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Lanka Hit News • Oct 6, 2025 · 1y ago • 10 min read
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India Sciences Po

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India has been one of the first countries to adopt the concept of the Indo-Pacific . In particular, Prime Minister Narendra Modi shared his vision of the Indo-Pacific for the first time on June 1, 2018 at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore ( 1 ) . In his speech he claimed that the Indo-Pacific “stands for a free, open, inclusive region, which embraces us all in a common pursuit of progress and prosperity” and “includes all nations in this geography as also others beyond who have a stake in it.” ( 2 )

PM Modi’s speech was a culmination of earlier efforts in India to articulate elements of its new engagement in the region:

Concomitant with these developments, India’s foreign policy has gradually shifted focus towards the maritime domain. An illustration of this evolution, the Indian Navy has released several policy documents concerning doctrines and strategies: the Indian Maritime Doctrine (2004, revised in 2009) ( 6 ) , and Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (2007) reflected the Navy’s maritime strategic outlook. In his foreword to Ensuring Secure Seas: India’s Maritime Security Strategy (2015), India’s Chief of Naval Staff highlighted that ‘[t]he shift in worldview from a Euro-Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political, economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean Region and impacted India’s maritime environment in tangible ways.’ ( 7 )

The Indo-Pacific described in Modi’s 2018 Shangri-la Dialogue speech extends “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas”.

While the Indian Ministry of External Affairs claims that “India’s Indo-Pacific vision is premised upon the principle of ASEAN-Centrality ” ( 8 ) , at the same time, the Indian Ocean clearly occupies the epicentre of the Indian definition of the Indo-Pacific. In his last book, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, the Minister of External Affairs, points out that India’s Indo-Pacific strategy relies on three “concentric circles”. The first circle is largely domestic: the priority is to upgrade India’s ports. Several close neighbouring countries separated by the sea – Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles – are part of a second circle. The third circle remains undefined but is apparently made of the rest of the Indian ocean. He concludes that the real challenge is “the revival of the Indian Ocean as a community that builds on its historical and cultural foundations”. ( 9 )

Indian efforts to combine the centrality of the Indian Ocean and the that of ASEAN within the framework of the Indo-Pacific became manifest in the meeting held in Delhi on 13-14 December 2019. This “Dialogue-XI” with ASEAN member states had a revealing title: Indo-Pacific: Re-imagining the Indian Ocean through an Expanded Geography. ( 10 )

In his 2018 Shangri-La speech, referred to above, Narendra Modi presented his vision of the Indo-Pacific as a means of supporting principles which have been dear to India for several decades . These, notably, are reiterated in the BRICS summits and encompass principles such as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue, and adherence to international rules and laws.

Modi defined India’s “vision of an open, stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” ( 11 ) around several key ideas:

These official declarations avoid defining an adversary. Yet, Indian experts also consider that the adoption of the Indo-Pacific concept is a way to “balance China ” ( 13 ) . For these observers, India’s approach to the region has been shaped by a new strategic environment “coinciding with the rise of China”. ( 14 ) From this perspective, India’s new foreign policy orientation can be seen as a response to China’s expanding influence and presence in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean region, and to a context of increasing strategic competition in India’s neighbourhood and beyond. In 2017, New Delhi had openly raised concerns about China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the global initiative of infrastructure and connectivity projects announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. At the economic level, some of India’s new partnerships enshrined within the discourse of the Indo-Pacific, for instance with Japan in Sri Lanka, have been perceived as a both countering – as well as a potential alternative to – BRI infrastructure projects. ( 15 )

At another level, one analyst has noted that “the ability to sustain a military presence near the key choke points connecting [the] trade routes [of the Indian Ocean]” is “at the heart of the geopolitical struggle” in the region. ( 16 ) The Indian Navy has recognized the strategic importance of sea lanes of communication of the region and the need to protect them. The 2015 Indian Maritime Security Strategy notes that “Protection of India’s SLOCs, and carriage of national trade and cargo therein, will be an essential component of the strategy for conflict.” ( 17 )

To a larger extent, experts have seen India’s new Indo-Pacific approach as “an opportunity to expand its footprint across the region while facing significant capacity and capital constraints”. ( 18 ) Its new approach would offer “new opportunities to India’s great power ambitions”, while providing New Delhi an opportunity to address a new security and strategic environment through new partnerships. ( 19 ) India’s goal would therefore be to “use the Indo-Pacific as a tool to advance its strategic interests and respond to a changing security environment.” ( 20 )

To deepen its economic and defence cooperation in the region, India is relying on various means.

India has adapted its diplomatic machinery to the Indo-Pacific, as shown initially in the creation of a new division within its Ministry of External Affairs, the Indian Ocean Region Division, followed by the creation of an Indo-Pacific division in 2019.

More importantly, India has invested in the Indian Navy . Recently, in November 2020, Union Minister of State for Defence Shripad Naik announced that expected orders for surface ships and submarines to be executed from 2020 to 2030 by the Indian Navy amounted to approximately $51 billion, while also highlighting that 60 per cent of the Indian Navy’s budget was dedicated to capital expenditure. ( 21 ) It remains, however, that the Navy has been under-resourced in comparison to the army and the air force. In the defence budget of 2020-2021, it was allocated only 15% of the defence budget (that is, approximately, $6.70 billion), ( 22 ) compared with 23% for the Air Force and 56% for the Army. ( 23 ) Under revised estimates, the new Budget 2021-22 proposed a decline in the total capital outlay earmarked for the Navy compared to the previous year’s Revised Estimates. ( 24 ) Generally speaking, defence capital outlay in 2020-21 has declined since 2011-12: from representing 31.8 percent of total defence budget, it came to account for 24.1 per cent of the total defence budget (including defence pension). ( 25 ) To a larger extent, while India’s defence budget has grown in absolute terms since the 1990s, ( 26 ) the share of defence spending in the total government expenditure has decreased over the past few years. ( 27 )

India has also extended defence lines of credit for Vietnam ($500 million in 2016; $100 million in 2020), Seychelles ($100 million in 2018), Mauritius ($100 million in 2021) and Bangladesh ($500 million in 2021).

At the economic level, India has developed cooperative arrangements in building infrastructure with Japan , ranging from the mega-project for an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor to smaller initiatives in South Asia and Southeast Asia.

Moreover, the Indian Navy has developed its reach and activities in the region in three ways. Firstly, through capacity building and humanitarian assistance initiatives . In May 2020, it launched its Mission SAGAR to deliver Covid-related assistance to the island states of the Indo-Pacific and, in November 2020, Mission SAGAR-II delivered food aid to African states. Secondly, by aiming to create Maritime Domain Awareness and expand its presence across this domain. ( 28 ) In 2014, it launched the Information Management and Analysis Centre and, in 2018, it set up an Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region, which began compiling maritime data with partners in 2019. ( 29 ) Thirdly, and to a larger extent, the Navy has built partnerships in the region through training exercise and in conducting goodwill mission and taking part in joint naval exercises with partner countries.

At the multilateral level, since 2008, India has sought to promote collective security through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. ( 30 ) In 2019, at the East Asia Summit, Narendra Modi has suggested the launching of an “ Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative ” “to create a safe, secure and stable maritime domain”. ( 31 ) India is also a part of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia that entered into force in 2006.

Partnerships with partner countries are central to India’s approach to the Indo-Pacific. They provide additional economic and military resources to New Delhi to address the challenge of a changing strategic environment and enable it to coordinate a response.

India’s partnerships are based on multi-layered, issue-based cooperation with regional powers and countries. Its primary partners are the United States, Japan, Australia, countries with which India has annual 2+2 Dialogues, and France, with which it holds an annual defence dialogue.

For India, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), an informal security dialogue initially established in 2007 was revived in 2017 and has become a key grouping in the Indo-Pacific. On March 12, 2021, the first-ever leader-level summit of the Quad resulted in a communiqué that echoed Narendra Modi’s 2018 speech by supporting “the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity”. ( 32 )

With Quad and non-Quad countries, India’s partnership has found expression in military naval exercises with the US, Australia and, since 2015, Japan (the Malabar joint-manoeuvres ( 33 ) ) as well as with France and Australia (the Varuna exercises ( 34 ) ).

India is part of other mini-lateral groupings in the Indo-Pacific, including the Trilateral Dialogue with France and Australia since 2020, ( 35 ) with Japan and the United States since 2018, and with Australia and Indonesia since 2017. ( 36 )

India has signed logistical exchange agreements on military facilities access with the US and France, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea.

India has developed cooperation with other countries in the region, including:

New Delhi also considers that Russia is a power of the Indo-Pacific, and has reportedly told Moscow that it should join the Indo-Pacific framework. ( 38 )

If the Quad and the Trilateral Dialogue are compatible, the way India considers “Russia as an Indo-Pacific power” ( 39 ) reflects a unique viewpoint that the present Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar defines as “plurilateralism”. ( 40 ) While some Indian experts argue that New Delhi should continue its rapprochement with the West, and even initiate a dialogue with NATO, ( 41 ) the Indian diplomatic community is not prepared to take sides. This ambivalent attitude might have an impact on the cohesiveness of the Quad.

All the more so as India is not prepared to antagonize China either. In fact Jaishankar claims that “The ability of India and China to work together could determine the Asian century”. ( 42 )

Along similar lines, in his 2018 Shangri-La speech, Narendra Modi expressed his opposition to “great power rivalries”, stating instead that the “Asia of cooperation will shape this century”. ( 43 ) He also stressed that India’s “friendships are not alliances of containment”, ( 44 ) indicating that New Delhi does not want to be seen as part of a containment effort vis-à-vis China. India’s attitude vis-à-vis China has clear affinities with the European view of the Indo-Pacific, a concept that France, Germany and the EU characterize as a “third way” between China and the US. Yet, whether Beijing’s policy vis-à-vis India will be sufficiently accommodating for ambivalence to remain the order of the day remains to be seen.

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