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As Sri Lanka moves to reform its judiciary amid mounting pressures on the administration of justice, the government’s decision to extend judges’ retirement ages has exposed tensions between institutional reform and the safeguards of judicial independence. Examining the Twenty-Second Amendment, Dr. Asanga Welikala argues that while the changes respond to legitimate administrative concerns, their immediate application to serving judges raises questions about judicial tenure, institutional impartiality, and the proper limits of constitutional power.
In September, when its Supreme Court reached the age of 225 years as one of the oldest apex courts in the Commonwealth, Sri Lanka introduced a significant structural change to its judiciary by increasing the retirement age of all judges by two years. The reform was introduced in the context of substantial and endemic pressures on the administration of justice. The Minister of Justice estimated a national backlog of approximately 1.1 million cases and identified Sri Lanka’s comparatively low ratio of judges to population as one cause of delay. Judicial capacity had reportedly not expanded sufficiently over the preceding decade, and retaining experienced judges was presented as one component of a wider programme of recruitment and institutional expansion.
In the abstract, there is no necessary incompatibility between increasing judicial retirement ages and the principle of judicial independence. Retirement ages may legitimately be reconsidered in response to demographic change, recruitment and retention difficulties, or institutional requirements. Moreover, an increase does not present the most direct form of interference with security of tenure: unlike a retrospective reduction, it does not terminate the tenure of serving judges prematurely.
However, the government proposal immediately attracted controversy for three reasons. One was the suddenness of the announcement. It was not part of the government’s manifesto commitments and there had not been any specific policy development known to the public until the intention to amend the Constitution was announced in June. Second, the government’s refusal to consult directly affected stakeholders, such as the Bar, as well as the public more generally before proposing the policy denoted a unilateralist mindset and fostered suspicions about the government’s motives. Finally, and most seriously, it was reported that the policy’s real aim was to keep the current Chief Justice in office for a further period, which would also deny the next most senior judge the opportunity to succeed him. The government was said to regard the Chief Justice’s continued tenure as conducive to the success of its policy of securing accountability for those accused of corruption and abuses of power under previous governments.
The constitutional issues raised by the increase in judicial retirement ages are nevertheless more complex than the government acknowledged. They concern how changes to constitutionally protected conditions of tenure may affect judicial independence when they apply immediately to identifiable incumbents. The controversy therefore raises a broader question of constitutional culture: whether rules governing judicial tenure should, beyond satisfying the requirements of constitutional legality, conform to principles of generality, prospectivity, and institutional impersonality.
The Twenty-Second Amendment to the Constitution and the Judicature (Amendment) Act No. 23 of 2026 were both enacted on 25 September 2026. The Twenty-Second Amendment increased the retirement age of judges of the Supreme Court from 65 to 67 and of judges of the Court of Appeal from 63 to 65. The Judicature (Amendment) Act increased the retirement age of judges of the High Court from 61 to 63 years, and all other judges and magistrates from 60 to 62 years. The legislation also increased the number of judges of the Court of Appeal from 19 to 24 and of the High Court from 110 to 120. In increasing the retirement age of Supreme Court judges, the Twenty-Second Amendment also made special provision for the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice will now retire on attaining the age of 67 or on completing six years from his or her date of appointment, whichever occurs earlier. Moreover, the six-year term limit does not apply to the incumbent Chief Justice, meaning that he will retire on attaining the age of 67.
Two features are particularly relevant. First, the changes were system-wide rather than confined to the superior courts or particular judges. Second, they operated immediately and consequently altered the tenure not only of future appointees but also of judges already in office. It was principally this second feature, rather than the retirement ages themselves, that generated constitutional objections.
The government’s justification was primarily administrative and institutional. Sri Lanka faced a substantial case backlog; experienced judges constituted a scarce institutional resource; existing retirement ages had remained unchanged for decades; and retaining serving judges would complement the proposed enlargement of the judiciary. The Minister of Justice also rejected suggestions that the legislation was intended to extend the tenure of any particular superior court judge.
An important feature of this justification is that the Amendment did not confer on the executive discretion to extend individual judicial appointments. Judges were not required to seek extensions, nor could the government determine which judges would receive them. The revised retirement ages applied generally and automatically to the relevant categories of judicial office. In this respect, the reform differs significantly from arrangements under which continued tenure depends upon a discretionary decision by the executive.
This distinction does not, however, resolve the issue of principle. Security of tenure protects the judiciary not merely against removal or disadvantage but against forms of political influence capable of affecting the institutional relationship between judges and the political branches. While a retrospective reduction in the retirement age constitutes the clearer infringement because it terminates anticipated tenure, an extension may also confer a significant institutional and personal benefit.
The relevant constitutional question is therefore not whether retirement at 67 is itself problematic, but whether existing conditions of tenure should be altered in relation to judges already holding office. The Twenty-Second Amendment occupies an intermediate position. It avoids the risks inherent in individually negotiated or selectively awarded extensions but lacks the institutional impersonality of a reform that applies only to future appointees.
The objections advanced by the Bar Association of Sri Lanka (BASL) were directed primarily to this distinction. The BASL did not principally challenge the substantive appropriateness of the new retirement ages. It questioned whether sufficient institutional justification had been provided for the reform, objected to its application to judges already in office, and criticised the process by which the constitutional amendment was undertaken. At its Special General Meeting on 29 July, it called for evidence-based justification, meaningful consultation, and consideration of the wider constitutional consequences of the proposal.
The Commonwealth Lawyers Association supported these concerns by reference to the Commonwealth Latimer House Principles and emphasised the relationship between judicial independence and public confidence in the judiciary. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers adopted a similarly qualified position . Increasing retirement ages could legitimately promote the retention of judicial expertise and institutional continuity, but immediate application to serving judges without appropriate transitional arrangements could give rise to concerns that the political branches were altering the composition of the existing judiciary rather than prescribing general conditions for future judicial tenure.
In their public and parliamentary interventions, the political opposition carried forward these critiques, characterising the Amendment as a threat to both judicial independence and democracy . In the parliamentary debate on the Twenty-Second Amendment Bill, the opposition was careful not make specific allegations of an understanding between the government and the incumbent Chief Justice, whereby an extension of tenure was exchanged for support of the government's accountability agenda. Such allegations could not be sustained by ascertainable let alone provable facts, but parliamentary privilege did permit members of Parliament to go further than others in implying that suspicion.
The controversy also illustrates an important dimension of the constitutional relationship between Bench and Bar. The institutional function of an independent Bar extends beyond protecting the immediate professional interests of serving judges. The Bar may therefore oppose measures that benefit individual judges if it considers them detrimental to the longer-term institutional safeguards of judicial independence.
The amendment bill was challenged in 67 petitions before the Supreme Court. Among the principal arguments advanced by the petitioners was that interference with judicial independence engaged the sovereignty of the people protected by Article 3 of the Constitution and therefore required approval at a referendum in addition to the parliamentary special majority prescribed for constitutional amendment.
The proceedings generated a further institutional controversy because members of the Supreme Court were required to adjudicate upon legislation that would alter the retirement age applicable to serving judges of the Court. An application that the matter be heard by the Full Court was rejected. The five-member bench held that Article 132 of the Constitution gave the Chief Justice discretion over bench composition, but did little to address concerns about the appearance of institutional self-interest or the constitutional significance of the issues raised.
The Supreme Court ultimately determined that the Twenty-Second Amendment did not require approval at a referendum under Article 83 , subject to prescribed modifications concerning the Chief Justice. It similarly concluded that the Judicature (Amendment) Act could be enacted by an ordinary parliamentary majority. Parliament subsequently enacted the constitutional amendment on 25 September by 158 votes to 63.
While the determination resolved the immediate question about the procedure for adopting the proposed reforms, the quality of the Court's reasoning attracted criticism . The judgment was characterised by a notable lack of analytical engagement with the petitioners' submissions, particularly concerning the relationship between judicial independence and popular sovereignty under Article 3. Rather than confronting the constitutional logic of these arguments and explaining why they failed, the Court frequently relied on conclusory assertions that they did fail. The effect was to substitute assertion for reasoning, leaving several of the central constitutional questions raised by the petitions insufficiently addressed. Moreover, even if the determination established the legal validity of the reforms, it did not answer the distinct question of constitutional propriety. The existence of constitutional authority to alter the tenure of serving judges is analytically separate from the question of how, and subject to what institutional restraints, that authority ought to be exercised.
The Twenty-Second Amendment resists categorical assessment, at least for now. Increasing judicial retirement ages is not, as such, inconsistent with judicial independence. The government identified legitimate considerations relating to judicial capacity and the retention of experience; the reform applies to general categories of judicial office rather than through discretionary extensions; and the accompanying enlargement of the judiciary indicates that it formed part of a broader response to problems of judicial administration.
At the same time, the fact that the reform extended rather than curtailed judicial tenure does not dispose of the concerns associated with security of tenure. Its immediate application altered the conditions of service of identifiable incumbents, delayed future vacancies, and thereby affected judicial succession. The unusual position of serving Supreme Court judges adjudicating upon legislation directly affecting the tenure of members of their own institution added a further dimension to the controversy.
The broader constitutional consideration is one of institutional impersonality. Conditions governing judicial tenure should, so far as possible, be formulated and altered by reference to general institutional considerations rather than the circumstances of identifiable office-holders. This suggests a presumption in favour of prospectivity when changes to tenure confer a substantial benefit upon serving judicial officeholders.
The significance of the Twenty-Second Amendment thus extends beyond the substantive question of the appropriate retirement age for Sri Lankan judges. It demonstrates the distinction between constitutional legality and constitutional propriety, and between the formal powers conferred upon political institutions and the conventions of restraint governing their exercise. A measure may accordingly be legally valid and supported by legitimate administrative objectives while remaining open to criticism in terms of the constitutional practices it establishes or reinforces. In this sense, the reform raises a question not only about judicial independence, but about the character of Sri Lanka’s constitutional culture. Whether the Twenty-Second Amendment will ultimately be judged as a necessary reform to strengthen the judiciary’s capacity to deliver justice and accountability, or as a measure tainted by an improper understanding between the executive and the head of the judiciary, remains to be seen. What is already clear, however, is that its true legacy will lie not in the retirement age it prescribed, but in perpetuating the habit of Sri Lanka’s political culture whereby constitutional amendments, motivated by executive convenience, are introduced suddenly and without regard to public opinion, let alone consultation and deliberation, and are normally passed without much pushback from either the legislature or the judiciary.
Dr Asanga Welikala is a Senior Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Edinburgh and a Visiting Lecturer in Law at the University of Oxford. He is the Director of the CPA-ECCL Programme on Comparative Constitutional Studies and Practice .
Asanga Welikala, ‘The 22nd Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka: The Increase in the Retirement Age of Judges, Judicial Independence, and Constitutional Culture', ConstitutionNet , International IDEA, 16 November 2026, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/sri-lanka-increase-retirement-age-judges-judicial-independence
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