed for any reason. It should always be remembered that the prime responsibility of a people’s representative is to serve the public. We will be sensitive to fulfilling the needs of the people, keeping in mind that all these positions are responsibilities and not privileges.”
Ponnanmalam declared that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s mandate (2019 November presidential and 2020 August parliamentary polls) did not extend to the North-East region. Ponnambalam depicted the vote received by all Tamils, including Ramanathan and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) Douglas Devananda, elected to the new Parliament, as one that overwhelmingly endorsed self-determination of the Tamil speaking people. Ponnambalam justified international intervention on the basis of the Tamil community being deprived of the security it deserved.
Declaring them (Tamil lawmakers) received a mandate for Tamil rights to be recognised, Ponnambalam declared: “two nations exist in this country.”
“Sovereignty can never be a defence. This country has gone through a war and the whole world says that heinous crimes have been committed and the state is the number one accused party,” Ponnambalam declared, adding “Under no circumstances can any President, or any country, for that matter, try to hide behind the concept of sovereignty, to prevent accountability for heinous crimes. The victims of these heinous crimes stand as Tamils… the major victims stand as Tamils and they have consistently said that genocide has been committed and that they want international accountability.”
When Ponnambalam went on and on repeating war crimes allegations, in Parliament, former Presidents and Commanders-in-Chief, Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala Sirisena, as well as war-winning Army Chief Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, were present. Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa, too, was present.
It would be pertinent to ask lawmaker Ponnambalam whether, as a member of the TNA, he endorsed the party’s decision to vote for the then common presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka at the January 26, 2010 presidential election. Did the TNA decision to join the UNP-led coalition, comprising the JVP, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) et al, was unanimously approved by all constituents of the TNA?
Now that Ponnambalam reiterated genocide allegations, he owed an explanation why the Tamil community overwhelmingly endorsed Fonseka at the presidential election after accusing him and his army of committing genocide. Fonseka comfortably won all electoral districts, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, though the South ensured Mahinda Rajapaksa secured a second term, with a staggering 1.8 mn majority. Mahinda Rajapaksa polled 6,015,934 votes (57.88%) whereas Fonseka received 4,173,185 votes (40.15%). Fonseka comfortably won the predominantly Tamil electoral districts of Jaffna, Vanni, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Digamadulla and Nuwara-Eliya.
The 2010 presidential election was held less than a year after the armed forces eradicated the LTTE. Blindly accusing the Sri Lanka army of war crimes, and genocide, seemed ridiculous, after having voted for the very man who conducted the ground offensive that brought the LTTE to its knees, in May 2009.
The truth is that the LTTE and the TNA really believed they could overwhelm President Mahinda Rajapaksa far more easily than Wickremesinghe. In spite of serious reservations, the TNA backed the LTTE’s move. Particularly, the Northern electorate boycotted the 2005 Nov. presidential election. The then top UNPer Malik Samarawickrema told the writer if not for that boycott, engineered by the LTTE, Wickremesinghe could have won the presidential poll. That may have very well been the case.
Having dug its own grave, the LTTE faced a relentless three-year military onslaught. The LTTE resumed large-scale operations in August 2006 and the counter offensive didn’t stop until Prabhakaran was isolated and killed on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.
The armed forces eradicated the LTTE in May 2009. In the following year, the TNA backed the very man who led the campaign against the LTTE at the presidential poll.
The war crimes and genocide allegations should have been reexamined after Fonseka won the Northern and Eastern provinces. Unfortunately, successive governments lacked interest and a cohesive plan to counter lies. In spite of exposure of calculated lies meant to humiliate Sri Lanka and increase international pressure, successive governments shirked their responsibility to counter those lies toe to toe in the face of propaganda against the country being primarily launched with the backing of the so-called international community, meaning the powerful West.
Sri Lanka never took tangible measures against those who propagated lies as part of an overall strategy. Some still couldn’t stomach the LTTE’s annihilation. Wigneswaran’s calculated lie is a case in point. Wigneswaran, and a section of the Tamil media, in August 2016, accused the military of killing over 100 LTTE combatants, in custody, by poisoning them. The PTI and NDTV were among the international media which reported unsubstantiated allegations.
Accusers placed the number of such deaths at 104. Accusations were made while the US Pacific Command’s ‘Pacific Angel’ exercise was underway, in the Jaffna peninsula.
Despite being a retired Supreme Court Judge, the highest legal body in the country, Wigneswaran raked up a brazen lie by brashly declaring that the US Air Force’s medical team, in Jaffna, would examine the former rehabilitated LTTE cadres, who, he alleged, had fallen sick because they were injected with poisonous substances, at government detention, or rehabilitation camps.
The US conveniently refrained from making its position clear on Wigneswaran’s claim when the writer raised the issue with the US Embassy in Colombo.
Responding to several questions The Island posed, regarding ex-LTTE cadres being poisoned, the US Embassy said: “Operation Pacific Angel is providing assistance, based on the specific needs of the local communities. Among the nearly 70 members of this multilateral assistance programme – including some medical staff and engineers from Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, as well as the United States – are over 40 doctors, providing basic medical services: dental procedures; physical therapy; general medical assistance; and optometry. These are the only services being provided.”
The writer asked the US Embassy whether it could confirm that US Pacific Command personnel, conducting medical tests on ex-LTTE cadres, allegedly poisoned by the previous government; whether they would be moved to overseas medical facility for further tests; whether the GoSL had been informed of the development; when did the TNA request the US intervention and whether the US military had conducted similar tests in other countries. For obvious reasons, the US refrained from responding to The Island queries.
The New Indian Express quoted Wigneswaran as having said that the US Air Force’s medical team would examine ex-LTTE cadres who had been sick because they were injected with poisonous substances by the Sri Lankan armed military while they were undergoing detention, or rehabilitation. Wigneswaran, according to the New Indian Express, had told the NPC (Northern Provincial Council) that he had mentioned the plight of the former combatants in his conversation with the US Ambassador, Atul Keshap, and asked if the USAF team could examine them and give an independent report.
Wigneswaran’s allegations died a natural death. Neither the TNA, nor the US, ever discussed the issue publicly.
With the latest New Delhi talk, Ponnambalam appeared to have taken the campaign against Sri Lanka to a new level.
Sasanka Perera (The writer is on X as @sasmester)
Sri Lankan social and mainstream media have shown considerable euphoria over oral observations made by the Indian Supreme Court on the Katchatheevu island in early October 2026. It stems primarily from a collective sense of relief and validation over the ownership of the island because Sri Lanka has faced intense political posturing, domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians, and legal challenges in India demanding the retrieval of the island. But nothing new or pathbreaking has emerged from the Indian Supreme Court on this issue. What is clear is that ownership of Katchatheevu is a settled issue irrespective of its continued reemergence in Indian courts and in Tamil Nadu political performances.
The Katchatheevu issue must be understood in its historical context, with legal clarity, strategic sensibility and a large dose of commonsense in which Sri Lankans are generally wanting. Neither an oral observation by India’s Supreme Court nor the Indian government’s continued adherence to existing maritime agreements constitutes a new, final judicial determination of sovereignty. More importantly, even an unequivocal recognition of Sri Lanka’s territorial rights would not remove the wider asymmetries of power between the two countries of which our political leaders must be extremely mindful when dealing with India.
What did India’s Supreme Court Decide?
The most recently reported proceedings, i.e. of 6 October 2026, concern several petitions challenging the 1974 India–Sri Lanka maritime boundary agreement and the subsequent 1976 agreement regulating fishing in each country’s maritime zones. The principal case, A.K. Selvaraj v. Union of India, was filed in 2008. The wider proceedings include Writ Petition (Civil) No. 430 of 2013; special leave petitions and a petition filed in 2021. Former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa was also among the petitioners in the litigation. The petitioners challenge the legality of recognising Katchatheevu as lying on Sri Lanka’s side of the maritime boundary, arguing, among other things, that the transfer of Indian territory required constitutional and parliamentary procedures.
On 6 October 2026, Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva heard the matter. The Court orally observed that Indian fishermen needed to be sensitised against entering Sri Lankan waters. It also questioned whether the Indian government was engaging Sri Lanka over the treaties. At the Attorney General’s request, the matter was adjourned to 2 February 2027. No final judgment on sovereignty was delivered. This state of affairs is crucial. An oral observation during a hearing is not a binding determination of territorial sovereignty. Nor does an adjournment amount to the dismissal of the petitions or an endorsement of every argument advanced by either side.
The Indian government’s position is nevertheless significant. According to publicly available information, the Attorney General of India informed the Court that the Indian government had no intention of reopening the 1974 and 1976 agreements, while concerns regarding Indian fishermen would continue to be pursued through diplomatic channels. This establishes the Indian government’s continuing commitment to the existing settlement. It is not a fresh concession of sovereignty made in response to a final Supreme Court ruling. However, it is entirely possible that the Indian government’s position could be influenced by future political developments, while the agreements themselves remain the operative bilateral framework at the moment.
Katchatheevu’s history is far more complex than the dominant popular Indian assertion that the island was Indian territory until it was handed over to Sri Lanka in 1974. British colonial administrations in India and Ceylon disputed aspects of the island’s status, and the available historical record contains evidence invoked by both sides. The proprietary interests claimed by the Raja of Ramnad, historical leases and British administrative records have featured prominently in Indian arguments. The 1904 Madras High Court case, Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, and a 1922 Imperial Records Department report have been cited by Indian commentators as evidence supporting the historical Indian claim. However, proprietary rights, fishing practices and administrative jurisdiction are not automatically equivalent to sovereign ownership over territory.
The 1921 negotiations between British India and Ceylon are particularly important. The two colonial administrations discussed a fisheries boundary in the Palk Strait. The Indian delegation agreed to a proposed line without prejudice to any territorial claim India might make to Katchatheevu. The reservation demonstrated that the island’s status was contested rather than conclusively resolved by that exercise. Subsequent correspondence from the Government of India in 1923 is also relevant to the historical debate. It has been cited in discussions of the government’s assessment of the competing claims. Nevertheless, the 1921 negotiations and the associated correspondence should not be presented as a conclusive international judicial ruling in Ceylon’s favour.
The more decisive development came after independence, in 1974 and 1976. In June 1974, India and Sri Lanka concluded the ‘Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters.’ Article 1 established the maritime boundary, placing Katchatheevu on the Sri Lankan side. Article 4 provided that each country would exercise sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the waters, islands, continental shelf and subsoil on its respective side of the boundary. Article 5 preserved access for Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit Katchatheevu as previously practiced, without requiring Sri Lankan travel documents or visas for these purposes. That provision, however, did not expressly grant fishing rights for Indians in Sri Lankan waters. The 1976 agreements subsequently clarified the exclusion of fishing vessels and fishermen from each country’s maritime zones, subject to the agreements’ specific provisions.
Both the 1974 and 1976 agreements were empowered in practice and were subsequently registered with the United Nations. They constitute the central legal instruments governing the present boundary.
Interestingly, debates on this issue in Sri Lanka and India often overlook the case of the Wadge Bank, a vast, ecologically rich submarine plateau located about 80 kilometers south of Kanyakumari. Although it lies outside India’s territorial waters, it falls within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Fishermen from both nations had commercially fished these waters since at least the 1920s, if not earlier. However, under the 1976 maritime agreement between the two countries, the region was formally recognised as part of India’s EEZ, and Sri Lankan fishing vessels were barred from the area starting around 1979. In essence, this served as a crucial trade-off: Sri Lanka secured full sovereignty over Katchatheevu along with surrounding fishing rights, while its fishers were completely barred from the far more resource-rich Wadge Bank.
What do the Earlier Legal Cases Establish?
The 1974 settlement did not end Indian domestic challenges to the island’s status. In Brij Khandelwal v. Union of India (1974), the Delhi High Court considered petitions filed by Brij Khandelwal and Shyama Charan Gupta challenging the Indian government’s agreement concerning Katchatheevu. The petitioners argued that Indian territory could not be ceded without the necessary constitutional procedures. The Court dismissed their petitions, finding that they had not established the requisite personal legal interest to obtain the relief sought. But this should not be misrepresented as an international adjudication conclusively resolving all historical questions of ownership.
The case remains important because it illustrates that the legality of the 1974 settlement was contested in India from the outset. However, these contestations did not result due to lack of clarity in legal positions. Instead, they resulted as a consequence of Indian nationalism and popular territoriality in the way these feelings manifested among people. These are subjective sentiments and always open to emotional and political manipulation which no law can control. As a result, subsequent challenges have continued to raise constitutional arguments, including whether the agreement required a consti
The broader constitutional question is not trivial. In ‘Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves’ (1960) the Supreme Court of India held that ceding Indian territory to a foreign state could require a constitutional amendment. Petitioners have invoked this principle in challenging the Katchatheevu agreements. But the application of the Berubari precedent to this particular maritime boundary settlement is a matter for judicial determination. It cannot be assumed that every argument advanced by the petitioners has already been accepted.
The crucial point for Sri Lanka is that these domestic Indian proceedings have not, to date, displaced the bilateral agreements. Equally, the latest Supreme Court hearing has not created a new determination confirming or rejecting Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Until a final judgment is delivered, the petitions remain pending.
For Sri Lanka, the principal diplomatic achievement is not that India has suddenly conceded a prevised Sri Lankan sovereignty over a disputed territory. Such a reading would be a misinterpretation. What is important here is that the Indian government continues to treat the existing maritime settlement as operative despite recurrent domestic political pressure to revisit it. This position reinforces the stability of Sri Lanka’s maritime jurisdiction. It also demonstrates that Indian electoral rhetoric and the Indian government’s official diplomatic position need not always coincide — even though they have at times. For instance, in 2024, in the run-up to the country’s elections, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah publicly criticised these agreements arguing they amounted to Katchatheevu being ceded to Sri Lanka by the then-Congress government. Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar also supported these claims in public at the time.
Yet the recent Sri Lankan euphoria surrounding Katchatheevu risks obscuring the distinction between territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The hype in Sri Lanka, particularly seen across social media supportive of the present government, comes from the extreme naivety with which most Sri Lankans — including political leaders and officials — view international relations and relations between Sri Lanka and India in particular.
A state may recognise another country’s borders while pursuing policies that substantially increase its influence over that country’s economic choices, infrastructure, energy systems and external relationships. This is where the Sri Lankan government and the country’s citizens must look beyond the immediate euphoria of the Indian Supreme Court observations.
In this situation, despite the rhetoric of convenience of populist Indian politicians, Sri Lanka should certainly welcome India’s official adherence to the maritime agreements without mistaking it to be a guarantee of future strategic restraint. The legal settlement of Katchatheevu and the wider balance of power are separate questions. One concerns territorial jurisdiction. The other concerns the practical ability of a sovereign state to determine its own economic and strategic future. Sri Lanka must continue to insist that the 1974 and 1976 agreements be respected, while addressing fishing disputes through diplomacy, legal enforcement and arrangements that protect the livelihoods of our own distraught coastal communities. It should avoid allowing never-ending fishing disputes to become a pretext for reopening already settled territorial questions.
The lesson of Katchatheevu is ultimately larger than the island itself. Sovereignty is not secured merely by having one’s territorial rights acknowledged by a powerful neighbor. It also depends on the institutions, economic resilience, political leadership and diplomatic capacity that enable a country to exercise those rights in practice. Sri Lanka has sound reasons to value the existing maritime settlement and India’s continued commitment to it. But the latest Supreme Court proceedings have not produced a final judicial verdict on ownership, and the Indian government has not newly conceded the island as a result of such a verdict. Nevertheless, the agreements remain the legal foundation of the settlement, while the pending litigation leaves constitutional arguments within India unresolved.
For Sri Lanka, the wisest response is neither triumphalism nor suspicion for its own sake. What is earnestly needed is a clear-eyed and independent foreign policy that welcomes cooperation, resists unnecessary confrontation and refuses to confuse economic corporation with the surrender of strategic choice.
Katchatheevu may be a small, even relatively inconsequential island, but the questions it raises about sovereignty, power and the future of Sri Lanka’s independence are anything but trivial.
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