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Did CIA chief William Burns visit Colombo in Feb 2023? Sri Lanka and the US refrained from formally confirming the visit. The Opposition sought confirmation of the then CIA Chief’s visit to Colombo in terms of the Right to Information Act but the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government sidestepped the query. A former Republican congressman from Texas and Director of National Intelligence (2020–2021) John Ratcliffe succeeded Burns in late January 2025.
On the sheer weight of new evidence presented by Asanga Abeyagoonasekera’s ‘Winds of Change’ , readers can get a clear picture of the forces that overthrew President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in 2022.
Even five years after the political upheaval, widely dubbed ‘ Aragalaya,’ controversy surrounds the high-profile operation that forced wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa to literally run for his dear life.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa, formerly of the Army but a novice to party politics, comfortably won the 2019 November presidential election against the backdrop of the Easter Sunday carnage that caused uncertainty and suspicions among communities. The economic crisis, also clandestinely engineered from abroad, firstly by crippling vital worker remittances from abroad, almost from the onset of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency, overwhelmed the government and created the environment conducive for external intervention. Could it have been avoided if the government, that enjoyed a near two-thirds majority in Parliament, sought the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)?
The costly and well-funded book project, undertaken at the time Abeyagoonasekera was working on a governance diagnostic report for the IMF, in the wake of the change of government in Sri Lanka, meticulously examined the former Lieutenant Colonel’s ouster, taking into consideration regional as well as global developments. Abeyagoonasekera dealt efficiently and furiously with rapidly changing situations and developments before the unprecedented 03 January, 2026, US raid on Venezuela.
Lt. Col. (retd) Gotabaya Rajapaksa, for some unexplainable reason and a considerable time after the events, has chosen to blame his ouster on the United States. We cannot blame him either, by the way we have seen how other regime changes had been engineered, in our region, by Washington, since and before Gotabaya’s ouster. The accusation is extraordinary as Gotabaya Rajapaksa in his memoirs ‘The conspiracy to oust me from presidency’ refrained from naming the primary conspirator, though he clearly alluded to an international conspiracy.
Launched in March 2024, in the run-up to the presidential election that brought Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) to power, almost in a dream ride, if not for the intervening outside evil actors, ‘The conspiracy to oust me from presidency’ discussed the international conspiracy, but conveniently failed to name the primary conspirator. What made the former President speak so candidly with Abeyagoonasekera, the founding Director-General of the national security think tank, the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSS), under the Ministry of Defence, from 2016 to 2020?
Abeyagoonasekera also served as Executive Director at the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute (LKI), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011–2015), during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term as the President. The author, both precisely and furiously, dealt with issues. Readers may find very interesting quotes and they do give a feeling of the author’s general hostility towards the US, India, as well as to the US-India marriage of convenience. Those who sense so may end up thinking ‘Change of Winds’ being supportive of the Chinese strategy. Among the highly sensitive quotes that underlined the Indian approach were attributed to Indian Defence Secretary Sanjay Mitra. The author quoted Mitra as having declared: “We need the MRCC centre [Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre], and you cannot give it to another nation.” As pointed out by the author, it was not a request but an order given to Sri Lanka on 8 April, 2019, meant to prevent Sri Lanka from even considering a competing proposal from China. Against that background, the author, who had been present at that meeting at which the Sri Lanka delegation was led by then Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando, questioned the failure on the part of the delegations to take up the Easter Sunday attacks. Terrorists struck two weeks later. Implications were telling.
That particular quote reveals the circumstances India and the US operated here. No wonder the incumbent government does not want to discuss the secret defence MoUs it has entered into with India and the US as they would clearly reveal the sellout of our interests.
The following line says a lot about the circumstances under which Gotabaya Rajapaksa was removed: “In Singapore, a senior journalist recounted how Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation was scripted, under duress, at a hotel, facilitated by a foreign motorcade.”
In the first Chapter that incisively dealt with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the author was so lucky to secure an explosive quote from the ousted leader in an exclusive, hitherto unreported, interview in June 2024, a few months after the launch of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s memoirs. The ex-President hadn’t minced his words when he alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) orchestrated his removal. He also claimed that he had been under US surveillance throughout his presidency.
The ousted leader has confidently cleared India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of complicity in the operation. What made him call Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval ‘a good man,’ in response to Abeyagoonasekera’s pointed query. Abeyagoonasekera quoted Gotabaya Rajapaksa as having said: “… he would never do such things.” The ex-President must have some reason to call Doval a good friend, regardless of intense pressure exerted on him and the Mahinda Rajapaksa government by the Indians to do away with large scale Chinese-funded projects. (Doval in late October last year declared “poor governance” was the reason behind uprisings that led to change of governments in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka over the period of past three-and-a-half years. The media quoted Doval as having said, during a function in New Delhi, that democracy and non-institutional methods of regime change in countries, such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, created their own set of problems. That was the first time a senior Indian government official made remarks on Nepal’s government change, followed by the Gen Z uprising in early September, 2025.)
Gotabaya Rajapaksa also cleared the Chinese of seeking to oust him. It would be pertinent to mention that China reacted sternly when at the onset of the Gotabaya presidency, the President suggested the need to re-negotiate the Hambantota Port deal.
During the treacherous ‘ Yahapalana’ administration (2015 to 2019) Gotabaya Rajapaksa told me how Doval had pressed him to halt not only the Colombo Port City project but to take back Hambantota Port as well. By then, the Chinese had twisted the arms of the Yahapalana leaders Mairthpala Sirisena and Ranil Wickremesinghe and secured the Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease in a one-sided USD 1.2 bn deal. The Colombo Port City project, that had been halted by the Yahapalana government, too, was resumed possibly under Chinese threat or for some money incentive.
Once Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, PC, declared, at a hastily arranged media briefing at Sri Lanka Foundation (SLF), that Sri Lanka would be relentlessly targeted as long as the Chinese held the Hambantota Port. The writer was present at that media briefing.
Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe said so in the aftermath of the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, while disclosing his abortive bid to convince the Yahapalana government to abrogate the Hambantota Port deal. Did the parliamentarian know something we were not aware of? The author’s assessment, regarding the Easter Sunday attacks, based on interviews with Chinese officials and scholars, is frightening and an acknowledgement of a possible Western role in Sri Lanka’s destabilisation plot.
The ousted leader, in his lengthy interview with Abeyagoonasekera, made some attention-grabbing comments on the then US Ambassador here, Julie Chung. The ex-President questioned a particular aspect of Chung’s conduct during the protest campaign but his decision not to reveal it all in his memoirs is a mystery. Perhaps, one of the most thought-provoking queries raised by Abeyagoonasekera is the rationale in Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s claim that he didn’t want to suppress the protest campaign by using force against the backdrop of his own declaration that the CIA orchestrated the project.
Author’s foray into parliamentary politics
For those genuinely interested in post-Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga developments, pertaining to international relations and geopolitics, may peruse ‘Winds of Change’ as the third of a trilogy. ‘Sri Lanka at Crossroads’ (2019) dealt with the Mahinda Rajapaksa period and ‘Conundrum of an Island’ (2021) discussed the treacherous Sirisena–Wickremesinghe alliance. The third in the series examined the end of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna’s (SLPP) President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s rule and the rise of Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) whom the author described as a Marxist, though this writer is of the view the JVP and NPP leader AKD is not so. AKD has clearly aligned his administration with US-India while trying to sustain existing relationship with China.
Among Asanga Abeyagoonasekera’s other books were ‘Towards a Better World Order’ (2015) and ‘Teardrop Diplomacy: China’s Sri Lanka Foray’ (2023, Bloomsbury).
Had Abeyagoonasekera succeeded in his bid to launch a political career in 2015, the trilogy on Sri Lanka may not have materialised. Abeyagoonasekera contested the Gampaha district at the August 2015 parliamentary election on the UNP ticket but failed to garner sufficient preferences to secure a place in Parliament. That dealt a devastating setback to Abeyagoonasekera’s political ambitions, but the Wickremesinghe-Sirisena administration created the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (INSS), under the Ministry of Defence, for him. Abeyagoonasekera received the appointment as the founding Director-General of the national security think tank, from 2016 to 2020.
Several persons dealt with ‘ Aragalaya ’ (the late Prof. Nalin de Silva used to call it (Paragalaya ) before Abeyagoonasekera though none of them examined the regional and global contexts so deeply, taking into consideration the relevant developments. Having read Wimal Weerawansa’s (Nine: The hidden story) , Sena Thoradeniya’s (Galle Face Protest; Systems Change or Anarchy?). Mahinda Siriwardena’s (Sri Lanka’s Economic Revival – Reflection on the Journey from Crisis to Recovery) and Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara’s (Aragalaye Balaya), the writer is of the opinion Abeyagoonasekera dealt with the period in question as an incisive insider.
Abeyagoonasekera, as a person who left the country, under duress, in 2021, painted a frightening picture of a country with a small and vulnerable economy trapped in major global rivalries. The former government servant attributed his self–imposed exile to two issues.
The first was the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Why did the Wickremesinghe-Sirisena government ignore the warning issued by Abeyagoonasekera, in his capacity as DG INSS, in respect of the Easter Sunday bombing campaign? There is absolutely no ambiguity at all in his claim. Abeyagoonasekera insists that he alerted the government four months before the National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ) bombers struck. The bottom line is that Abeyagoonasekera had issued the warning several weeks before India did but those at the helm of that inept administration chose to turn a blind eye.
The second was the impending economic crisis that engulfed the country in 2022. Abeyagoonasekera is deeply bitter about his arrest on 21 July, 2024, at the Bandaranaike International Airport (BIA) over an alleged IRD –related offence as reported at that time, especially because he was returning home to visit his sick mother.
Asanga’s father Ossie, a member of Parliament and controversial figure, was killed in an LTTE suicide attack at Thotalanga in late Oct. 1994. The Chairman and leader of Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya had been on stage with then UNP presidential election candidate Gamini Dissanayake when the woman suicide cadre blasted herself. The assassination was meant to ensure Kumaratunga’s victory. The LTTE probably felt that it could manipulate Kumaratunga than the experienced Dissanayake who may have had reached some sort of consensus with New Delhi on how to deal with the LTTE.
Let me reproduce a question posed to Asanga Abeyagoonasekera and his response in ‘Winds of Change’ as some may believe that the author is holding something back. “Didn’t they listen?” a US intelligence officer had asked me incredulously after the bombings. Years later, during my role as a technical advisor for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) amid Sri Lanka’s collapse, the question resurfaced: “How did you foresee the collapse of a powerful regime with a majority in parliament?” My answer remained the same—patterns. Rigorously gathered data and relentless analysis reveal the arcs of history before they unfold.
Perhaps, readers may find what former cashiered Flying Officer Keerthi Ratnayake had to say about ‘Aragalaya’ and related developments (https://island.lk/ex-slaf-officer-sheds-light-on-developments-leading-to-aragalaya/)
Essentially, Abeyagoonasekera, on the basis of his exclusive and lengthy interview with former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, confirmed what Wimal Weerawansa and Sena Thoradeniya alleged that the US spearheaded the operation.
But Prof. Maddumabandara, a confidant of first post- Aragalaya President Ranil Wickremesinghe has bared the direct Indian involvement in the regime change operation. In spite of Gotabaya Rajapaksa confidently clearing Indian NSA Doval of complicity in his ouster, Prof. Maddumabandara is on record as having said that the then Indian High Commissioner here Gopal Baglay put pressure on Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over the government for an interim period. (https://island.lk/dovals-questionable-regional-stock-taking/)
Obviously, the US and India worked together on the Sri Lanka regime change operation. That is the undeniable truth. India wanted to thwart Wickremesinghe receiving the presidency by bringing in Speaker Abeywardena. That move went awry in spite of some sections of both Buddhist and Catholic clergy throwing their weight behind New Delhi.
The 2022 violent regime change operation cannot be discussed without taking into consideration the US-led project that also involved the UNP, JVP and TNA to engineer retired General Sarath Fonseka’s victory at the 2010 presidential election and their backing for turncoat Maithripala Sirisena at the 2015 presidential election.
The section, titled ‘ Echoes of Crisis from Sri Lanka to Bangladesh: South Asia’s Struggle in a Polycrisis’, is riveting and underscores the complexity of the situation and fragility of governments. Executive power and undisputable majorities in Parliament seems irrelevant as external powers intervene thereby making the electoral system redundant.
Having meticulously compared the overthrowing of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Bangladesh’s Premier Sheikh Hasina, the author condemned them for their alleged failures and brutality. Abeyagoonasekera stated: “When the military sides with the protesters, as it did in Sri Lanka and now in Bangladesh, it reveals the rulers’ vulnerabilities.” The author unmercifully chided the former President for seeking refuge in the West while alleging direct CIA role in his ouster. But that may have spared his life. Had he sought a lifeline from the Chinese so late the situation could have taken a turn for worse.
The comment that had been attributed to Gotabaya Rajapaksa seemed to belittle Ranil Wickremesinghe who accepted the challenge of becoming the Premier in May 2022 and then chosen by the ruling SLPP to complete the remainder of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s five-year term. Ranil was definitely seen as an opportunistic vulture who backed ‘Aragalaya’ without any qualms till he saw an opening for himself out of the chaos.
Abeyagoonasekera discussed the joint US-Indian strategy pertaining to Sri Lanka. Whatever the National People’s Power (NPP) and its President say, the current dispensation is continuing Wickremesinghe’s policy as pointed out by the author. In fact, this government appears to be ready even to go beyond Wickremesinghe’s understanding with New Delhi. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence and the selling of the controlling interests of the Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL) to India, mid last year, must have surprised even those who always pushed for enhanced relations at all levels.
The economic collapse that resulted in political upheaval has given New Delhi the perfect opportunity to consolidate its position here. Uncomplimentary comments on current Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha in ‘Winds of Change’ have to be discussed, paying attention to Sri Lanka’s growing dependence and alleged clandestine activities of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). Abeyagoonasekera seemed to have no qualms in referring to RAW’s hand in 2019 Easter Sunday carnage.
Overall ‘Winds of Change’ encourages, inspires and confirms suspicions about US and Indian intelligence services and underscores the responsibility of those in power to be extra cautious. But, in the case of smaller and weaker economies, such as Sri Lanka still struggling to overcome the economic crisis, there seems to be no solution. Not only India and the US, the Chinese, too, pursue their agenda here unimpeded. Utilisation of political parties, represented in Parliament, selected individuals, and media, in the Chinese efforts, are obvious. Once parliamentarian Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe raised the Chinese interventions in Sri Lanka. He questioned the Parliament receiving about 240 personal laptops for all parliamentarians and top officials. The then UNPer told the writer his decision not to accept the laptop paid for by China. Perhaps, he is the only Sri Lankan politician to have written a strongly worded letter to Chinese leader Xi warning against high profile Chinese strategy.
Winds of Change is available at Vijitha Yapa and Sarasavi
Beginning of another ‘White Supremacist’ World Order?
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A leaked US diplomatic cable, dated July 15, 2009, signed by the then Geneva-based US Ambassador, Clint Williamson, cleared the Sri Lankan Army of crimes against humanity during the Vanni offensive. The cable, addressed to the US State Department, was based on a confidential conversation Ambassador Williamson had with the then ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacque de Maio, on July 9, 2009. Ambassador Williamson wrote: “The army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at an increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it didn’t amount to genocide. He (Maio) could cite examples of where the army had stopped shelling when the ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths. He concluded, however, by asserting that the GoSL failed to recognize its obligation to protect civilians, in spite of its approach resulting in higher military casualties.”
Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam recently declared, in New Delhi, that their biggest challenge was to convince the BJP government to take a much bigger interest in the question of accountability and on the question of a political solution.
The Tamil Guardian quoted Ponnambalam as having said: “They’re both two sides of the same coin.” The Island reproduced the Tamil Guardian report in its 6 Nov. edition (https://island.lk/sri-lanka-sees-tamil-nationhood-as-a-threat-to-buddhism-ponnambalam-tells-delhi-conference/)
This coming from Gajendrakumar, who, along with his late father Kumar Ponnambalam and grandfather, the legendary G.G. Ponnambalam, longtime residents of Colombo, with substantial wealth here and abroad, especially in owning prime real estate, even to this day, have no shame in wooing for a separatist Eelam, most probably to hoodwink the gullible Tamil masses to vote for him as their hero at future elections.
Several readers expressed serious concerns over the views expressed by the Jaffna District lawmaker. Retired Maj. Gen. Chagie Gallage, one of the notable battlefield strategists and outspoken Gajaba regiment veteran, was among them. “The country couldn’t turn a blind eye to this sort of propaganda,” Gallage declared, emphasising the responsibility on the part of those who benefited from the eradication of the LTTE to counter such lies. “An end to forcible conscription of children is sufficient to justify the eradication of the group,” he said, alleging none of those shedding crocodile tears today bothered to ask the LTTE to give up innocent human shields.
TNPF is not represented in Parliament. Ponnambalam contested the last parliamentary election on the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) ticket. He is the only ACTC lawmaker in the current Parliament. The Tamil nationhood, MP Ponnambalam had referred to at the onset of the fiery speech, spanned across some parts of the world, Tamil Nadu included. The so-called Tamil nationhood is not exclusively tied to Sri Lanka.
The late J.N. Dixit, one-time Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (1985 to 1989), pointed out in his memoirs ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun to Yashwant Sinha’ the late Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi feared the emergence of Tamil separatism in India if she refused to support, what Dixit called, aspirations of Sri Lanka Tamils (Chapter: An Indo-centric practitioner of realpolitik/p 147).
The involvement of the Australian Tamil Congress and the United States Tamil Action Group in the New Delhi conference revealed the despicable overall strategy of those who believed in the LTTE’s capacity to force the battlefield stalemate to their advantage.
The Norway-led almost one-sided peace process, during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s presidency, gave the LTTE an ample opportunity to advance its separatist agenda, thanks to the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s utterly irresponsible blind approach to a negotiated settlement. The LTTE quit the negotiating table in April 2003. That move made the war inevitable. It would be pertinent to remind that Ponnambalam had been a Jaffna district MP at the time the LTTE quit the negotiating table, while safely living in Colombo much of the time, as was the case with most Tamil leaders, including M.A. Sumanthiran, a resident of Wellawatte. So while maligning Sri Lanka with highly exaggerated claims, like existence of mass graves at every available opportunity, especially when they are abroad, those same Lankan Tamil leaders, however, still feel quite safe here and not India. And we must say we are proud to have them living among us as our brothers, despite all the nasty things they accuse us of. Even if we grant that some of their animosity is justified, there is no necessity to kill each other to settle issues, other than to work things out peacefully for the benefit of us all. Both Sinhalese and Tamils, especially the latter, must decide whether we want the permanent chaos, that is India with its innumerable caste/race/religious divisions, or do we bury the hatchet between the two major races to settle problems that beset us here, albeit without external interference.
Ponnambalam represented the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) that had recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people and thereby backed Velupillai Prabhakaran’s initiative. The ITAK parliamentary group consisted of 15 MPs, including one National List member. However, those who entered Parliament on the ITAK ticket were recognised as members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) consisting of ex-Indian sponsored terrorist groups and the ITAK.
The LTTE advanced its terror campaign in the run-up to the 2004 parliamentary poll. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, the LTTE actions directly benefited the TNA. The LTTE undermined other political parties in the fray. Their objective was clear. They wanted the largest possible ITAK group in Parliament to back the war effort. Twenty-two were elected on the ITAK ticket at the parliamentary polls held in early April 2004. That effort was successful with the LTTE stuffing ballot boxes for ITAK candidates as was clearly observed by EU election monitors in their post-election report. Ponnambalam was among the elected group. Throughout the Eelam War IV (Aug. 2006 to May 2009), ITAK/TNA fiercely backed the LTTE. They remained loyal to the LTTE as its units gradually retreated until the group suffered a humiliating defeat at Anandapuram, in April 2009, before the total collapse several weeks later.
Against the backdrop of the devastating split in the LTTE, caused by its Eastern Commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka Karuna Amman, rebelling against their supreme leader Prabhakaran, alleging discrimination against Easterners, in 2004, ahead of the parliamentary polls, ITAK/TNA remained committed to the LTTE macabre cause. After the armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion, Ponnambalam quit the TNA. He formed the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) in 2010. The TNPF fielded candidates at the 2010 and 2015 parliamentary polls but couldn’t even secure a single seat. Ponnambalam returned to Parliament again in Aug 2020.
Qualified as a Barrister-at-Law, in the UK, in 1997, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam received Sri Lanka qualification as an Attorney-at-Law, two years later, before entering active politics, in the wake of his father Kumar Ponnambalam’s assassination, in early January 2000.
Ponnambalam conveniently forgot the responsibility on the part of India, as well as the Tamil community, for the crimes committed in Sri Lanka and India. Tamil Guardian report on Ponnambalam’s speech, made no reference to the Indian military intervention, deaths of over 1,200 Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka, thousands of Tamils, both LTTE and civilians, killed by the foreign army, elimination of Tamil political leadership by the LTTE and the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991, just over a year after India ended its disastrous military mission here.
The BJP wouldn’t be deceived by unfounded claims, such as Ponnambalam’s Delhi declaration that the Sri Lankan State considered the very potential of Tamil nationhood as a threat to Buddhism and was hell-bent on dismantling it.
BJP leader and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, having repeatedly paid tribute to Indian officers and men who perished in Sri Lanka and twice paid floral tributes to the Indian military memorial near Parliament, would be averse to anti-Sri Lanka rhetoric. Unfortunately, some Tamil politicians have sought to depict a bleak picture of the country, though the Northern and Eastern Provinces achieved impressive post-war success. After Modi assumed the premiership, in 2014, India gradually changed its Sri Lanka strategy and New Delhi’s overall approach cannot be discussed, forgetting the role they played in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2022 and the facilitation of the JVP/NPP victory at the presidential and parliamentary polls in Sept. and Nov., 2024, respectively.
No one will be able to entice New Delhi by propagating that the Sri Lankan State was pursuing a hostile attitude towards Tamil Hindus. Much to the discomfort of those seeking to arouse communal feelings, the Tamil community in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, for the first time in post-independence history, voted overwhelmingly for the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) at the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024.
The emergence of the NPP as the dominant power in the predominantly Tamil speaking regions has troubled ITAK and other Tamil parties. The deterioration of ITAK/TNA began after the eradication of the LTTE. Once the dominant political power that worked with the LTTE gradually declined and was reduced to eight seats at the last parliamentary poll.
The Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA), consisting of parties that broke away from the ITAK-led TNA, won a seat with Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) leader Selvam Adaikkalanathan winning in Vanni.
Independent candidate Dr Ramanathan Archuna won a seat in Jaffna, probably at the expense of M.A. Sumanthiran, PC, who could have made a significant contribution in Parliament. Archuna has caused chaos with repeated declarations, both in and outside Parliament, that the Tamil Diaspora funded the NPP campaign. The influence of the Tamil Diaspora, too, has deteriorated over the years, though European political parties bent backwards to appease the voters of Sri Lankan origin. But, foreign governments, to a certain extent, have lost interest in accountability issues, though on and off statements are made and concerns expressed over the delay in addressing long standing issues. However, accountability issues are no longer a priority as repeatedly indicated by India. The post- Aragalaya Indo-Sri Lanka relationship/partnership underscored by seven MoUs finalised in April 2025, including one on defence, followed by three defence MoUs signed in Sept, this year, as well as transfer of Colombo Dockyard Ltd. (CDL) controlling shares to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), affiliated with the Indian Defence Ministry, marked a fundamental shift towards New Delhi.
With the NPP emerging as the dominant political power in the Northern and Eastern regions, the Tamil parties seemed to be on the back foot. Lawmaker Ponnambalam’s recent bid to cause concern among the Indian establishment over perceived Sinhala Buddhist threat to Tamil Hindus seemed a desperate move that failed to convince their own.
Ponnambalam returned to Parliament in August 2020, as the leader of Ahila Ilankai Thamil Congress. The party also secured one National List slot. Ponnambalam accommodated Selvarasa Gajenthiran, who quit the TNA, along with him, in 2010, on the National List.
Ponnambalam attacked the wartime political leadership and the war-winning armed forces. Alleging that the Tamil community had been subjected to genocide, Ponnambalam demanded international accountability. The MP dismissed whatever proposals meant to address the issues through domestic mechanisms.
Ponnambalam attacked President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s policy statement. The lawmaker targeted the following section in particular: “It is equally important to precisely interpret the mandate given by the people. We respect the trust that the people have placed in me and the Prime Minister and the newly elected people’s representatives. We have a clear understanding of the expectations with which the people gave such a powerful mandate to the government. We will leave no room for such expectations to be dashed for any reason. It should always be remembered that the prime responsibility of a people’s representative is to serve the public. We will be sensitive to fulfilling the needs of the people, keeping in mind that all these positions are responsibilities and not privileges.”
Ponnanmalam declared that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s mandate (2019 November presidential and 2020 August parliamentary polls) did not extend to the North-East region. Ponnambalam depicted the vote received by all Tamils, including Ramanathan and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) Douglas Devananda, elected to the new Parliament, as one that overwhelmingly endorsed self-determination of the Tamil speaking people. Ponnambalam justified international intervention on the basis of the Tamil community being deprived of the security it deserved.
Declaring them (Tamil lawmakers) received a mandate for Tamil rights to be recognised, Ponnambalam declared: “two nations exist in this country.”
“Sovereignty can never be a defence. This country has gone through a war and the whole world says that heinous crimes have been committed and the state is the number one accused party,” Ponnambalam declared, adding “Under no circumstances can any President, or any country, for that matter, try to hide behind the concept of sovereignty, to prevent accountability for heinous crimes. The victims of these heinous crimes stand as Tamils… the major victims stand as Tamils and they have consistently said that genocide has been committed and that they want international accountability.”
When Ponnambalam went on and on repeating war crimes allegations, in Parliament, former Presidents and Commanders-in-Chief, Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala Sirisena, as well as war-winning Army Chief Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, were present. Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa, too, was present.
It would be pertinent to ask lawmaker Ponnambalam whether, as a member of the TNA, he endorsed the party’s decision to vote for the then common presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka at the January 26, 2010 presidential election. Did the TNA decision to join the UNP-led coalition, comprising the JVP, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) et al, was unanimously approved by all constituents of the TNA?
Now that Ponnambalam reiterated genocide allegations, he owed an explanation why the Tamil community overwhelmingly endorsed Fonseka at the presidential election after accusing him and his army of committing genocide. Fonseka comfortably won all electoral districts, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, though the South ensured Mahinda Rajapaksa secured a second term, with a staggering 1.8 mn majority. Mahinda Rajapaksa polled 6,015,934 votes (57.88%) whereas Fonseka received 4,173,185 votes (40.15%). Fonseka comfortably won the predominantly Tamil electoral districts of Jaffna, Vanni, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Digamadulla and Nuwara-Eliya.
The 2010 presidential election was held less than a year after the armed forces eradicated the LTTE. Blindly accusing the Sri Lanka army of war crimes, and genocide, seemed ridiculous, after having voted for the very man who conducted the ground offensive that brought the LTTE to its knees, in May 2009.
The truth is that the LTTE and the TNA really believed they could overwhelm President Mahinda Rajapaksa far more easily than Wickremesinghe. In spite of serious reservations, the TNA backed the LTTE’s move. Particularly, the Northern electorate boycotted the 2005 Nov. presidential election. The then top UNPer Malik Samarawickrema told the writer if not for that boycott, engineered by the LTTE, Wickremesinghe could have won the presidential poll. That may have very well been the case.
Having dug its own grave, the LTTE faced a relentless three-year military onslaught. The LTTE resumed large-scale operations in August 2006 and the counter offensive didn’t stop until Prabhakaran was isolated and killed on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.
The armed forces eradicated the LTTE in May 2009. In the following year, the TNA backed the very man who led the campaign against the LTTE at the presidential poll.
The war crimes and genocide allegations should have been reexamined after Fonseka won the Northern and Eastern provinces. Unfortunately, successive governments lacked interest and a cohesive plan to counter lies. In spite of exposure of calculated lies meant to humiliate Sri Lanka and increase international pressure, successive governments shirked their responsibility to counter those lies toe to toe in the face of propaganda against the country being primarily launched with the backing of the so-called international community, meaning the powerful West.
Sri Lanka never took tangible measures against those who propagated lies as part of an overall strategy. Some still couldn’t stomach the LTTE’s annihilation. Wigneswaran’s calculated lie is a case in point. Wigneswaran, and a section of the Tamil media, in August 2016, accused the military of killing over 100 LTTE combatants, in custody, by poisoning them. The PTI and NDTV were among the international media which reported unsubstantiated allegations.
Accusers placed the number of such deaths at 104. Accusations were made while the US Pacific Command’s ‘Pacific Angel’ exercise was underway, in the Jaffna peninsula.
Despite being a retired Supreme Court Judge, the highest legal body in the country, Wigneswaran raked up a brazen lie by brashly declaring that the US Air Force’s medical team, in Jaffna, would examine the former rehabilitated LTTE cadres, who, he alleged, had fallen sick because they were injected with poisonous substances, at government detention, or rehabilitation camps.
The US conveniently refrained from making its position clear on Wigneswaran’s claim when the writer raised the issue with the US Embassy in Colombo.
Responding to several questions The Island posed, regarding ex-LTTE cadres being poisoned, the US Embassy said: “Operation Pacific Angel is providing assistance, based on the specific needs of the local communities. Among the nearly 70 members of this multilateral assistance programme – including some medical staff and engineers from Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, as well as the United States – are over 40 doctors, providing basic medical services: dental procedures; physical therapy; general medical assistance; and optometry. These are the only services being provided.”
The writer asked the US Embassy whether it could confirm that US Pacific Command personnel, conducting medical tests on ex-LTTE cadres, allegedly poisoned by the previous government; whether they would be moved to overseas medical facility for further tests; whether the GoSL had been informed of the development; when did the TNA request the US intervention and whether the US military had conducted similar tests in other countries. For obvious reasons, the US refrained from responding to The Island queries.
The New Indian Express quoted Wigneswaran as having said that the US Air Force’s medical team would examine ex-LTTE cadres who had been sick because they were injected with poisonous substances by the Sri Lankan armed military while they were undergoing detention, or rehabilitation. Wigneswaran, according to the New Indian Express, had told the NPC (Northern Provincial Council) that he had mentioned the plight of the former combatants in his conversation with the US Ambassador, Atul Keshap, and asked if the USAF team could examine them and give an independent report.
Wigneswaran’s allegations died a natural death. Neither the TNA, nor the US, ever discussed the issue publicly.
With the latest New Delhi talk, Ponnambalam appeared to have taken the campaign against Sri Lanka to a new level.
Sasanka Perera (The writer is on X as @sasmester)
Sri Lankan social and mainstream media have shown considerable euphoria over oral observations made by the Indian Supreme Court on the Katchatheevu island in early October 2026. It stems primarily from a collective sense of relief and validation over the ownership of the island because Sri Lanka has faced intense political posturing, domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians, and legal challenges in India demanding the retrieval of the island. But nothing new or pathbreaking has emerged from the Indian Supreme Court on this issue. What is clear is that ownership of Katchatheevu is a settled issue irrespective of its continued reemergence in Indian courts and in Tamil Nadu political performances.
The Katchatheevu issue must be understood in its historical context, with legal clarity, strategic sensibility and a large dose of commonsense in which Sri Lankans are generally wanting. Neither an oral observation by India’s Supreme Court nor the Indian government’s continued adherence to existing maritime agreements constitutes a new, final judicial determination of sovereignty. More importantly, even an unequivocal recognition of Sri Lanka’s territorial rights would not remove the wider asymmetries of power between the two countries of which our political leaders must be extremely mindful when dealing with India.
What did India’s Supreme Court Decide?
The most recently reported proceedings, i.e. of 6 October 2026, concern several petitions challenging the 1974 India–Sri Lanka maritime boundary agreement and the subsequent 1976 agreement regulating fishing in each country’s maritime zones. The principal case, A.K. Selvaraj v. Union of India, was filed in 2008. The wider proceedings include Writ Petition (Civil) No. 430 of 2013; special leave petitions and a petition filed in 2021. Former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa was also among the petitioners in the litigation. The petitioners challenge the legality of recognising Katchatheevu as lying on Sri Lanka’s side of the maritime boundary, arguing, among other things, that the transfer of Indian territory required constitutional and parliamentary procedures.
On 6 October 2026, Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva heard the matter. The Court orally observed that Indian fishermen needed to be sensitised against entering Sri Lankan waters. It also questioned whether the Indian government was engaging Sri Lanka over the treaties. At the Attorney General’s request, the matter was adjourned to 2 February 2027. No final judgment on sovereignty was delivered. This state of affairs is crucial. An oral observation during a hearing is not a binding determination of territorial sovereignty. Nor does an adjournment amount to the dismissal of the petitions or an endorsement of every argument advanced by either side.
The Indian government’s position is nevertheless significant. According to publicly available information, the Attorney General of India informed the Court that the Indian government had no intention of reopening the 1974 and 1976 agreements, while concerns regarding Indian fishermen would continue to be pursued through diplomatic channels. This establishes the Indian government’s continuing commitment to the existing settlement. It is not a fresh concession of sovereignty made in response to a final Supreme Court ruling. However, it is entirely possible that the Indian government’s position could be influenced by future political developments, while the agreements themselves remain the operative bilateral framework at the moment.
Katchatheevu’s history is far more complex than the dominant popular Indian assertion that the island was Indian territory until it was handed over to Sri Lanka in 1974. British colonial administrations in India and Ceylon disputed aspects of the island’s status, and the available historical record contains evidence invoked by both sides. The proprietary interests claimed by the Raja of Ramnad, historical leases and British administrative records have featured prominently in Indian arguments. The 1904 Madras High Court case, Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, and a 1922 Imperial Records Department report have been cited by Indian commentators as evidence supporting the historical Indian claim. However, proprietary rights, fishing practices and administrative jurisdiction are not automatically equivalent to sovereign ownership over territory.
The 1921 negotiations between British India and Ceylon are particularly important. The two colonial administrations discussed a fisheries boundary in the Palk Strait. The Indian delegation agreed to a proposed line without prejudice to any territorial claim India might make to Katchatheevu. The reservation demonstrated that the island’s status was contested rather than conclusively resolved by that exercise. Subsequent correspondence from the Government of India in 1923 is also relevant to the historical debate. It has been cited in discussions of the government’s assessment of the competing claims. Nevertheless, the 1921 negotiations and the associated correspondence should not be presented as a conclusive international judicial ruling in Ceylon’s favour.
The more decisive development came after independence, in 1974 and 1976. In June 1974, India and Sri Lanka concluded the ‘Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters.’ Article 1 established the maritime boundary, placing Katchatheevu on the Sri Lankan side. Article 4 provided that each country would exercise sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the waters, islands, continental shelf and subsoil on its respective side of the boundary. Article 5 preserved access for Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit Katchatheevu as previously practiced, without requiring Sri Lankan travel documents or visas for these purposes. That provision, however, did not expressly grant fishing rights for Indians in Sri Lankan waters. The 1976 agreements subsequently clarified the exclusion of fishing vessels and fishermen from each country’s maritime zones, subject to the agreements’ specific provisions.
Both the 1974 and 1976 agreements were empowered in practice and were subsequently registered with the United Nations. They constitute the central legal instruments governing the present boundary.
Interestingly, debates on this issue in Sri Lanka and India often overlook the case of the Wadge Bank, a vast, ecologically rich submarine plateau located about 80 kilometers south of Kanyakumari. Although it lies outside India’s territorial waters, it falls within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Fishermen from both nations had commercially fished these waters since at least the 1920s, if not earlier. However, under the 1976 maritime agreement between the two countries, the region was formally recognised as part of India’s EEZ, and Sri Lankan fishing vessels were barred from the area starting around 1979. In essence, this served as a crucial trade-off: Sri Lanka secured full sovereignty over Katchatheevu along with surrounding fishing rights, while its fishers were completely barred from the far more resource-rich Wadge Bank.
What do the Earlier Legal Cases Establish?
The 1974 settlement did not end Indian domestic challenges to the island’s status. In Brij Khandelwal v. Union of India (1974), the Delhi High Court considered petitions filed by Brij Khandelwal and Shyama Charan Gupta challenging the Indian government’s agreement concerning Katchatheevu. The petitioners argued that Indian territory could not be ceded without the necessary constitutional procedures. The Court dismissed their petitions, finding that they had not established the requisite personal legal interest to obtain the relief sought. But this should not be misrepresented as an international adjudication conclusively resolving all historical questions of ownership.
The case remains important because it illustrates that the legality of the 1974 settlement was contested in India from the outset. However, these contestations did not result due to lack of clarity in legal positions. Instead, they resulted as a consequence of Indian nationalism and popular territoriality in the way these feelings manifested among people. These are subjective sentiments and always open to emotional and political manipulation which no law can control. As a result, subsequent challenges have continued to raise constitutional arguments, including whether the agreement required a consti
The broader constitutional question is not trivial. In ‘Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves’ (1960) the Supreme Court of India held that ceding Indian territory to a foreign state could require a constitutional amendment. Petitioners have invoked this principle in challenging the Katchatheevu agreements. But the application of the Berubari precedent to this particular maritime boundary settlement is a matter for judicial determination. It cannot be assumed that every argument advanced by the petitioners has already been accepted.
The crucial point for Sri Lanka is that these domestic Indian proceedings have not, to date, displaced the bilateral agreements. Equally, the latest Supreme Court hearing has not created a new determination confirming or rejecting Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Until a final judgment is delivered, the petitions remain pending.
For Sri Lanka, the principal diplomatic achievement is not that India has suddenly conceded a prevised Sri Lankan sovereignty over a disputed territory. Such a reading would be a misinterpretation. What is important here is that the Indian government continues to treat the existing maritime settlement as operative despite recurrent domestic political pressure to revisit it. This position reinforces the stability of Sri Lanka’s maritime jurisdiction. It also demonstrates that Indian electoral rhetoric and the Indian government’s official diplomatic position need not always coincide — even though they have at times. For instance, in 2024, in the run-up to the country’s elections, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah publicly criticised these agreements arguing they amounted to Katchatheevu being ceded to Sri Lanka by the then-Congress government. Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar also supported these claims in public at the time.
Yet the recent Sri Lankan euphoria surrounding Katchatheevu risks obscuring the distinction between territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The hype in Sri Lanka, particularly seen across social media supportive of the present government, comes from the extreme naivety with which most Sri Lankans — including political leaders and officials — view international relations and relations between Sri Lanka and India in particular.
A state may recognise another country’s borders while pursuing policies that substantially increase its influence over that country’s economic choices, infrastructure, energy systems and external relationships. This is where the Sri Lankan government and the country’s citizens must look beyond the immediate euphoria of the Indian Supreme Court observations.
In this situation, despite the rhetoric of convenience of populist Indian politicians, Sri Lanka should certainly welcome India’s official adherence to the maritime agreements without mistaking it to be a guarantee of future strategic restraint. The legal settlement of Katchatheevu and the wider balance of power are separate questions. One concerns territorial jurisdiction. The other concerns the practical ability of a sovereign state to determine its own economic and strategic future. Sri Lanka must continue to insist that the 1974 and 1976 agreements be respected, while addressing fishing disputes through diplomacy, legal enforcement and arrangements that protect the livelihoods of our own distraught coastal communities. It should avoid allowing never-ending fishing disputes to become a pretext for reopening already settled territorial questions.
The lesson of Katchatheevu is ultimately larger than the island itself. Sovereignty is not secured merely by having one’s territorial rights acknowledged by a powerful neighbor. It also depends on the institutions, economic resilience, political leadership and diplomatic capacity that enable a country to exercise those rights in practice. Sri Lanka has sound reasons to value the existing maritime settlement and India’s continued commitment to it. But the latest Supreme Court proceedings have not produced a final judicial verdict on ownership, and the Indian government has not newly conceded the island as a result of such a verdict. Nevertheless, the agreements remain the legal foundation of the settlement, while the pending litigation leaves constitutional arguments within India unresolved.
For Sri Lanka, the wisest response is neither triumphalism nor suspicion for its own sake. What is earnestly needed is a clear-eyed and independent foreign policy that welcomes cooperation, resists unnecessary confrontation and refuses to confuse economic corporation with the surrender of strategic choice.
Katchatheevu may be a small, even relatively inconsequential island, but the questions it raises about sovereignty, power and the future of Sri Lanka’s independence are anything but trivial.
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