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Let us now turn our attention to Sri Lanka’s prehistory corresponding to the Stone Age. Although it is possible that a Paleolithic, or Early Stone Age, culture existed in the island more than one hundred thousand years ago, the archaeological evidence in support of this hypothesis is somewhat sketchy. On the other hand, the discovery of rare fossil remains of homo-erectus in Balangoda, a region in south-central Sri Lanka, is strong archaeological evidence that the island was probably inhabited by primitive ape-like men about 34,000 BP. “These anatomically modern prehistoric humans belonged to what are called the Balangoda cultures,” as stated by de Silva, K.M. ‘A History of Sri Lanka’ , fifth edition, 2016. The stone implements found in the island are mostly of the Mesolithic, or Middle Stone Age, type which date back to about 28,000 BP and are associated with a hunter-gatherer way of life. They are similar to those found in the South-Indian peninsula, which suggests that there were cultural connections between Sri Lanka and South India during prehistoric times.
But the stone implements of Sri Lanka show a higher degree of local specialization than those of South India, which suggest first, that migration of technique figured more prominently in this development than migration of peoples and second, that adoption and local adaptation of improved technology played a key role in both territorial and population expansion during that period. It must be emphasized that this interpretation represents the line of thinking pioneered by Senake Bandaranayake, which differs radically from the conventional viewpoint.
We may note in passing that new evidence, in the form of miniaturized bone and stone implements or ‘projectiles’, has emerged from the site of the Fa-Hien cave in Kalutara District (Western Province), to indicate that previous assumptions regarding the earliest period of human settlements in the island need to be re-examined. Employing radiocarbon technology, scientists have determined that the bone implements (arrowheads) were used around 48,000 BP (Hanson, Molly, ‘ 48,000-year-old bone arrowheads and jewelry discovered in Sri Lankan cave’ , Internet, 2020) and the stone implements (microliths), around 45,000 BP (Randall, Ian, ‘ Ancient 45,000-year old quartz tools ‘used to hunt animals up trees’ are found in Sri Lanka’ , Internet, 2019). To quote Hanson: “If the researchers’ conclusions are correct, this finding marks the earliest definitive proof of high-powered projectile hunting in a tropical rainforest environment.”
It is important to note that there is little evidence of a clearly defined Neolithic (Late Stone Age) culture in Sri Lanka. It appears the island bypassed the Neolithic period on the whole and moved directly from the Middle Stone Age (Mesolithic Period) to the Early Iron Age. Since, in the South Asian context, the Early Iron Age and megalithic cultures are coterminous, the term ‘Early Iron Age megalithic culture’ is increasingly gaining currency (Seneviratne, Sudharshana. ‘ Common Lankan, South-Indian Trade Routes in Early Iron Age’ , Interview, 2006). We should also note that the Early Iron Age coincides with the island’s protohistory, the period between prehistory and Early Historic Period when the existing culture had not yet developed writing. Protohistory; megalithic culture; Early Iron Age, the timeframe for all three periods is more or less the same: 1,000 BCE to 500 BCE.Sudharshana Seneviratne is of the view that the megalithic culture of Sri Lanka was very similar to that of Southern India in respect of key attributes such as pottery types, symbols on megalithic pottery, iron technology, bead types, black and red ware (BRW), and megalithic tombs. Moreover, he opines that migration of techniques occurred in both directions.
The following quote helps identify the fundamental difference between ‘prehistory’ and ‘Early Iron Age’ in the South-Asian context: “The prehistoric period cannot be counted as a formative period since it is represented by nomadic stone-using groups which did not sustain institutions…But with the ushering in of iron came semi-settled village culture and most importantly, the domestication of plants and animals in the far South and Sri Lanka in association with the Early Iron Age culture. This was a watershed development…the point of commencement of Early Iron Age culture. By far South, I mean an area south of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, going all the way down to Sri Lanka, that is, an area engulfing modern Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Sri Lanka” (ibid).
A prominent feature of Sri Lanka’s historical trajectory that distinguishes it from the corresponding Indian experience is the relatively late but extremely rapid transition from stone-age hunting and gathering to an advanced, and literate, agrarian civilization, a historical leap, if you will, that seems to have occurred in the first millennium BCE (Bandaranayake, Senake, ‘ The Settlement Pattern of the Protohistoric-Early Historic Interface in Sri Lanka’, 1989). We may also note another historian’s observations in this regard: “Historical age in any country begins from the time history can be clearly reconstructed with written records. It is generally believed that an alphabet and the art of writing were introduced into the island during the time of Devanampiya Tissa (250 BCE-210 BCE)…It is due to this reason that the Mahavamsa stories related to the period from the time of the demise of the Buddha to the reign of Devanampiya Tissa have to be examined with caution…From the third century B.C. onwards, a reasonably clear history could be reconstructed with corroborative evidence in contemporary lithic records and chronicles” (Siriweera, W.I. ‘ History of Sri Lanka: From earliest times up to the sixteenth century’ , second edition, 2004).
The territorial authority of the Anuradhapura monarchs from Devanampiya Tissa to Elara (250-161 BCE) did not extend beyond a limited region. There were several polities ruled by chieftains which were more or less autonomous. The first monarch to end the power of the feudal chiefs was Dutugemunu (161-137 BCE). Under his rule, the whole country was transformed into a unified political entity for the first time in its history (Ibid).
Under the unified system of governance, provincial administrative structures were established to complement the central bureaucracy. The key positions in the vast bureaucratic machinery were held by close or distant relatives of the king. Thus lineage was a key factor in enabling one to rise to a position of power and authority. Perhaps due to the influence of Buddhism, there was no attempt by the royalty to impose a Wittfogelian type of despotic rule over the island. “The king, as well as the bureaucrats, were expected to balance the scales of justice” (ibid). Moreover, wherever possible, the king was expected to ensure fair play in administration so as to discourage government officials from engaging in corrupt practices. Whereas the strong kings generally abided by these principles, the weak ones did not. Invariably, during the reign of a weak king, the bureaucracy ran amok and fomented revolt and dissent, especially in the provinces.
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The seizure of 471 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, or ‘ICE’, concealed inside a container, at the Port of Colombo, is being rightly treated as a significant Customs success. Yet the seizure should also provoke a more uncomfortable question. How long can Sri Lanka continue trying to secure a 21st century trading hub with an inspection system designed around methods that belong to another era?
The answer cannot simply be more inspections, more paperwork or more officials opening more containers. Colombo handles enormous volumes of containerised cargo, much of it legitimate. A single container can contain tonnes of goods, packed into hundreds of individual packages. When contraband represents only a fraction of the cargo, physical examination alone becomes an exercise in probability.
The challenge is not merely finding the needle in the haystack. It is determining which haystack is worth searching in the first place.
The Asian Development Bank identified this problem years ago. Its technical assistance assessment found that Sri Lanka’s trade logistics procedures suffered from a “lack of a modern risk management system and other modern customs tools”, combined with “insufficient use of automated systems”, contributing to cargo queues at the Port. It also found that the movement of cargo to and from Customs examination yards, which had poor access, contributed to congestion. These were not casual observations. They formed part of an ADB-supported programme intended to modernise Sri Lanka’s trade logistics system.
The findings were even more uncomfortable. The ADB identified “inadequate use of modern customs tools”, excessive documentation, insufficient automation, inadequate cooperation among border agencies, the absence of a port facilitation system, weaknesses in inland cargo clearance and inadequate capacity. It also reported that Customs risk rules were written in such a way that “80% of the consignments are targeted”. A system in which such a large proportion of cargo becomes subject to targeting inevitably risks undermining the very principle of risk-based Customs control. The more everything becomes suspicious, the less meaningful suspicion becomes.
The ADB-supported feasibility study for a new Customs inspection facility was initiated in 2020, with its final report submitted in December 2021. The study considered alternative locations before Kerawalapitiya emerged as the preferred site. The objective was not simply to construct another yard. The ADB Terms of Reference required the consultants to determine the physical and operational feasibility of the facility, assess potential demand, identify infrastructure requirements and prepare a comprehensive cost estimate. They were also required to identify the government stakeholders involved and “the time allocated for review and approvals”. The irony is difficult to miss. Years after the feasibility exercise, Sri Lanka is still discussing how to bring the facility into operation.
The proposed Kerawalapitiya Customs Verification Centre therefore represents something larger than another infrastructure project. It is a test of whether the Sri Lankan state can convert policy into implementation. According to reporting in 2024, the proposed facility was designed to accommodate around 3,000 containers. Yet the project remained caught in administrative and financial uncertainty years after the feasibility work had been completed. Government land was subsequently allocated and the government moved towards a hybrid public-private partnership model. The question now is why such a basic modernisation programme should have taken so long to progress.
This is where the private sector cannot simply be treated as an ideological inconvenience. Sri Lanka’s public sector has demonstrated repeatedly that it can commission studies, establish committees, formulate strategies and announce projects. The more difficult test is delivering complex infrastructure on time, within budget, and according to measurable standards. A modern Customs inspection centre requires sophisticated scanning equipment, electronic tracking, data systems, cybersecurity, maintenance and continuous technological upgrading. These are precisely the areas in which properly regulated private-sector participation can bring capital, expertise and operational discipline.
That does not mean privatising Customs. The authority to inspect, seize, investigate, impose duties and enforce the law must remain with the state. But there is no compelling reason why every piece of infrastructure, technology platform and operational service surrounding those sovereign functions, must be designed and delivered exclusively through traditional government mechanisms.
The government has already moved in this direction. Cabinet approved the establishment of the Kerawalapitiya Customs Verification Centre and subsequently approved a process to select a private partner under a hybrid public-private partnership model. The policy question is therefore no longer whether private-sector involvement is possible. It is whether the Government can structure that involvement transparently enough to prevent a new system from simply reproducing old weaknesses under a different ownership arrangement.
That requires radical transparency. The public should know who is selected, how the contract is awarded, what the operator is required to deliver, what technology will be installed, what performance standards will apply and what penalties will follow failure. The Government should publish a timetable with identifiable responsibility for every stage. Otherwise, “public-private partnership” risks becoming another phrase that conceals rather than solves institutional delay.
The technology must also be substantially more ambitious than a larger physical yard. The ADB found that existing cargo seals were “not tamper-proof” and that existing devices did not provide live tracking or alerts concerning tampering or diversion. A modern Kerawalapitiya
centre should integrate non-intrusive inspection, electronic cargo tracking, intelligence databases, automated risk profiling and secure digital records. Artificial intelligence may assist image analysis, but it should supplement trained Customs judgement rather than become an excuse to outsource accountability to algorithms.
The principle should be simple. Sri Lanka does not need 100 percent physical examination of containers. It needs 100 percent visibility of risk. That means legitimate traders should not be punished because the system cannot distinguish them from high-risk consignments. Low-risk cargo should move quickly. Suspicious containers should receive scanning and targeted examination. High-risk shipments should receive intensive inspection. The result should be stronger border security alongside faster trade, not security achieved by paralysing commerce.
The recent drug seizure demonstrates that Customs officers can and do intercept major threats. But individual successes cannot substitute for institutional reform. If Sri Lanka waits for every new seizure to trigger another debate about Customs weaknesses, it will remain trapped in a reactive cycle.
The ADB study has already identified the weaknesses. The government has already identified the land. The feasibility work has already been undertaken. The partnership model has already entered the policy process. What is missing is decisive implementation. Kerawalapitiya should, therefore, become a test of governmental accountability. Sri Lanka does not need another promise to modernise Customs. It needs a functioning facility, modern technology, transparent procurement and a deadline that cannot quietly disappear into another government file.
The real scandal would not be that criminals occasionally attempt to exploit weaknesses in a complex trading system. The real failure would be knowing where those weaknesses are, knowing how to fix them and still taking years to do so.
(Nirmala de Fonseka is a former Director of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, and currently works as a consultant specialising in logistics management)
In Parliament last week, Deputy Minister Anil Jayantha responded to MP Ravi Karunanayake’s question regarding the future of Sri Lankan exports to the EU market by stating that, “It is expected to examine and report on possible options for securing long-term and sustainable market access to the EU through a deeper economic arrangement, including a possible comprehensive trade agreement, in the event of Sri Lanka graduating from the GSP+ scheme if it is classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank for three consecutive years. Sri Lanka has recorded upper-middle-income status in 2026.” The deputy minister had also referred to the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and its impact on Sri Lankan exports.
This is alarming, given that the plans remain in a very early stage of development. The negotiations on the India–European Union Free Trade Agreement were concluded in January 2026. Sri Lanka should have engaged with the European Commission soon afterwards to discuss the FTA’s potential impact on Sri Lanka, and this should have been a key item on the agenda of the joint commission meeting between the European Commission and Sri Lanka in February. (see my article on this at https://island.lk/an-innocent-bystander-or-a-passive-onlooker/). Unfortunately, the joint press release following the meeting makes no reference to this critical issue.
Even at this late stage, considering a comprehensive trade agreement is undoubtedly a positive development. Particularly because after the expiration of GSP benefits, an FTA is Sri Lanka’s sole pathway to retaining preferential access to the EU market. But FTAs typically take years to negotiate. The EU-India FTA, for example, followed a long process that began in 2007. Negotiations officially concluded on
January 27, 2026. The agreement is expected to be signed in December 2026, with full implementation targeted for early 2027.
Now, let’s explore what other nations can teach us about this.
Indonesia is the latest country to “graduate” from the EU’s GSP arrangement. Indonesia achieved upper-middle-income status in 2020, briefly fell back due to economic shifts, and regained it in 2024, maintaining that status ever since. As a direct result of this sustained economic growth, Indonesia will graduate from the EU’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) on January 1, 2027. To safeguard its long-term competitiveness in the EU market ahead of this transition, the country has been negotiating the Indonesia–European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement since official talks began in July 2016. Following 19 rounds of talks, negotiators wrapped up the agreement in September 2025, though it remains unsigned; Indonesia is now rushing to complete both signing and ratification before the GSP deadline.
The Philippines and Sri Lanka were both reclassified as upper-middle-income countries on July 1, 2026. As a GSP Plus beneficiary, the Philippines anticipated that the economic development could
negatively affect its preferential market access to the EU and, to counter this, the country resumed stalled EU-FTA negotiations in 2024, which had paused during President Duterte’s regime over human rights issues. Having already secured substantial agreement on core terms, the formal trade pact is expected to be finalised in 2027, ahead of the country’s graduation from the GSP.
After briefly holding upper-middle-income status from July 2019 to July 2020, Sri Lanka fell back to the middle-income group due to the pandemic and economic crisis. Sri Lanka was reclassified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank in July 2026. This milestone starts the countdown to graduate from the EU’s GSP. If Sri Lanka keeps upper-middle-income status, it will exit the GSP programme by July 2029 — or by July 2030 if a transitional extension applies. Consequently, Sri Lanka’s exports to the European Union will face Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rates by 2030.
How prepared is Sri Lanka to transition out of the EU’s GSP Plus scheme?
The weekend newspaper reports on the preparatory arrangements for the FTA negotiations and lists FTA negotiations planned to pursue, but does not include a possible FTA with the EU. Sri Lanka should have begun exploring alternative paths to secure long-term, sustainable market access to the EU back in 2019, when the country briefly achieved upper-middle-income status. This should have included negotiating a comprehensive trade agreement to cushion the graduation from GSP+. Unfortunately, our trade policy experts have been entirely asleep at the wheel both then and in the years since.
It is also perplexing that influential trade bodies, such as the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and the Joint Apparel Association Forum, remain silent on this impending crisis. While they are currently vocal regarding the potential impacts of the 22nd Amendment and the Prevention of Terrorism Act on Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status, they have failed to alert or advise the government about the need for a long-term strategy to preserve a level playing field in the EU market. These bodies should take the lead immediately. The stakes are far higher now than they were in 2010, when GSP+ was withdrawn. Then, Sri Lanka transitioned from GSP Plus to the standard GSP framework. This time, the country faces a direct shift to MFN tariffs – the European Union’s least favourable tariff option. (The writer can be reached at [email protected] )
Continue Reading Features Fighting crime while safeguarding democracy now and in the future Published
The government’s determination to tackle corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime is one of the most important challenges it has taken upon itself. The scale of the problem is evident from recent seizures of drugs at sea and at the airport, which indicate the enormous dimensions of the illicit drug trade. The street value of some consignments has reportedly approached staggering sums, running into hundreds of millions of dollars. The financial resources available to those involved in this trade must be immense. Their ability to corrupt individuals and institutions cannot be underestimated. The revelations of the involvement of persons connected with previous governments, their families and even members of the security forces in the drug trade are particularly disturbing. This is not simply a problem of law enforcement. It is a threat to the integrity of the State itself. The government appears to be approaching this challenge more systematically and seriously than any government in the past.
In two public engagements this past week, the President explained the government’s position. The first was a gathering of Buddhist monks and members of other religious communities, at Temple Trees to mark the first anniversary of Ratama Ekata, the national anti-drug programme. The purpose was to brief religious leaders on progress and enlist their support in carrying the message to communities throughout the country. The second was a trade union conference in Colombo, where the President responded to concerns about the proposed anti-terrorism and anti-crime legislation. At both, the President drew a distinction between two groups opposing the proposed laws. One consisted of criminal groups and those who give them patronage and protection. The other consisted of civil society organisations and human rights groups raising concerns from the perspective of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law. The President said the government was prepared to listen to this second group and discuss the legislation with them, and that these were issues on which discussion and consensus needed to be obtained.
The Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (PSTB) would replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979, while the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill (POC Bill) would give the authorities new powers against organised crime. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has personally taken up the task of answering criticism from opposition parties, civil society and international human rights organisations. This shows that the two bills form central pillars of the government’s programme to restore the integrity of the State. However, concerns expressed regarding these two draft laws are substantial. In a 31-page communication made public this week, five United Nations human rights mandates warned that the POC Bill could increase the risk of torture and arbitrary detention. They pointed to police custody of 72 hours before a Magistrate’s review and detention for up to a year in police stations on ministerial authorisation. They also cited the admissibility of confessions to senior police officers, police access to phone records without court approval, surveillance of encrypted communications, and the possibility that trade unionists and protesters could fall within the law.
The President’s offer to reduce the 72-hour period to 48 hours, made in the course of a public speech, is a welcome sign of flexibility. The better test is whether the final text reaches the 24-hour norm of ordinary criminal procedure, or whether detention beyond it requires judicial approval. Sri Lanka’s experience under the PTA shows why this matters. Laws meant for exceptional threats can acquire a much wider application in practice. Bitter experience over nearly four decades has shown that people can spend years in detention without being charged, only eventually to be released without any charges being brought against them. The years they lose in detention can never be returned. They may lose the best and most productive years of their lives, their livelihoods and family relationships, without ever being found guilty of an offence. No subsequent release can compensate them for such a loss. This is precisely the kind of injustice that laws must be designed to prevent, rather than create the conditions in which it can occur.
There is a fundamental principle at stake. The liberty of individuals cannot be entrusted to the unfettered discretion of public officials or security forces. Whenever the State seeks to deprive a person of liberty, the judiciary must have an effective and decisive role. This is not a question of showing leniency towards those suspected of serious crimes. It is recognition that the power to arrest, detain and restrict the liberty of individuals is among the most important powers exercised by the State, and therefore requires the strongest safeguards. Law enforcement authorities must have the powers necessary to investigate and prosecute crime, but they cannot be the sole judges of how long a person may be deprived of liberty. That responsibility must remain firmly anchored in an independent judiciary. The State has a duty to protect society from criminals, but it also has an equally important duty to protect the innocent from the misuse of State power. The credibility of its efforts to combat crime depends on its ability to do both.
The role of the courts therefore needs to be strengthened in both bills. Decisions concerning prolonged detention, access to legal representation, the admissibility of confessions and restrictions on personal liberty should be subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny. The courts must have the authority to examine the necessity and proportionality of measures taken by the police and executive authorities, rather than merely endorse decisions already made by them. The breadth of certain definitions also raises questions about whether individuals could be brought within the ambit of the law on the basis of their associations or other characteristics rather than evidence of criminal conduct. A system in which members of the security establishment can exercise extensive powers while judicial officers have limited ability to intervene would weaken the constitutional safeguards that protect all citizens.
The President’s willingness to engage with civil society and human rights critics is a positive indicator. So is his assurance that the bills will not be rushed through Parliament, but considered only after comprehensive discussion and wider consensus. He has directed the Minister of Justice to engage with stakeholders. The fact that the Supreme Court is considering the PSTB, and that both bills have been challenged on constitutional grounds, provides another important avenue for scrutiny. The government has indicated that it will consider the Court’s determination and proposals for amendment. These developments offer a chance to improve the legislation rather than turn the debate into a confrontation between the government and its critics. The test of the government’s commitment to good governance will be whether it incorporates reasonable criticism into the final laws, including changes to provisions it originally thought necessary.
An aspect of good governance is to bring about changes that will stand the test of time. The government needs to demonstrate that it has effective mechanisms for ensuring that future legislation is subjected to independent scrutiny, meaningful consultation with the Bar Association, trade unions, media bodies, civil society and opposition parties, and rigorous human rights assessment before it reaches Parliament. The credibility of a government is measured not only by its determination to combat crime or its willingness to listen to criticism, but also by the care with which it exercises its legislative powers. Legislation should be built on sound legal foundations, informed public consultation and democratic consensus, rather than corrected only after its weaknesses have become matters of public controversy. Consensus may take longer to build, but the resulting changes are more likely to be accepted, respected and sustained. The challenge is not simply to enact laws that are strong enough to confront organised crime today, but to establish laws and institutions that will protect society and individual liberty under governments of the future.
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