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After what seems to have been an eternity, it was refreshing to hear a Prime Minister who knew what she was talking about and whom she was talking to. Last Friday, 26 September, Dr. Harini Amarasuriya was the Chief Guest at the Sri Lanka premiere of the 4K restoration of Gehenu Lamayi. Reflecting on the film, Amarasuriya noted its director Sumitra Peries as a trendsetter and a trailblazer. She went on to add that she was more than a director, arguing that she broadened our understanding of feminism in South Asia.
I thought the tribute was well articulated, because it touched on three points which scholars of the Sinhala cinema have missed out. The first is that Sumitra’s ascent as a film director followed a trajectory that was very different to all her contemporaries, bar none, in Sri Lanka and South Asia. Unlike the other distinguished figures of women’s filmmaking in the region, Sumitra was educated in the West as an editor and found employment in Sri Lanka as an editor and an assistant director. In this, as I noted in my tribute to Sumitra after her passing in 2023, she became a precursor to the likes of Mira Nair.
The second is that in her choice of source text for her first film, she deliberately overlooked the conventional choices of the day. When Lester Peries selected Golu Hadawatha as the first of three films he made for Ceylon Theatres, in 1968, Karunasena Jayalath tended to be viewed negatively by the country’s critical establishment. One of Sumitra’s overarching achievements – which almost no biographer or critic has commented on – was her ability to transform the most mundane, sentimental texts into living works of art. Jayalath’s novels resonated well with popular readers, and in Sumitra’s hands, Gehenu Lamayi became more than just a teenage romance, a morality tale of class and love.
The third point is Sumitra’s ability to even out the political and popular aspects of the story. Watching Gehenu Lamayi on the big screen, I was struck at some of the scenes which were suffused – there is no other word for it – by a feminine sensibility.
Note that very first sequence between Kusum, played by Vasanthi Chathurani, and Padmini, played by Shyama Ananda. The British filmmaker Mark Cousins, with whom I spoke about Sumitra, said that she “probed shyness and tentative love” well. That sequence with these two girls mingling with each other, which ends with another classmate describing Padmini as “almost Kusum’s partner”, showed how Sumitra was able to delve into a world and an experience – in a word, girl-girl friendships – which, as Prime Minister Amarasuriya noted in her speech, “none of her contemporaries could.”
When the film was screened in Mannheim, Germany, one critic commented on its “aura of pessimism” and its “unobtrusive photography.” Reflecting on the review with me – I think somewhere back in 2016 or 2017, when I had deep conversations with her – Sumitra noted that she had to restrain herself from being obtrusive with the camera.
Sumitra Peries (right) filming Gehenu Lamayi. Courtesy Sumitra Peries
You see this tension throughout Gehenu Lamayi; it crops up in some of her other films as well, prominently Ganga Addara, where sequences that otherwise add very little value to the narrative – like the protagonist’s wedding – go on endlessly. Sumitra herself admitted that she had a tendency to “prettify everything.” But as Mark Cousins has noted, this only added layers and layers of depth to her work.
What distinguishes Gehenu Lamayi from Ganga Addara – the latter had the luxury of a rich producer and all the time and freedom Sumitra wanted – is how essentially innocent the former is. The latter is a bolder and more expressive work: emotions are not kept back, they gush out in torrents, sometimes in hysterics.
In Gehenu Lamayi, only the audience is privy to Kusum’s inner thoughts: almost no other character – except Padmini – pays much attention to what she is thinking and feeling. When Nimal’s mother, played by Chitra Vakishta (who also played Dhammi’s mother, incidentally, in Golu Hadawatha), discovers Kusum’s affair, and reproves her for it, Kusum cries by a tree; when Nimal’s mother comes back with a cup of tea and notices the tears, all she can say is, “How can you go on the road looking like that? Here, wipe those off.”
Ultimately, Gehenu Lamayi became to Sumitra’s career what Rekava was to Lester’s, Ahas Gawwa to Dharmasena Pathiraja’s, and Palagetiyo to Vasantha Obeyesekere’s. When you compare these debut works with their later films, you notice a rawness of style and vision, a somewhat jagged edge, which you don’t in their later years. Commenting on Ahas Gawwa, Regi Siriwardena noted its “inevitable technical roughnesses.” It’s like what Randall Jarrell wrote of Walt Whitman’s poetry: “[t]here are faults in this passage, and they do not matter.” Pauline Kael wrote the same of some of Brian De Palma’s early films.
I think this is applicable to Gehenu Lamayi as well. There is a certain slowness in the second half, especially in those scenes at the school, which might disarm younger audiences today. The dialogues, most of which I believe were taken from Jayalath’s novel, have a sentimental and highfalutin quality which only Jayalath was capable of. Yet ultimately, they do not matter. There is a wider social and political relevance in the narrative, which I feel transcends these limitations. I can do no more than quote the rest of Jarrell’s judgment on Whitman’s poetry; in his words, I think, we can find a true and honest reading of Sumitra’s film.
“… the serious truth, the complete realization of these last lines, make us remember that few poets have shown more of the tears of things, and the joy of things, and of the reality beneath either tears or joy.”
Uditha Devapriya is an independent researcher, writer, and columnist whose work spans art, culture, history and foreign policy. He is working on a study of Martin Wickramasinghe and an oral autobiography of the Sri Lankan director Sumitra Peries. Both are slated for publication in 2026. He can be reached at .
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The seizure of 471 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, or ‘ICE’, concealed inside a container, at the Port of Colombo, is being rightly treated as a significant Customs success. Yet the seizure should also provoke a more uncomfortable question. How long can Sri Lanka continue trying to secure a 21st century trading hub with an inspection system designed around methods that belong to another era?
The answer cannot simply be more inspections, more paperwork or more officials opening more containers. Colombo handles enormous volumes of containerised cargo, much of it legitimate. A single container can contain tonnes of goods, packed into hundreds of individual packages. When contraband represents only a fraction of the cargo, physical examination alone becomes an exercise in probability.
The challenge is not merely finding the needle in the haystack. It is determining which haystack is worth searching in the first place.
The Asian Development Bank identified this problem years ago. Its technical assistance assessment found that Sri Lanka’s trade logistics procedures suffered from a “lack of a modern risk management system and other modern customs tools”, combined with “insufficient use of automated systems”, contributing to cargo queues at the Port. It also found that the movement of cargo to and from Customs examination yards, which had poor access, contributed to congestion. These were not casual observations. They formed part of an ADB-supported programme intended to modernise Sri Lanka’s trade logistics system.
The findings were even more uncomfortable. The ADB identified “inadequate use of modern customs tools”, excessive documentation, insufficient automation, inadequate cooperation among border agencies, the absence of a port facilitation system, weaknesses in inland cargo clearance and inadequate capacity. It also reported that Customs risk rules were written in such a way that “80% of the consignments are targeted”. A system in which such a large proportion of cargo becomes subject to targeting inevitably risks undermining the very principle of risk-based Customs control. The more everything becomes suspicious, the less meaningful suspicion becomes.
The ADB-supported feasibility study for a new Customs inspection facility was initiated in 2020, with its final report submitted in December 2021. The study considered alternative locations before Kerawalapitiya emerged as the preferred site. The objective was not simply to construct another yard. The ADB Terms of Reference required the consultants to determine the physical and operational feasibility of the facility, assess potential demand, identify infrastructure requirements and prepare a comprehensive cost estimate. They were also required to identify the government stakeholders involved and “the time allocated for review and approvals”. The irony is difficult to miss. Years after the feasibility exercise, Sri Lanka is still discussing how to bring the facility into operation.
The proposed Kerawalapitiya Customs Verification Centre therefore represents something larger than another infrastructure project. It is a test of whether the Sri Lankan state can convert policy into implementation. According to reporting in 2024, the proposed facility was designed to accommodate around 3,000 containers. Yet the project remained caught in administrative and financial uncertainty years after the feasibility work had been completed. Government land was subsequently allocated and the government moved towards a hybrid public-private partnership model. The question now is why such a basic modernisation programme should have taken so long to progress.
This is where the private sector cannot simply be treated as an ideological inconvenience. Sri Lanka’s public sector has demonstrated repeatedly that it can commission studies, establish committees, formulate strategies and announce projects. The more difficult test is delivering complex infrastructure on time, within budget, and according to measurable standards. A modern Customs inspection centre requires sophisticated scanning equipment, electronic tracking, data systems, cybersecurity, maintenance and continuous technological upgrading. These are precisely the areas in which properly regulated private-sector participation can bring capital, expertise and operational discipline.
That does not mean privatising Customs. The authority to inspect, seize, investigate, impose duties and enforce the law must remain with the state. But there is no compelling reason why every piece of infrastructure, technology platform and operational service surrounding those sovereign functions, must be designed and delivered exclusively through traditional government mechanisms.
The government has already moved in this direction. Cabinet approved the establishment of the Kerawalapitiya Customs Verification Centre and subsequently approved a process to select a private partner under a hybrid public-private partnership model. The policy question is therefore no longer whether private-sector involvement is possible. It is whether the Government can structure that involvement transparently enough to prevent a new system from simply reproducing old weaknesses under a different ownership arrangement.
That requires radical transparency. The public should know who is selected, how the contract is awarded, what the operator is required to deliver, what technology will be installed, what performance standards will apply and what penalties will follow failure. The Government should publish a timetable with identifiable responsibility for every stage. Otherwise, “public-private partnership” risks becoming another phrase that conceals rather than solves institutional delay.
The technology must also be substantially more ambitious than a larger physical yard. The ADB found that existing cargo seals were “not tamper-proof” and that existing devices did not provide live tracking or alerts concerning tampering or diversion. A modern Kerawalapitiya
centre should integrate non-intrusive inspection, electronic cargo tracking, intelligence databases, automated risk profiling and secure digital records. Artificial intelligence may assist image analysis, but it should supplement trained Customs judgement rather than become an excuse to outsource accountability to algorithms.
The principle should be simple. Sri Lanka does not need 100 percent physical examination of containers. It needs 100 percent visibility of risk. That means legitimate traders should not be punished because the system cannot distinguish them from high-risk consignments. Low-risk cargo should move quickly. Suspicious containers should receive scanning and targeted examination. High-risk shipments should receive intensive inspection. The result should be stronger border security alongside faster trade, not security achieved by paralysing commerce.
The recent drug seizure demonstrates that Customs officers can and do intercept major threats. But individual successes cannot substitute for institutional reform. If Sri Lanka waits for every new seizure to trigger another debate about Customs weaknesses, it will remain trapped in a reactive cycle.
The ADB study has already identified the weaknesses. The government has already identified the land. The feasibility work has already been undertaken. The partnership model has already entered the policy process. What is missing is decisive implementation. Kerawalapitiya should, therefore, become a test of governmental accountability. Sri Lanka does not need another promise to modernise Customs. It needs a functioning facility, modern technology, transparent procurement and a deadline that cannot quietly disappear into another government file.
The real scandal would not be that criminals occasionally attempt to exploit weaknesses in a complex trading system. The real failure would be knowing where those weaknesses are, knowing how to fix them and still taking years to do so.
(Nirmala de Fonseka is a former Director of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, and currently works as a consultant specialising in logistics management)
In Parliament last week, Deputy Minister Anil Jayantha responded to MP Ravi Karunanayake’s question regarding the future of Sri Lankan exports to the EU market by stating that, “It is expected to examine and report on possible options for securing long-term and sustainable market access to the EU through a deeper economic arrangement, including a possible comprehensive trade agreement, in the event of Sri Lanka graduating from the GSP+ scheme if it is classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank for three consecutive years. Sri Lanka has recorded upper-middle-income status in 2026.” The deputy minister had also referred to the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and its impact on Sri Lankan exports.
This is alarming, given that the plans remain in a very early stage of development. The negotiations on the India–European Union Free Trade Agreement were concluded in January 2026. Sri Lanka should have engaged with the European Commission soon afterwards to discuss the FTA’s potential impact on Sri Lanka, and this should have been a key item on the agenda of the joint commission meeting between the European Commission and Sri Lanka in February. (see my article on this at https://island.lk/an-innocent-bystander-or-a-passive-onlooker/). Unfortunately, the joint press release following the meeting makes no reference to this critical issue.
Even at this late stage, considering a comprehensive trade agreement is undoubtedly a positive development. Particularly because after the expiration of GSP benefits, an FTA is Sri Lanka’s sole pathway to retaining preferential access to the EU market. But FTAs typically take years to negotiate. The EU-India FTA, for example, followed a long process that began in 2007. Negotiations officially concluded on
January 27, 2026. The agreement is expected to be signed in December 2026, with full implementation targeted for early 2027.
Now, let’s explore what other nations can teach us about this.
Indonesia is the latest country to “graduate” from the EU’s GSP arrangement. Indonesia achieved upper-middle-income status in 2020, briefly fell back due to economic shifts, and regained it in 2024, maintaining that status ever since. As a direct result of this sustained economic growth, Indonesia will graduate from the EU’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) on January 1, 2027. To safeguard its long-term competitiveness in the EU market ahead of this transition, the country has been negotiating the Indonesia–European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement since official talks began in July 2016. Following 19 rounds of talks, negotiators wrapped up the agreement in September 2025, though it remains unsigned; Indonesia is now rushing to complete both signing and ratification before the GSP deadline.
The Philippines and Sri Lanka were both reclassified as upper-middle-income countries on July 1, 2026. As a GSP Plus beneficiary, the Philippines anticipated that the economic development could
negatively affect its preferential market access to the EU and, to counter this, the country resumed stalled EU-FTA negotiations in 2024, which had paused during President Duterte’s regime over human rights issues. Having already secured substantial agreement on core terms, the formal trade pact is expected to be finalised in 2027, ahead of the country’s graduation from the GSP.
After briefly holding upper-middle-income status from July 2019 to July 2020, Sri Lanka fell back to the middle-income group due to the pandemic and economic crisis. Sri Lanka was reclassified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank in July 2026. This milestone starts the countdown to graduate from the EU’s GSP. If Sri Lanka keeps upper-middle-income status, it will exit the GSP programme by July 2029 — or by July 2030 if a transitional extension applies. Consequently, Sri Lanka’s exports to the European Union will face Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rates by 2030.
How prepared is Sri Lanka to transition out of the EU’s GSP Plus scheme?
The weekend newspaper reports on the preparatory arrangements for the FTA negotiations and lists FTA negotiations planned to pursue, but does not include a possible FTA with the EU. Sri Lanka should have begun exploring alternative paths to secure long-term, sustainable market access to the EU back in 2019, when the country briefly achieved upper-middle-income status. This should have included negotiating a comprehensive trade agreement to cushion the graduation from GSP+. Unfortunately, our trade policy experts have been entirely asleep at the wheel both then and in the years since.
It is also perplexing that influential trade bodies, such as the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and the Joint Apparel Association Forum, remain silent on this impending crisis. While they are currently vocal regarding the potential impacts of the 22nd Amendment and the Prevention of Terrorism Act on Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status, they have failed to alert or advise the government about the need for a long-term strategy to preserve a level playing field in the EU market. These bodies should take the lead immediately. The stakes are far higher now than they were in 2010, when GSP+ was withdrawn. Then, Sri Lanka transitioned from GSP Plus to the standard GSP framework. This time, the country faces a direct shift to MFN tariffs – the European Union’s least favourable tariff option. (The writer can be reached at [email protected] )
Continue Reading Features Fighting crime while safeguarding democracy now and in the future Published
The government’s determination to tackle corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime is one of the most important challenges it has taken upon itself. The scale of the problem is evident from recent seizures of drugs at sea and at the airport, which indicate the enormous dimensions of the illicit drug trade. The street value of some consignments has reportedly approached staggering sums, running into hundreds of millions of dollars. The financial resources available to those involved in this trade must be immense. Their ability to corrupt individuals and institutions cannot be underestimated. The revelations of the involvement of persons connected with previous governments, their families and even members of the security forces in the drug trade are particularly disturbing. This is not simply a problem of law enforcement. It is a threat to the integrity of the State itself. The government appears to be approaching this challenge more systematically and seriously than any government in the past.
In two public engagements this past week, the President explained the government’s position. The first was a gathering of Buddhist monks and members of other religious communities, at Temple Trees to mark the first anniversary of Ratama Ekata, the national anti-drug programme. The purpose was to brief religious leaders on progress and enlist their support in carrying the message to communities throughout the country. The second was a trade union conference in Colombo, where the President responded to concerns about the proposed anti-terrorism and anti-crime legislation. At both, the President drew a distinction between two groups opposing the proposed laws. One consisted of criminal groups and those who give them patronage and protection. The other consisted of civil society organisations and human rights groups raising concerns from the perspective of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law. The President said the government was prepared to listen to this second group and discuss the legislation with them, and that these were issues on which discussion and consensus needed to be obtained.
The Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (PSTB) would replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979, while the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill (POC Bill) would give the authorities new powers against organised crime. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has personally taken up the task of answering criticism from opposition parties, civil society and international human rights organisations. This shows that the two bills form central pillars of the government’s programme to restore the integrity of the State. However, concerns expressed regarding these two draft laws are substantial. In a 31-page communication made public this week, five United Nations human rights mandates warned that the POC Bill could increase the risk of torture and arbitrary detention. They pointed to police custody of 72 hours before a Magistrate’s review and detention for up to a year in police stations on ministerial authorisation. They also cited the admissibility of confessions to senior police officers, police access to phone records without court approval, surveillance of encrypted communications, and the possibility that trade unionists and protesters could fall within the law.
The President’s offer to reduce the 72-hour period to 48 hours, made in the course of a public speech, is a welcome sign of flexibility. The better test is whether the final text reaches the 24-hour norm of ordinary criminal procedure, or whether detention beyond it requires judicial approval. Sri Lanka’s experience under the PTA shows why this matters. Laws meant for exceptional threats can acquire a much wider application in practice. Bitter experience over nearly four decades has shown that people can spend years in detention without being charged, only eventually to be released without any charges being brought against them. The years they lose in detention can never be returned. They may lose the best and most productive years of their lives, their livelihoods and family relationships, without ever being found guilty of an offence. No subsequent release can compensate them for such a loss. This is precisely the kind of injustice that laws must be designed to prevent, rather than create the conditions in which it can occur.
There is a fundamental principle at stake. The liberty of individuals cannot be entrusted to the unfettered discretion of public officials or security forces. Whenever the State seeks to deprive a person of liberty, the judiciary must have an effective and decisive role. This is not a question of showing leniency towards those suspected of serious crimes. It is recognition that the power to arrest, detain and restrict the liberty of individuals is among the most important powers exercised by the State, and therefore requires the strongest safeguards. Law enforcement authorities must have the powers necessary to investigate and prosecute crime, but they cannot be the sole judges of how long a person may be deprived of liberty. That responsibility must remain firmly anchored in an independent judiciary. The State has a duty to protect society from criminals, but it also has an equally important duty to protect the innocent from the misuse of State power. The credibility of its efforts to combat crime depends on its ability to do both.
The role of the courts therefore needs to be strengthened in both bills. Decisions concerning prolonged detention, access to legal representation, the admissibility of confessions and restrictions on personal liberty should be subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny. The courts must have the authority to examine the necessity and proportionality of measures taken by the police and executive authorities, rather than merely endorse decisions already made by them. The breadth of certain definitions also raises questions about whether individuals could be brought within the ambit of the law on the basis of their associations or other characteristics rather than evidence of criminal conduct. A system in which members of the security establishment can exercise extensive powers while judicial officers have limited ability to intervene would weaken the constitutional safeguards that protect all citizens.
The President’s willingness to engage with civil society and human rights critics is a positive indicator. So is his assurance that the bills will not be rushed through Parliament, but considered only after comprehensive discussion and wider consensus. He has directed the Minister of Justice to engage with stakeholders. The fact that the Supreme Court is considering the PSTB, and that both bills have been challenged on constitutional grounds, provides another important avenue for scrutiny. The government has indicated that it will consider the Court’s determination and proposals for amendment. These developments offer a chance to improve the legislation rather than turn the debate into a confrontation between the government and its critics. The test of the government’s commitment to good governance will be whether it incorporates reasonable criticism into the final laws, including changes to provisions it originally thought necessary.
An aspect of good governance is to bring about changes that will stand the test of time. The government needs to demonstrate that it has effective mechanisms for ensuring that future legislation is subjected to independent scrutiny, meaningful consultation with the Bar Association, trade unions, media bodies, civil society and opposition parties, and rigorous human rights assessment before it reaches Parliament. The credibility of a government is measured not only by its determination to combat crime or its willingness to listen to criticism, but also by the care with which it exercises its legislative powers. Legislation should be built on sound legal foundations, informed public consultation and democratic consensus, rather than corrected only after its weaknesses have become matters of public controversy. Consensus may take longer to build, but the resulting changes are more likely to be accepted, respected and sustained. The challenge is not simply to enact laws that are strong enough to confront organised crime today, but to establish laws and institutions that will protect society and individual liberty under governments of the future.
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