India go 2-0 up after narrow DLS win in low-scoring suspenser
New Zealand sweep aside Samoa to reach Women’s World Cup final
‘Clicky Ponting’ cheat-row cricketer banned from club cricket for two years
Vaibhav Sooryavanshi appointed Bihar captain
Wins for CDB, Fairfirst Insurance. Hayleys Group ‘A’ and HNB ‘A’ on Thursday
by Sasanka Perera (The writer is on X as @sasmester)
On 28 October 2024, I wrote in this column an essay, titled ‘Israelis in Sri Lanka and the Advent of a ‘Neo’ Colonialism. ’ My concern then was the disruption long-term Israeli tourists, often over-staying tourist visas, were causing particularly in the Eastern Province. Government intervention was mostly visible through relative inaction. Over the past year, Sri Lanka’s pristine coastal enclaves, from Hikkaduwa and Weligama in the west to Arugam Bay in the East, have found themselves at the centre of a complex and needless geopolitically-inflected controversy. As I explained in my earlier essay, too, the rapid growth of Israeli tourism has brought to light serious concerns regarding regulatory oversight, economic fairness, and national sovereignty. The latest controversy erupted in August 2026, in Hiriketiya, near Dickwella, in the country’s south. Unlike in the east, where the protesters were mostly from Muslim communities, in Hiriketiya, the protests were led by Buddhists, including monks.
At the centre of latest public debate is the establishment of a ‘Chabad House’, essentially a Jewish community and religious centre, catering to Israeli travellers. One of the primary demands the protesters made, was to investigate if this religious entity was established legally and if the activities of Israeli residents, including running businesses, were legal. In the context of the earlier controversy, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya is on record for clarifying in Parliament on 8 January, 2025, that neither the Ministry of Buddhasasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs nor any other government institution had granted official permission for the establishment of Israeli religious sites. In other words, what existed was illegal.
Chabad Houses as private business entities
Representatives of the local Chabad Houses, of which there are about six at present, claim they operate as registered private business entities. However, operating public religious and communal hubs on standard tourist or corporate permits violates local town planning and immigration guidelines. Besides, despite the claim, it is very unclear even if standard business licenses were issued in the first place. If religious entities were run under temporary business licenses, then, that itself is a clear violation of Sri Lankan law showing scant disregard to both the legal system in the country and its socio-political sensitivities.
This setup stands in stark contrast to how Sri Lanka’s own religious presence is managed in Israel. In Tel Aviv, a Sri Lankan Buddhist temple was established in 2013 to serve thousands of Sri Lankan migrant workers. The effort was facilitated by the Sri Lankan Embassy in the Israeli capital. To respect local Israeli laws and urban regulations, that temple operates discreetly inside a private apartment complex rather than as a prominent, independent public centre with an overt public religious personality as is usually the case with Buddhist temples globally. The Chief Incumbent of the temple, at the time it opened in 2013, Ven. Karavilakotuwe Dhammathilaka, is on record for stating very clearly that in keeping with the religious sensitivities in Israel, the inaugural ceremony itself was also held on a low scale without much publicity. This makes sense given the fact that Israel is one of the most religiously intolerant societies in the world as its track record amply demonstrates. This is more so in the last few years. What is important in the context of the opening of the Buddhist temple in Tel Aviv is, no laws were violated, the temple was meant for long term-residents, and respected local laws and sensitivities. It was also an effort formally facilitated by the Sri Lankan Embassy.
The comparison raises a fundamental question of parity: why should foreign nationals in Sri Lanka, including Israelis, establish public religious and cultural centres without municipal or government authorisation, while Sri Lankans abroad strictly abide by local constraints, as the nondescript Sri Lankan Buddhist temple in Tel Aviv clearly demonstrates?
The debate and anxieties around the Israeli presence in Sri Lanka occurs alongside another pressing concern. That is, the relatively precarious position of thousands of Sri Lankan workers in Israel who are mostly in the construction, agriculture and caregiving sectors. Recently, thousands of Sri Lankan migrant workers faced deportation from Israel due to job category violations, after switching from agriculture or caregiving to unauthorised sectors. The Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry reportedly actively intervened with Israeli authorities to negotiate regularisations and protect these workers. In my view, Illegality is illegality everywhere. If Sri Lankans violated Israeli law, that country had every right to deport them, and we should not have intervened. But I do understand the government’s position, too, as it relates to employment of citizens. Then, there should be a system where such regularisations are managed via the facilitation of the Sri Lankan Embassy, and if citizens do not make use of such a facility, they should clearly face the consequences of Israeli law.
Whichever way one looks at it, this highlights a very troubling double standard. That is, while Sri Lankan workers and the government have to cautiously navigate strict Israeli labour and visa laws, Israeli visitors in Sri Lanka frequently evade local visa laws without consequence. This mostly occurs as a result of the institutionalised spinelessness of our law enforcement when it comes to foreigners, and particularly seemingly ‘white’ foreigners. But surely, over 78 years after Independence, spineless meekness on our part must have clear limits. There needs to be clear reciprocity. Besides, Israelis are not here to work as the Sri Lankans in Israel are. They are supposed to be tourists. They should neither work nor establish religious edifices as they feel fit violating our laws and sensitivities as a matter of routine. This is why the ongoing Israeli activities reek of settler-colonialism.
Also, it is not only a matter of Israeli intransigence and official and public Sri Lankan apathy. The latter becomes possible when locals, who rent buildings to visa facilitate in running illegal Israeli businesses depriving their own citizens of legitimate incomes, are not even prosecuted by local law enforcement and judicial systems. As often is the case, foreign arrogance is built upon local meekness and lack of even the most basic sense of national pride. Of course, this does not apply to anyone, including Israelis who are operating a business in Sri Lanka legally, based on legitimate licenses issued by the government.
The proliferation of unlicensed, foreign-run businesses poses severe economic challenges to Sri Lanka’s local tourism industry. Many Israeli visitors enter this country on standard tourist visas but illegally set up guesthouses, surf camps, and cafes. Often operating exclusively in Hebrew, these businesses transact via informal channels or foreign accounts. When foreign visitors, including Israelis, run unregistered businesses, there are numerous local fallouts. For one thing, Sri Lanka loses substantial corporate, local government, and value-added tax revenues. Secondly, these activities severely undercut local livelihoods. Local vendors, tour guides, and small hoteliers are excluded by closed-loop and illegal Israeli operators. One of the common complaints where illegal Chabad Houses have been established is that they provide accommodation and meals to Israeli tourists, seriously disadvantaging local tourism-related businesses.
Much of the income earned from these closed illegal operations, hardly comes to Sri Lanka in any way except for payment for supplies and rentals. Finally, since properties lease informally at inflated long-term rates to these operators, it drives up costs for Sri Lankan entrepreneurs and small business owners. But all this has become possible and so entrenched because of the established track record of relative inactivity of the Sri Lankan government in general as well as local governments and law enforcement in particular.
This brings to my mind the Israeli feature film, Arugam Bay . Directed by Marco Carmel and shot on location in Sri Lanka, including Ella and Arugam Bay. The film follows former Israeli soldiers using Sri Lanka’s coastal towns to process military combat trauma. The production received formal clearances for filming from the Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau in so far as publicly available information indicates. However, its narrative — framing Sri Lankan beach towns as retreats for Israeli military veterans — with blood in their hands and massive human rights violations to their credit, reaffirms local concerns about the island being used as a backdrop for Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians without sufficient regard for local perspectives.
It is precisely this kind of narrative, through word of mouth as well as social media, that creates an image of Sri Lanka as meek and trouble-free destination for Israelis intent on illegal activities. Do the Sri Lankan government or Sri Lankans want such a label attached to the country? I certainly don’t. It is quite shocking that the Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau gave permission for a such film to be shot locally. It shows both the Authority’s sorry view of what tourism is and scant disregard for ethical tourism.
Pushback mischaracterised as anti-Jewish sentiment
Public pushback against these illegal activities has sometimes been described by local as well as Israel supporters as anti-Jewish sentiment. But this completely mischaracterises the issue. Global condemnation of Israel’s military actions in Gaza and beyond and massive rights violations of entire Palestinian communities is rooted in international humanitarian law — not antisemitism. Differentiating between opposition towards violating state policies and hostility toward Jewish people is critical. Sri Lankans standing against Israeli military aggression or localised law-breaking are asserting human rights and national law as well as decent and legal behaviour by foreigners in our own country. This is not engaging in discrimination. That is, Israelis must be treated here as our people are treated in Israel. By law and by the book.
Sri Lanka must remain a welcoming host to international tourists. However, hospitality must not replace accountability. The government must strictly enforce visa restrictions, shut down unauthorised commercial and communal spaces, and protect local businesses. By upholding the rule of law uniformly, Sri Lanka can safeguard its economy, preserve its national sovereignty, and maintain harmony along its shores.
If Sri Lanka wants ‘real’ stability, only one way to achieve it, in a short time
Whatever on earth happened to meritocracy, pragmatism, and honesty in Sri Lanka?
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Aragalaya (2022) exposed some of the maladies that beset politics. It opened the eyes of millions. But the “system change” and “Utopia” promised by the new generation have become another false election promise. And so, society is in darkness. Shame, sadness, and guilt have replaced hope. Yet we must also be fair. The past 76 years have seen real progress. Literacy rose from 23% to 97%; life expectancy increased from 44 years to 78 years; per capita rose from USD 300 to 5000; electricity supply expanded from 23% to 98% for households; the number of universities has increased from 3 to 17; and roads, health, and education expanded to every village. That did not happen by accident.
In every tea shop, in every office, and on every street during the last election, one sentence was heard again and again: 76 years of national curse. It was shouted in anger. And it was not without reason. Corruption, incompetence, lawbreaking, and callous disregard for human dignity had brought public trust to its lowest point. But in that anger, are we throwing away the good with the bad? Because society, deep down, is not asking for revolution alone. It is asking for something else. It is looking for leaders with the qualities of our golden yesteryears — qualities that are so lacking in the present lot, more or less.
What Kind of Leader Are We Looking For?
If you ask politically mature citizens today, the list is remarkably consistent. We want leaders with intelligence and a fair education. Not degree certificates, but the ability to understand policy, economics, and history. We want a clear vision for the future of the country. Not 5-year slogans, but a 25-year plan. We want patriotism. Love of country above love of party, family, or self. We want honesty and integrity. The kind where public money is treated as sacred.
We want leaders who care more about the less fortunate, who remember that development is measured by how much the least privileged in society are empowered. We want firm decision-making and accountability for good governance. The courage to say no, and the courage to take responsibility when things go wrong. We want respect for Law and Order, for the highest and the lowest in society alike. And yes, we also want a dose of firm Singapore-style discipline. Not cruelty, but a system where rules are followed, delays are not tolerated, and national interest comes before political games.
My personal ideal of a great leader for the future would combine: the vision of D.S. Senanayake, the humanism of Dudley Senanayake, the nationalism of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the decisiveness of Sir John Kotelawala, the integrity of minority patriotic leaders like Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, Sir T. B. Jayah and Sir Razeek Fareed, along with a fair measure of firm authority to enforce the law.
It is now generally accepted by those who study our history, that the country started slipping into chaos and gradual destruction soon after Dudley Senanayake’s death in 1973. I believe that with his demise, we lost the last Prime Minister who governed with compassion, restraint and foresight. His government strove to be truly ‘national’ and ‘democratic’ and his Cabinet comprised MPs from different ethnic communities and different political leanings. By 1970, the country was therefore politically and economically stable with little evidence of ethnic disharmony.
The 1970 general elections, fought against undercurrents of bogus promises, disinformation campaigns, jealousy, and conspiracies witnessed the unexpected defeat of a host of honourable political veterans – men and women who had done much for the country. The political climate of the country began to change thereafter. Standards began to erode. We began painting all politicians with the same brush. That was so blatantly unfair by political leaders who were well known for their integrity and incorruptibility and some of whom had even sacrificed personal wealth for the public good. It also sent negative signals about our country to the international community, that we Sri Lankans had mismanaged our affairs once the British left our country. Sri Lanka (Ceylon) was doing so well at one time that Singapore was then trying to emulate us. Political slogans apart, we must not forget that Sri Lanka (though a third world country) is one of the very few countries that has offered free Education and free Health services and benefits to All our citizens for many decades.
(2022) exposed some of the maladies that beset politics. It opened the eyes of millions. But the “system change” and “Utopia” promised by the new generation have become another false election promise. And so, society is in darkness. Shame, sadness, and guilt have replaced hope. Yet we must also be fair. The past 76 years have seen real progress. Literacy rose from 23% to 97%; life expectancy increased from 44 to 78; per capita rose from USD 300 to 5000; electricity supply expanded from 23% to 98% for households; the number of universities has increased from 3 to 17; and roads, health, and education expanded to every village. That did not happen by accident. It happened because of careful planning and sacrifice. We cannot curse the entire journey because of the last few wrong turns.
Short Term Remedies: Clean the House Now
1. Affidavit of Eligibility: Every candidate for public office must declare by affidavit that they are fully entitled and eligible. No pending criminal cases. No hidden assets.
2. Clean Track Record: The affidavit must clearly state there are no convictions regarding financial dealings, law and order violations, or corruption.
3. Party Responsibility: Party leaders must ensure candidates are qualified and above board. No more “anyone with money” tickets.
4. Legal Accountability for Promises: Citizens must be empowered to challenge in court violations of election promises and principles of good governance.
5. Hold Party Officials Responsible: Officials who field corrupt candidates must also face consequences.
6. Rule of Law for All: Ensure that everyone, from the highest to the lowest, abides by the laws. End VIP culture. Mid and Long Term Remedies: Build the Citizen The real cure is not in Parliament. It is in our homes and schools.
1. From Year 3: Teach children to clean and arrange their own desks and beds. Teach responsibility.
2. Order and Care: Teach them to keep footwear and belongings orderly. Small discipline builds big character.
3. Independence: Encourage them to pack their own school bags.
4. Purpose: Teach them early why they were born human, and to their parents. Teach gratitude.
5. Duties: Up to age 6, educate them on duties to parents and society.
6. Public Conduct: Teach them how a responsible citizen behaves in public.
7. IQ + EQ: Develop intelligence, but develop empathy even more. Intelligence without EQ is dangerous.
8. Lead by Example: Parents and community leaders must set the example. Children copy what they see, not what they are told.
Add anything more that enhances the quality of our children. A nation is only as good as its next generation.
We do not need to invent a new model. We need to remember the old one.
What we need now is not another slogan. We need leaders, who combine the patriotism of D.S., the decency of Dudley, the firmness of Sirimavo and the discipline of Singapore. The curse will end the day we stop voting for the loudest voice and start voting for the best character. These are my thoughts on our present predicament and some ideas to remedy it. I offer them openly for discussion and for better suggestions. Because of the mess we have created, we must also have the courage to clean.
Continue Reading Opinion France’s unrest: Beyond immigration, deeper crisis of political and social confidence Published
by Viran Maddumage (Assistant Lecturer & PhD (Reading) Department of Human Geography Macquarie University & Sanduni Rathnayake Lecturer (Probationary) Faculty of Law General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University
As France approaches another presidential election, student demonstrations, economic discontent and political polarisation reveal a society struggling with questions that extend far beyond migration.
France has long been a country where political disagreement finds expression in the streets. From the revolutionary traditions that shaped its republican identity to the nationwide strikes and demonstrations of more recent decades, public protest has remained an important feature of French political life. Yet the latest wave of demonstrations unfolding across the country raises a question that deserves closer examination: is France confronting an immigration crisis, or is it experiencing a much deeper crisis of political, economic and social confidence?
The distinction matters. Although migration has become an increasingly prominent issue in French political discourse, the demonstrations that emerged in September 2026 were not initially organised as an anti-immigration movement. They began with students demanding better educational facilities, adequate staffing and greater government investment in public education. Their subsequent expansion into a nationwide movement reflects the accumulation of grievances that have been developing within French society for years.
To understand the present situation, it is necessary to look beyond the images of burning vehicles, clashes with police and political accusations that have dominated international media coverage.
From classrooms to the streets: The origins of the protests
The immediate origins of the current protests can be traced to September 2026, when students at a high school in Créteil, in the southeastern suburbs of Paris, joined teachers in expressing dissatisfaction with inadequate educational resources. The movement began around 21 September and subsequently spread to schools across the country.
The students’ grievances were neither abstract nor exclusively political. They included shortages of teachers, unfilled teaching positions, overcrowded classrooms, deteriorating school buildings, excessive timetables and concerns regarding the university admissions system, Parcoursup. The latter has attracted criticism from students who consider its selection procedures insufficiently transparent and socially unequal.
The protests also exposed a broader concern about educational opportunity. Students from economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods have questioned whether they receive the same quality of education as their counterparts in more affluent communities. The issue, therefore, extends beyond the physical condition of school buildings. It concerns the ability of the French state to provide meaningful equality of opportunity through public institutions.
By early October, demonstrations had expanded considerably, with teachers, parents, trade unions and other sections of society expressing support. Reports documented the use of tear gas and other crowd-control measures by police, while several incidents involving injuries to young demonstrators intensified criticism of law enforcement practices.
The movement reached a significant turning point on 17 October, when demonstrations across France brought together students, workers, trade unions and supporters of the Yellow Vest movement. Estimates of participation differed: the Interior Ministry reported approximately 550,000 participants, while organisers placed the figure considerably higher. Although many demonstrations remained peaceful, violence, looting and attacks on public property occurred in several cities.
It is important, however, not to confuse the actions of violent groups with the grievances of the wider protest movement. The right to peaceful assembly and expression is fundamental to democratic participation, but it does not legitimise attacks on individuals, public institutions or private property. Equally, the occurrence of violence should not automatically invalidate the legitimate demands that initially brought demonstrators onto the streets.
The Yellow Vest legacy and the accumulation of economic grievances
The participation of Yellow Vest supporters in the latest demonstrations is particularly significant.
The Yellow Vest movement, which emerged in November 2018, initially developed in opposition to proposed increases in fuel taxes. However, its demands quickly expanded to encompass the cost of living, purchasing power, economic inequality and the perceived distance between political decision-makers and ordinary citizens.
Although farmers and agricultural organisations subsequently participated in protests associated with the movement, the Yellow Vests were never exclusively a farmers’ movement. They represented a much broader expression of dissatisfaction, particularly among people who believed that economic policies disproportionately burdened ordinary households.
The movement also exposed an enduring tension within French politics: the relationship between economic reform and social protection. Measures presented by governments as necessary for fiscal responsibility or environmental transition can generate considerable opposition when citizens perceive that the costs are being distributed unequally.
The present demonstrations appear to reflect a similar convergence of concerns. Students are protesting educational inequalities, workers are expressing dissatisfaction with wages and living costs, and trade unions are raising concerns about public expenditure and employment conditions.
France’s economic circumstances provide important context. The government has faced pressure to reduce public spending and address its budget deficit. Its proposed savings measures have generated opposition, particularly where public sector employment, salaries and services are concerned. Consequently, what began as a dispute about educational resources has developed into a wider debate about the priorities of the state.
The government’s subsequent proposals, including school renovation financing, measures to limit class sizes and changes to the university admissions system, demonstrate that the educational demands have received institutional attention. Nevertheless, teachers’ unions and student representatives have questioned whether these measures are sufficient.
This suggests that the protests cannot be understood merely as a reaction to a single budgetary decision. They reflect a more fundamental disagreement about the distribution of public resources and the future of France’s social model.
The historical dimension: France’s complicated relationship with migration
Migration nevertheless remains an important part of the political landscape.
France’s relationship with immigration is historically complex, shaped by colonial history, labour migration, economic transformation and successive changes in government policy. It would therefore be inaccurate to suggest that immigration became a significant issue only in 1981.
However, the election of Socialist President François Mitterrand in 1981 marked an important moment in the development of French immigration policy. His government introduced measures that included the regularisation of certain undocumented migrants, reforms concerning the rights of foreign residents and the restoration of the right of association for foreigners.
These developments took place against a background of earlier restrictive immigration policies and growing debates about integration, employment and national identity. Economic recession and unemployment subsequently contributed to the politicisation of immigration during the 1980s.
Over the following decades, migration became an increasingly contested subject, particularly in discussions about cultural identity, social cohesion, employment, public services and national security. The French political establishment has repeatedly returned to questions concerning the balance between immigration control, integration and the protection of individual rights.
The contemporary debate must also be understood within the context of France’s overseas territories. The unrest in New Caledonia in May 2024, for example, centred on proposed electoral reforms and their implications for the indigenous Kanak population. Meanwhile, protests in Martinique during September 2024 focused on the high cost of living, particularly the substantial difference between food prices in the Caribbean territory and mainland France.
These events should not be mistaken for a single movement or attributed to a common cause. Nevertheless, they illustrate how economic inequality, historical grievances and questions of political representation can generate discontent across different parts of the French Republic.
They also demonstrate that France’s challenges cannot be understood solely through the lens of immigration. Its relationship with its overseas territories, colonial legacy and regional inequalities remains an important part of the wider discussion.
Political polarisation and the approaching 2027 presidential election
Perhaps the most consequential dimension of the current unrest is its political context.
President Emmanuel Macron, who came to power in 2017 with a political movement seeking to transcend the traditional division between left and right, is approaching the end of his second consecutive presidential mandate. Article 6 of the French Constitution provides that no individual may exercise more than two consecutive presidential mandates. Macron is therefore constitutionally unable to seek a third consecutive term in 2027.
His political movement, initially established as En Marche! and subsequently renamed Renaissance, attracted support from different sections of the political spectrum. Its political orientation is generally described as centrist or liberal, with a strong emphasis on European integration and economic reform.
However, the weakening of traditional political alignments has coincided with the increasing prominence of parties and movements at both ends of the political spectrum.
On the far right, Marine Le Pen and the National Rally have made immigration, national identity, security and restrictions on migration central components of their political programme. Le Pen has contested the presidential elections of 2012, 2017 and 2022, reaching the second round in the latter two elections. Her party’s position within French politics has consequently become a central feature of the national debate.
The approaching 2027 election has further intensified political competition. Le Pen has remained an important figure within the National Rally, although the party’s eventual presidential representation and her own political position have been affected by legal proceedings. Jordan Bardella has also emerged as a potential presidential representative of the party.
On the opposite side of the political spectrum, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of La France Insoumise, announced in May 2026 that he would seek the presidency for a fourth time. Having contested the elections of 2012, 2017 and 2022, Mélenchon has positioned himself as a prominent figure of the radical left. His political programme emphasises economic redistribution, social equality and opposition to the far right.
His renewed candidacy, however, has not been without controversy. Critics have questioned his political style and statements, while disagreements within the broader French left raise questions about the possibility of presenting a unified alternative in 2027.
The significance of these developments lies not simply in the presence of competing candidates, but in the increasing difficulty of maintaining a politically coherent centre. The current protests provide both the radical left and the far right with opportunities to present their respective interpretations of France’s difficulties.
The left has emphasised economic inequality, public services and the consequences of government austerity. The far right has sought to connect public dissatisfaction with questions of security, immigration and national identity. These competing narratives demonstrate how a common experience of economic and institutional frustration can produce sharply different political interpretations.
When immigration becomes the explanation for everything
One of the most important questions arising from the present situation concerns the way immigration is being incorporated into political explanations of social unrest.
During periods of economic insecurity, public dissatisfaction can create an environment in which political actors seek relatively straightforward explanations for complicated structural problems. Immigration can become a convenient political reference point in debates about employment, public expenditure, housing, education and social cohesion.
Some political figures have attributed broader social problems to migration, while others have rejected such explanations and emphasised economic policy, institutional shortcomings and inequality.
However, the available accounts of the current student movement indicate that its initial demands concerned educational resources, staffing and the quality of public services. The subsequent involvement of trade unions and workers similarly brought economic concerns to the forefront.
This does not mean that immigration is irrelevant to the wider political debate. Rather, it means that the presence of immigration in political rhetoric should not be confused with the actual origins of the demonstrations.
There is also a distinction between discussing immigration policy as a legitimate subject of democratic debate and attributing complex social problems to migrants as a collective group. The latter risks obscuring the structural causes of inequality while encouraging social divisions.
The challenge for French political institutions is therefore to address legitimate concerns about migration and integration without allowing those discussions to displace the equally urgent questions of education, employment, economic security and public accountability.
France’s present difficulties reveal a society negotiating several interconnected challenges. Educational inequalities have brought young people into the streets; economic pressures have encouraged workers and trade unions to join them; concerns about policing have intensified disagreements about the relationship between citizens and the state; and political polarisation has created an environment in which competing movements seek to interpret and capitalise on public dissatisfaction.
The approaching presidential election makes these developments particularly consequential. With Macron constitutionally unable to seek another consecutive mandate, the 2027 election will take place against a background of unresolved social grievances and intense competition over the country’s political direction.
Yet the most important question may extend beyond which political movement eventually occupies the Élysée Palace. It concerns whether France’s institutions can respond meaningfully to the concerns being expressed by different sections of its population.
A republic founded upon the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity must confront the reality that political equality cannot be sustained independently of meaningful access to education, economic opportunity and public services.
The images of unrest may suggest a country divided over immigration and national identity. But beneath those images lies a broader question about the relationship between the French state and its citizens.
Perhaps, therefore, the crisis confronting France is not simply about who belongs within its borders, but also about whether those already within its institutions and communities believe that the Republic continues to deliver on its promises.
As France approaches 2027, that question may prove considerably more difficult to resolve than any single debate about migration.
(The views expressed in this article are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions with which the authors are affiliated.)
The Joint Apparel Association Forum’s (JAAF) recent statement on the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (PSTA) and its impact on the GSP Plus, to my mind, is a classic case of being one’s own worst enemy. Why? Because statements like these get amplified, often with diabolical twists, to generate adverse headlines locally (Lanka’s anti-terror law could cost it a trade lifeline—JAAF) and internationally (Sri Lanka’s harsh anti-terrorism law leaves garment makers hanging: EU threatens to pull lucrative trade preferences over human rights concerns). These are not the headlines our exporters to the EU need at this stage. To make matters worse, others have now joined the bandwagon (e.g., the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce).
If the JAAF has any genuine concerns about the proposed bill, it certainly has the right and responsibility to raise them directly with the government, in this case with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake himself. If they were not given access to the President, then they could have petitioned the Supreme Court. These would have been relatively more discreet measures. With the public statements, it appears JAAF is about to repeat the blunders it made in 2010.
In 2010, as a result of those blunders, Sri Lanka became the only country to lose preferences to the EU in a punitive manner. Though the EU had also withdrawn these benefits from Myanmar, Cambodia and Belarus, those withdrawals were simply symbolic and had no serious economic impact on those countries.
Withdrawals from Myanmar, Belarus and Cambodia
In1997, when the EU withdrew Myanmar’s GSP trade benefits, as a sanction against the routine and widespread use of forced labour and systematic human rights violations, Europe accounted for less than 3% of Myanmar’s total exports. Out of that, only 31% were eligible for GSP treatment. So, the impact of the withdrawal on Myanmar’s economy was negligible.
Similarly, when the EU completely withdrew GSP trade privileges from Belarus in 2007, due to its continuous labour rights violations and suppression of trade unions, its impact was limited because most of the Belarusian exports to Europe were not covered by GSP preferences. In addition to that, the pre-withdrawal GSP utilisation by Belarus was very low (around 12%). That meant a large share of eligible trade was not even claiming the preference beforehand. Hence, the economic impact of the withdrawal on Belarus was also nominal.
Unlike Myanmar or Belarus, Cambodia was heavily dependent on the EU market in 2020, when the EU decided to withdraw GSP Everything but Arms (EBA) benefits from Cambodia, due to serious and systematic violations of human rights and labour rights. So, the Cambodian trade negotiators cleverly negotiated “a partial withdrawal” of GSP (EBA) preferences. This partial withdrawal affected roughly 20% of Cambodia’s total exports to the EU market, and the remaining 80% of Cambodian exports continued to enjoy duty-free and quota-free access. So once again the impact was marginal. After the partial withdrawal of the GSP
(EBA) in 2020, the EU’s imports from Cambodia increased significantly from Euro 3.6 billion (in 2020) to Euro 6.4 billion by 2025, and 80% of Cambodian exports entered the EU with zero duty.
In 2010, when the EU fully withdrew, Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status due to significant shortcomings in the implementation of core human rights conventions, the EU was the largest and the most important market for Sri Lanka. Hence, the impact of the withdrawal was extremely harsh and had a long-lasting impact. Though Sri Lanka’s benefits were reinstated in 2017, exports have not shown significant growth when compared to Cambodia. The EU’s imports from Sri Lanka increased from Euro 2 billion in 2020 to Euro 2.9 billion by 2025, and only 74% of our exports entered duty-free.
Was Sri Lanka singled out for a harsher treatment by the EU?
Yes. The European Commission subjected Sri Lanka to stricter rules, heavier discipline, and harsher criticism than other countries. For example, the EU withdrew GSP benefits from Cambodia due to serious and systematic violations of human rights and labour rights. The GSP benefits were withdrawn from Sri Lanka for a lesser sin, “significant shortcomings in the implementation of core human rights conventions”. Yet, the penalty imposed on Sri Lanka was much more ruthless than what was imposed on Cambodia. Though the European Commission balanced its human rights conditions against the economic development and poverty-reduction needs of Cambodia, the approach adopted towards Sri Lanka was much less magnanimous and was designed to generate the maximum devastation of Sri Lanka’s economy.
In 2010, there were a few other GSP plus beneficiaries with records on serious and systematic violations of human rights and labor rights. For example, between 2000 and 2010, approximately 1,000 trade union leaders and members were murdered in Colombia by pro-government right-wing paramilitary groups. In some documented cases, by active or retired state, military, and police forces. Other GSP plus beneficiaries in Central America were strongly criticised by the ILO committees for gross violations of the core conventions. However, those countries were not even investigated by the EU! Similarly, the European Commission simply turned a blind eye to Pakistan and the Philippines. Interestingly, the former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is currently detained at the International Criminal Court (ICC) detention center in The Hague for his formal trial for crimes against humanity.
Why was Sri Lanka singled out for harsher treatment?
I do not want to dwell at length on mistakes Sri Lanka made in 2010 in this article. But let me point out that during those negotiations, Sri Lanka’s focal point for GSP, the Department of Commerce with the most experienced officers on the subject, was kept out of the negotiations. The negotiations were taken over by the Foreign Ministry, JAAF, and the Sri Lankan mission to the EU. Most of it was through megaphone diplomacy, that is, through public statements, press releases, and open accusations rather than through private, behind-the-scenes diplomatic channels.
Another factor that triggered it was constant and intense lobbying by the domestic “stakeholders”, including politicians, NGOs, and trade unionists. These doom-merchants lobbied, or should I say, begged the EU and INGOs to use the threat of withdrawing the GSP plus benefits to exert maximum pressure on the government.
Now that game has started once again. It started with the 22A and the Bar Association.
When the BASL strongly opposed the 22nd Amendment and expressed deep concern that extending judicial retirement ages threatens judicial independence and the separation of powers, our doom merchants claimed that perceived compromises to judicial independence would jeopardize Sri Lanka’s GSP Plus market access. Now that 22A is adopted, we should use it to promote our case for the GSP Plus renewal. Countries normally extend judicial retirement ages to strengthen judicial independence and the separation of powers.
So, I believe, it is the time to start thinking and acting like a nation, and to stop this self-sabotage, fear mongering and negative narratives.
(The writer can be reached at [email protected] )
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