13 Sep 2026 | By Gayantha Dehiwatte
Sri Lanka’s current economic situation differs significantly from the financial crisis experienced in 2022. Yet there is once again a growing sense that the economy is entering a crisis. The key difference is that, unlike in 2022, the present constraints do not primarily originate from the supply side. Instead, there are increasing signs of weakness in aggregate demand.
Proponents of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) growth framework place considerable emphasis on supply side factors, assuming that expanding productive capacity and improving the availability of factor inputs will generate sustainable growth.
The Sri Lankan Government appears to have adopted a similar approach, focusing on resource availability and factor inputs even when these come at exceptionally high prices. However, this approach overlooks the critical role of effective demand in determining economic activity.
Recent data indicate that IMF-driven austerity had already pushed the economy towards a downward trajectory well before the Cyclone Ditwah crisis. According to reporting in a leading national newspaper on 31 December 2025, corporate earnings declined Year-on-Year (YoY) during the September 2025 quarter, reflecting sharp contractions in the food, beverage, and tobacco sector and in capital goods. Earnings in the food, beverage, and tobacco sector fell by 60% YoY, while capital goods declined by 72% YoY, significantly weakening aggregate consumption.
I had previously warned that austerity would severely constrain domestic demand in my article published in The Sunday Morning on 16 November 2025, titled ‘A neoliberal turn with dire social consequences’. I also argued that increasing financialisation – where credit expansion substitutes for real income growth – would create an economy increasingly dependent on debt-driven consumption and speculative investment rather than productive expansion.
These concerns have since received empirical support. A leading national newspaper reported a sharp divergence between financial sector performance and the real economy. Banking sector earnings increased by 39% YoY, while the broader financial sector recorded extraordinary growth of 112% YoY. The expansion of financial profits alongside suppressed household incomes and weakening consumption highlights the structural distortions created by austerity-led policies.
Sri Lanka’s current situation demonstrates that economic growth cannot be determined by supply alone; effective demand is equally fundamental. There is insufficient demand to generate sustained real economic growth, even as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures are supported by taxation and transfer payments rather than equivalent increases in productive capacity.
Rising fuel, gas, and electricity prices are steadily eroding household purchasing power. The depreciation of the rupee further weakens real incomes, as the inflationary consequences of currency depreciation effectively operate as an additional burden on households. At the same time, increasing Government taxation removes a significant portion of private sector spending power, while elevated interest rates absorb an increasing share of the remaining income of households and firms.
Taken together, these factors have weakened private sector purchasing power and placed effective demand on a downward trajectory.
Unlike the 2022 crisis, when severe supply side constraints were central to the disruption, the present situation is increasingly characterised by inadequate demand despite the availability of resources on the supply side. Moreover, GDP may provide a misleading picture of underlying productive performance when growth is supported by taxation and transfer payments rather than corresponding increases in production.
The economic contraction could therefore prove considerably more severe than current forecasts suggest. This risk is heightened by the Government’s continued emphasis on accumulating local currency fiscal surpluses through taxation, irrespective of whether the private sector has sufficient capacity to generate the income required to sustain such taxation.
The untimely extraction of purchasing power from the private sector through taxation can further suppress private investment and household consumption. At a time when counter-cyclical fiscal policy may be required to support aggregate demand, the Government continues to pursue contractionary tax policies while presenting increased tax revenue as an economic achievement.
However, accumulating local currency provides limited relief against Sri Lanka’s fundamental external constraint. What ultimately matters for the external sector is foreign currency. For the first time in three years, Sri Lanka’s external sector position has turned negative. According to June 2026 reports, the current account recorded a deficit of $ 868.4 million, reversing the surplus of $ 623 million recorded in the first quarter of this year.
If this negative trajectory continues, Sri Lanka’s external financing requirements and foreign debt burden are likely to increase. Policymakers’ limited understanding of fiscal policy space therefore risks pushing the country into prolonged economic stagnation or recession, characterised by higher unemployment, weaker consumption, declining foreign investment, and increasing capital flight.
SL’s bubble economy approaching a breaking point
Following the 2022 financial crisis, Sri Lanka’s financial markets gradually regained stability, supported by fresh dollar inflows from bilateral and institutional creditors. Particularly during the latter part of 2023, foreign capital began flowing into domestic assets, including shares, bonds, and real estate, many of which had fallen substantially from their previous peaks.
These foreign capital inflows required investors to purchase local currency to acquire domestic assets, contributing to the appreciation of the rupee from its previous lows. By 2024, net foreign inflows had also contributed to rising share prices. As equity prices increased, domestic investors increasingly entered the market, creating a bandwagon effect that pushed prices even higher. The combination of foreign and domestic portfolio inflows therefore contributed to a rapid increase in equity valuations.
During this period, rising asset values also made it easier for investors and businesses to obtain credit and service existing loans. As collateral values increased, balance sheets appeared stronger and borrowing conditions became more favourable.
However, these conditions no longer exist. Incomes are declining, borrowers are finding it increasingly difficult to service debt, and asset prices have stopped rising. Some asset classes, particularly equities, have already begun to decline.
For example, between 2024 and 2026, the share market rose by approximately 100% annually, while the real economy expanded by only around 5% in terms of GDP over the same period. This divergence suggests that the increase in equity valuations was not supported by a comparable expansion in corporate profitability. The rise in share prices therefore became increasingly detached from the earnings and productive performance of the underlying businesses.
The situation has now begun to deteriorate further. Economic growth appears to be slowing while the real economy is weakening. During the preceding boom, both the domestic currency and domestic asset prices appreciated simultaneously, reinforcing market confidence and encouraging further investment.
That process now appears to be reversing. Foreign investors have begun withdrawing capital from domestic asset markets. Net capital outflows from the share market over the past eight months amounted to approximately $ 180 million, equivalent to roughly Rs. 56 billion worth of equities sold by foreign investors. Reports indicate that this trend continued in subsequent months, with August alone recording net outflows of approximately $ 60 million, corresponding to around Rs. 19.5 billion worth of shares.
The combination of rising expenditure, elevated asset valuations, and declining incomes is causing market confidence to weaken. The reported $ 695 million inflow was insufficient to sustain the earlier bandwagon effect or offset the foreign currency outflows associated with foreign investors exiting the market. This suggests that market expectations are increasingly incorporating the possibility of further rupee depreciation.
Without substantial and sustained foreign currency inflows, the outlook for Sri Lanka’s financial markets remains fragile. I previously examined the relationship between market confidence, historical experience, and exchange rate expectations in my article published in The Sunday Morning on 7 June, titled ‘How financial liberalisation trapped Sri Lanka in currency instability’.
Although uncertainty may have contributed to recent capital outflows, short-term investors have also accumulated substantial returns from the preceding increase in asset prices. Investors entered bonds carrying coupon rates exceeding 25% and participated in an equity market that had gained more than 200%. These additional rupee-denominated returns will ultimately need to be converted into foreign currency when investors repatriate their capital.
Such capital outflows will continue to place pressure on foreign exchange reserves while contributing to downward pressure on the rupee. The rapid movement of foreign currency out of the country has therefore left Sri Lanka’s financial markets increasingly vulnerable. Weak corporate earnings and declining household consumption further reinforce this fragile outlook.
The combination of declining returns on financial assets and weak returns on physical investment could also result in a rise in private sector loan repayment arrears. The recent increase in interest rates is likely to intensify this pressure by increasing debt-servicing costs across an economy carrying approximately Rs. 11.9 trillion in private domestic debt as of March this year. The recent one-percentage-point increase in interest rates may also indicate the possibility of further monetary tightening.
The current situation differs fundamentally from that of 2022 because private sector domestic debt has expanded substantially since then. Private sector domestic debt has increased by approximately 240% over the past decade, while the real economy has expanded by only around 20%. This divergence is particularly concerning because it suggests that a significant proportion of the additional debt may not have been directed towards productive investment. Instead, increasing amounts may have supported consumption and speculative activity in asset markets.
I had already warned of this trend and its potential consequences in my November 2025 article, ‘A neoliberal turn with dire social consequences’. Given the scale of accumulated private sector debt and the weakening income base, the repayment capacity associated with this debt stock appears increasingly fragile. Consequently, the possibility of a private sector domestic debt crisis cannot be dismissed.
The current Sri Lankan predicament can, in my view, be understood as a consequence of IMF-led reforms that have encouraged the deregulation of capital controls and the relaxation of Government regulations, thereby increasing the economy’s exposure to financial and external vulnerabilities.
Essentially, the IMF-neoliberal framework has contributed to an unstable, debt-dependent, and increasingly financialised bubble economy. Three major points of vulnerability can be identified: the currency market; asset markets, including equities, bonds, and real estate; and credit markets, encompassing foreign currency debt and private sector domestic debt.
Financial stress can originate at any one of these points and rapidly spread to the others, generating market panic and potentially triggering a broader financial crisis. Under such circumstances, currency values, asset prices, and the value of physical investments can decline simultaneously, reinforcing the downward spiral.
The combined effects of reduced monetary sovereignty and IMF-mandated deregulation are likely to perpetuate Sri Lanka’s historical pattern of recurrent external indebtedness cycles. These cycles have repeatedly constrained the country’s development prospects while reinforcing dependence on international creditors.
The persistence of this pattern is partly attributable to the way foreign capital inflows have been utilised. Rather than being directed predominantly towards productive investments capable of expanding domestic productive capacity and strengthening long-term debt servicing capabilities, foreign capital has largely contributed to financing structural external imbalances, including trade deficits and subsequent capital outflows.
Foreign capital inflows can therefore temporarily stabilise financial markets and support asset prices without necessarily strengthening the underlying productive economy. When these inflows reverse, the same financial structure can become a channel for capital flight, currency depreciation, and financial instability.
Sri Lanka consequently faces a fundamental contradiction: an economy can experience rising asset prices and temporary financial stability while simultaneously experiencing weak household incomes, declining consumption, and inadequate productive investment.
The central issue is therefore not simply whether Sri Lanka can attract more foreign capital, but whether such capital can be channelled into productive investment that expands domestic productive capacity, generates sustainable income, and strengthens the country’s long-term external position. Without such a transformation, the transition from foreign capital inflows to capital flight may remain an inherent feature of Sri Lanka’s financial system.
(The writer is a graduate of Monash University, Melbourne, Australia; an entrepreneur; and the author of the book ‘Wikalpa Maga – De-Dollarization’)
(The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the official position of this publication)
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