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After assassinating the foremost Sri Lankan Tamil political leader and one-time Opposition leader Appapillai Amirthalingam and ex-Jaffna MP Vettivelu Yogeswaran, in July 1989, in Colombo, the LTTE declared those who stepped out of line, thereby deviated from policy of separate state, would be killed. Ex-Nallur MP Murugesu Sivasithamparam was shot and wounded in the same incident. In 1994, the LTTE ordered the boycott of the general election but EPDP leader Douglas Devananda contested. His party won nine seats in the Jaffna peninsula.
The LTTE also banned the singing of the national anthem and the hoisting of the national flag at government and public functions in Tamil areas. Devananda defied this ban, too.
The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) played a significant role in Sri Lanka’s overall campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The EPDP threw its weight behind the war effort soon after the LTTE resumed hostilities in June 1990 after India withdrew forces deployed in terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord signed on July 29, 1987, under duress, in the aftermath of the infamous uninvited ‘ parippu drop’ over northern Sri Lanka by the Indian Air Force, a modern-day New Delhi version of the Western gunboat diplomacy.
India ended its military mission here in late March 1990. Having conducted an unprecedented destabilisation project against Sri Lanka, India ceased the mission with egg on her face. The monument erected near Sri Lanka Parliament for over 1,300 Indian military personnel, who made the supreme sacrifice here, is a grim reminder of the callous project.
In fact, the United National Party (UNP) government reached a consensus with the EPDP, PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), ENDLF (Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front), TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation) and EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front) for their deployment. Of them, the EPDP was among three groups ready to deploy cadres against the LTTE.
The LTTE ended its honeymoon (May 1989 to June 1990) with President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Within weeks after the resumption of hostilities, the government lost the Kandy-Jaffna A9 stretch of the road between north of Vavuniya and Elephant Pass.
It would be pertinent to mention that the above-mentioned groups suffered debilitating losses in the hands of the LTTE during the then Premadasa government’s honeymoon with the LTTE. At the behest of President Premadasa, the military provided tacit support for LTTE operations. But, in the wake of resumption of hostilities by the LTTE, the other groups grabbed the opportunity to reach consensus with the government, though they knew of President Premadasa’s treacherous actions.
On the invitation of the government, anti-LTTE Tamil groups set up ‘offices’ in Colombo. The writer first met Douglas Devananda at his ‘office’ at No. 22, Siripa Lane, Thimbirigasyaya, in November, 1990. There were scores of people. Some of them carried weapons. When Kathiravelu Nythiananda Devananda, wearing a sarong and short-sleeved banian, sat across a small table, facing the writer, he kept a pistol on the table. Devananda explained the role played by his group in Colombo and in the North-East region.
The so-called office had been used by the EPDP to question suspected LTTEers apprehended in Colombo. Those who are not familiar with the situation then may not be able to comprehend the complexity of overt and covert operations conducted by the military against Tiger terrorists. The EPDP, as well as other groups, namely the PLOTE and TELO, taking part in operations against the LTTE not only apprehended suspects but subjected them to strenuous interrogation. There had been excesses.
The UNP government provided funding for these groups, as well as weapons. In terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord signed on July 29, 1987, India and Sri Lanka agreed to disarm all groups, including the LTTE.
Following is the relevant section of the agreement: 2.9 The emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Northern Provinces by Aug. 15, 1987. A cessation of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within 48 hours of signing of this agreement. All arms presently held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by the Government of Sri Lanka.
Consequent to the cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups, the Army and other security personnel will be confined to barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of surrendering arms and the confinement of security forces personnel moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.
An ex-colleague of Devananda, now living overseas, explained the circumstances of the one-time senior EPRLF cadre, EPDP leader switched his allegiance to the Sri Lankan government. Devananda formed the EPDP in the wake of a serious rift within the top EPRLF leadership. However, Devananda, at the time he had received training in Lebanon as a result of intervention made by UK based Tamils, served the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS). Subsequently, a group that included K. Padmanabah formed the General Union of Students (GUES) before the formation of the EPRLF.
The formation of the EPDP should be examined taking into consideration Devananda’s alleged involvement in Diwali-eve murder in Chennai in 1986. Devananda’s ex-colleague claimed that his friend hadn’t been at the scene of the killing but arrived there soon thereafter.
Devananda, who had also received training in India in the ’80s, served as the first commander of the EPRLF’s military wing but never achieved a major success. However, the eruption of Eelam War II, in June, 1990, gave the EPDP an unexpected opportunity to reach an agreement with the government. In return for the deployment of the EPDP in support of the military, the government ensured that it got recognised as a registered political party. The government also recognised PLOTE, EPRLF and TELO as political parties. President Premedasa hadn’t been bothered about their past or them carrying weapons or accusations ranging from extrajudicial killings to extortions and abductions.
Some of those who found fault with President Premadasa for granting political recognition for those groups conveniently forgot his directive to then Election Commissioner, the late Chandrananda de Silva, to recognise the LTTE, in early Dec. 1989.
The writer was among several local and foreign journalists, invited by the late LTTE theoretician Anton Balasingham, to the Colombo Hilton, where he made the announcement. Chain-smoking British passport holder Balasingham declared proudly that their emblem would be a Tiger in a red flag of rectangular shape. Neither Premadasa, nor the late Chandrananda de Silva, had any qualms about the PFLT (political wing of the LTTE) receiving political recognition in spite of it being armed. The LTTE received political recognition a couple of months before Velupillai Prabhakaran resumed Eelam War II.
Devananda, in his capacity as the EPDP Leader, exploited the situation to his advantage. Having left Sri Lanka for India in May 1986, about a year before the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord, Devananda returned to the country in May 1990, a couple of months after India ended its military mission here.
Of all ex-terrorists, Devananda achieved the impossible unlike most other ex-terrorist leaders. As the leader of the EPDP and him being quite conversant in English, he served as a Cabinet Minister under several Presidents and even visited India in spite of the Madras High Court declaring him as a proclaimed offender in the Chennai murder case that happened on Nov. 1, 1986. at Choolaimedu.
Regardless of his inability to win wider public support in the northern and eastern regions, Devananda had undermined the LTTE’s efforts to portray itself as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people. In 2001, the LTTE forced the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)-led Tamil National Alliance (TNA) to recognise Velupillai Prabhakaran as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people.
Whatever various people say in the final analysis, Devananda served the interests of Sri Lanka like a true loyal son, thereby risked his life on numerous occasions until the military brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009. Devananda’s EPDP may have not participated in high intensity battles in the northern and eastern theatres but definitely served the overall military strategy.
During the conflict and after the EPDP maintained a significant presence in Jaffna islands, the US and like-minded countries resented the EPDP as they feared the party could bring the entire northern province under its domination by manipulating parliamentary, Provincial Council and Local Government elections. The West targeted the EPDP against the backdrop of the formation of the TNA under the late R. Sampanthan’s leadership to support the LTTE’s macabre cause, both in and outside Parliament. At the onset, the TNA comprised EPRLF, TELO, PLOTE and even TULF. But, TULF pulled out sooner rather than later. The EPDP emerged as the major beneficiary of the State as the LTTE, at gun point, brought all other groups under its control.
During the honeymoon between the government and the LTTE, the writer had the opportunity to meet Mahattaya along with a group of Colombo-based Indian journalists and veteran journalist, the late Rita Sebastian, at Koliyakulam, close to Omanthai, where LTTE’s No. 02 Gopalswamy Mahendrarajah, alias Mahattaya, vowed to finish off all rival Tamil groups. That meeting took place amidst a large-scale government backed campaign against rival groups, while India was in the process of de-inducting its troops (LTTE pledges to eliminate pro-Indian Tamil groups, The Island, January 10, 1990 edition).
Devananda survives two suicide attacks
The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) worked out by Norway in 2002, too, had a clause similar to the one in the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987. While the 1987 agreement envisaged the disarming of all Tamil groups, the Norwegian one was meant to disarm all groups, other than the LTTE.
Devananda’s EPDP had been especially targeted as by then it remained the main Tamil group opposed to the LTTE, though it lacked wide public support due to the conservative nature of the Tamil society to fall in line with long established parties and their leaders. A section of the Tamil Diaspora that still couldn’t stomach the LTTE’s eradication were really happy about Devananda’s recent arrest over the recovery of a weapon issued to him by the Army two decades ago ending up with the underworld. The weapon, issued to Devananda, in 2001, was later recovered following the interrogation of organised criminal figure ‘Makandure Madush’ in 2019. Devananda has been remanded till January 9 pending further investigations.
Being the leader of a militant group forever hunted by Tiger terrorists surely he must have lost count of all the weapons he received on behalf of his party to defend themselves. Surely the Army has lost quite a number of weapons and similarly so has the police, but never has an Army Commander or an IGP remanded for such losses. Is it because Devananda stood up against the most ruthless terrorist outfit that he is now being hounded to please the West? Then what about the large quantities of weapons that Premadasa foolishly gifted to the LTTE? Was anyone held responsible for those treacherous acts?
Then what action has been taken against those who took part in the sinister Aragalaya at the behest of the West to topple a duly elected President and bring the country to its knees, as were similar putsch in Pakistan, Bangladesh effected to please white masters. Were human clones like the ‘Dolly the Sheep’ also developed to successfully carry out such devious plots?
Let me remind you of two suicide attacks the LTTE planned against Devananda in July 2004 and Nov. 2007. The first attempt had been made by a woman suicide cadre later identified as Thiyagaraja Jeyarani, who detonated the explosives strapped around her waist at the Kollupitiya Police station next to the Sri Lankan Prime Minister’s official residence in Colombo killing herself and four police personnel, while injuring nine others. The woman triggered the blast soon after the Ministerial Security Division (MSD) assigned to protect the then Hindu Cultural Affairs Minister Devananda handed her over to the Kollupitiya police station on suspicion. Investigations revealed that the suicide bomber had been a servant at the Thalawathugoda residence of the son of a former UNP Minister for about one and half years and was considered by the family as an honest worker (Bomber stayed with former UNP Minister’s son, The Island, July 12, 2004).
She had been planning to assassinate Devananda at his office situated opposite the Colombo Plaza. The police identified the person who provided employment to the assassin as a defeated UNP candidate who contested Kandy district at the April 2004 parliamentary election.
The second attempt on Devananda was made at his Ministry at Narahenpita on 28 Nov. 2007. Several hours later, on the same day, the LTTE triggered a powerful blast at Nugegoda, killing 10 persons and causing injuries to 40 others. The bomb had been wrapped in a parcel and was handed over to a clothing store security counter and detonated when a policeman carelessly handled the parcel after the shop management alerted police.
Having lost control of areas it controlled in the Eastern Province to the military by July 2007, the LTTE was battling two Army formations, namely 57 Division commanded by Brigadier Jagath Dias and Task Force 1 led by Colonel Shavendra Silva on the Vanni west front. The LTTE sought to cause chaos by striking Colombo. Obviously, the LTTE felt quite confident in eliminating Devananda, though the EPDP leader survived scores of previous assassination attempts. Devananda had been the Social Welfare Minister at the time. The Minister survived, but the blast triggered in his office complex killed one and inflicted injuries on two others.
Hardcore LTTE terrorists held at the Jawatte Jail, in Kalutara attacked Devananda on June 30, 1998, made an attempt on Devananda’s life when he intervened to end a hunger strike launched by a section of the prisoners. One of Devananda’s eyes suffered permanent impairment.
Having served as a Jaffna District MP for over three decades, Devananda failed to retain his seat at the last parliamentary election when the National People’s Power (NPP) swept all electoral districts. The NPP, in fact, delivered a knockout blow not only to the EPDP but ITAK that always enjoyed undisputed political power in the northern and eastern regions. Devananda, now in his late 60, under the present circumstances may find it difficult to re-enter Parliament at the next parliamentary elections, four years away.
Devananda first entered Parliament at the 1994 August general election. He has been re-elected to Parliament in all subsequent elections.
The EPDP contested the 1994 poll from an independent group, securing just 10,744 votes but ended up having nine seats. The polling was low due to most areas of the Jaffna peninsula being under LTTE control. But of the 10,744 votes, 9,944 votes came from the EPDP-controlled Jaffna islands. Devananda managed to secure 2,091 preference votes. That election brought an end to the 17-year-long UNP rule. By then Devananda’s first benefactor Ranasinghe Premadasa had been killed in a suicide attack and Devananda swiftly aligned his party with that of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance (PA).
The LTTE mounted an attack on Devananda’s Colombo home on the night of Oct. 9, 1995. It had been one of 12 such attempts on his life
Devananda, who had survived the July 1983 Welikada Prison riot where Sinhala prisoners murdered 53 Tamils detainees. He then got transferred to Batticaloa Prison from where he escaped along with 40 others in September of the same year, received his first Cabinet position as Minister of Development, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the North, and Tamil Affairs, North and East following the 1994 general election. Devananda lost his Cabinet position following the PA’s defeat at the 2001 parliamentary election. Devananda entered the Cabinet as the Minister of Agriculture, Marketing Development, Hindu Education Affairs, Tamil Language & Vocational Training Centres in North following the UPFA’s victory at the 2004 general election.
Devananda further consolidated his position during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s presidency (2005 to 2015). He earned the wrath of the LTTE and Tamil Diaspora for his support for the government that eradicated the LTTE. Over the years, the EPDP’s role in overall security strategy diminished though the group maintained a presence in Jaffna islands.
There had been accusations against the EPDP. There had also been excesses on the part of the EPDP. But, Devananda and his men played an important role though not in numbers deployed against the LTTE. The EPDP proved that all Tamils didn’t follow the LTTE’s destructive path.
Three years after the eradication of the LTTE, in May 2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa sent Devananda to the UN Human Rights Council as part of the official government delegation to Geneva.
Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka, Ambassador/ Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office in Geneva, comment on Devananda’s arrest is a must read. Devananda’s fate would have been different if he remained with the EPRLF, one of the Indian backed terrorist groups installed as the first North East Provincial Administration in which Jayatilleke served as Minister of Planning and Youth Affairs.
The EPRLF administration was brought to an unceremonious end when India ended its military mission here in 1990.
While multiple LTTE attempts to assassinate Devananda failed during the war with the last attempt made in late 2007, less than two years before the end of the conflict, obviously the EPDP leader remains a target. Those who still cannot stomach the LTTE’s humiliating defeat, seem to be jubilant over Devananda’s recent arrest over a missing weapon.
Therefore it is incumbent upon the NPP/JVP government to ensure the safety of Devananda under whatever circumstances as he has been a true patriot unlike many a bogus revolutionary in the present government from top to bottom, who are nothing more than cheap opportunists. Remember these same bogus zealots who threatened to sacrifice their lives to fight Indian threat to this country, no sooner they grabbed power became turncoats and ardent admirers of India overnight as if on a cue from Washington.
Various interested parties, including the US, relentlessly targeted the EPDP. US Embassy cable originating from Colombo quoted Stephen Sunthararaj, the then-Coordinator for the Child Protection Unit of World Vision in Jaffna directing a spate of allegations against the EPDP. In attempting to paint black the relationship between the military and the EPDP, Sunthararaj even accused the latter of child trafficking, sexual violence and running Tamil prostitution rings for soldiers.
The diplomatic cable also quoted the World Vision man as having said… because of the large number of widows in Jaffna, men associated with the EPDP, often from neighbouring villages, are used to seduce women with children, especially girls, with the promise of economic protection. After establishing a relationship, the men then take the children, sometimes by force and sometimes with the promise that they will be provided a better life.
The children are sold into slavery, usually boys to work camps and girls to prostitution rings, through EPDP’s networks in India and Malaysia.”
It would be interesting to examine whether World Vision at any time during the conflict took a stand against the use of child soldiers and indiscriminate use of women and children in high intensity battles and suicide missions by the LTTE. Did World Vision at least request the LTTE not to depend on human shields on the Vanni east front as the area under LTTE control gradually shrank? Have we ever heard of those who had been shedding crocodile tears for civilians opposing the LTTE’s despicable strategies? Never.
Against the backdrop of such accusations the non-inclusion of Devananda in some sanctioned list is surprising. Devananda, however, is receiving the treatment meted out to those Tamils who opposed the LTTE or switched allegiance to the government. Ex-LTTE Pilleyan and his one-time leader Karuna are among them. But unlike them, Devananda never served the LTTE’s despicable cause.
Historical context of politicisation of Mahavamsa, and Tamil translation of the last volume
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A leaked US diplomatic cable, dated July 15, 2009, signed by the then Geneva-based US Ambassador, Clint Williamson, cleared the Sri Lankan Army of crimes against humanity during the Vanni offensive. The cable, addressed to the US State Department, was based on a confidential conversation Ambassador Williamson had with the then ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacque de Maio, on July 9, 2009. Ambassador Williamson wrote: “The army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at an increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it didn’t amount to genocide. He (Maio) could cite examples of where the army had stopped shelling when the ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths. He concluded, however, by asserting that the GoSL failed to recognize its obligation to protect civilians, in spite of its approach resulting in higher military casualties.”
Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam recently declared, in New Delhi, that their biggest challenge was to convince the BJP government to take a much bigger interest in the question of accountability and on the question of a political solution.
The Tamil Guardian quoted Ponnambalam as having said: “They’re both two sides of the same coin.” The Island reproduced the Tamil Guardian report in its 6 Nov. edition (https://island.lk/sri-lanka-sees-tamil-nationhood-as-a-threat-to-buddhism-ponnambalam-tells-delhi-conference/)
This coming from Gajendrakumar, who, along with his late father Kumar Ponnambalam and grandfather, the legendary G.G. Ponnambalam, longtime residents of Colombo, with substantial wealth here and abroad, especially in owning prime real estate, even to this day, have no shame in wooing for a separatist Eelam, most probably to hoodwink the gullible Tamil masses to vote for him as their hero at future elections.
Several readers expressed serious concerns over the views expressed by the Jaffna District lawmaker. Retired Maj. Gen. Chagie Gallage, one of the notable battlefield strategists and outspoken Gajaba regiment veteran, was among them. “The country couldn’t turn a blind eye to this sort of propaganda,” Gallage declared, emphasising the responsibility on the part of those who benefited from the eradication of the LTTE to counter such lies. “An end to forcible conscription of children is sufficient to justify the eradication of the group,” he said, alleging none of those shedding crocodile tears today bothered to ask the LTTE to give up innocent human shields.
TNPF is not represented in Parliament. Ponnambalam contested the last parliamentary election on the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) ticket. He is the only ACTC lawmaker in the current Parliament. The Tamil nationhood, MP Ponnambalam had referred to at the onset of the fiery speech, spanned across some parts of the world, Tamil Nadu included. The so-called Tamil nationhood is not exclusively tied to Sri Lanka.
The late J.N. Dixit, one-time Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (1985 to 1989), pointed out in his memoirs ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun to Yashwant Sinha’ the late Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi feared the emergence of Tamil separatism in India if she refused to support, what Dixit called, aspirations of Sri Lanka Tamils (Chapter: An Indo-centric practitioner of realpolitik/p 147).
The involvement of the Australian Tamil Congress and the United States Tamil Action Group in the New Delhi conference revealed the despicable overall strategy of those who believed in the LTTE’s capacity to force the battlefield stalemate to their advantage.
The Norway-led almost one-sided peace process, during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s presidency, gave the LTTE an ample opportunity to advance its separatist agenda, thanks to the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s utterly irresponsible blind approach to a negotiated settlement. The LTTE quit the negotiating table in April 2003. That move made the war inevitable. It would be pertinent to remind that Ponnambalam had been a Jaffna district MP at the time the LTTE quit the negotiating table, while safely living in Colombo much of the time, as was the case with most Tamil leaders, including M.A. Sumanthiran, a resident of Wellawatte. So while maligning Sri Lanka with highly exaggerated claims, like existence of mass graves at every available opportunity, especially when they are abroad, those same Lankan Tamil leaders, however, still feel quite safe here and not India. And we must say we are proud to have them living among us as our brothers, despite all the nasty things they accuse us of. Even if we grant that some of their animosity is justified, there is no necessity to kill each other to settle issues, other than to work things out peacefully for the benefit of us all. Both Sinhalese and Tamils, especially the latter, must decide whether we want the permanent chaos, that is India with its innumerable caste/race/religious divisions, or do we bury the hatchet between the two major races to settle problems that beset us here, albeit without external interference.
Ponnambalam represented the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) that had recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people and thereby backed Velupillai Prabhakaran’s initiative. The ITAK parliamentary group consisted of 15 MPs, including one National List member. However, those who entered Parliament on the ITAK ticket were recognised as members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) consisting of ex-Indian sponsored terrorist groups and the ITAK.
The LTTE advanced its terror campaign in the run-up to the 2004 parliamentary poll. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, the LTTE actions directly benefited the TNA. The LTTE undermined other political parties in the fray. Their objective was clear. They wanted the largest possible ITAK group in Parliament to back the war effort. Twenty-two were elected on the ITAK ticket at the parliamentary polls held in early April 2004. That effort was successful with the LTTE stuffing ballot boxes for ITAK candidates as was clearly observed by EU election monitors in their post-election report. Ponnambalam was among the elected group. Throughout the Eelam War IV (Aug. 2006 to May 2009), ITAK/TNA fiercely backed the LTTE. They remained loyal to the LTTE as its units gradually retreated until the group suffered a humiliating defeat at Anandapuram, in April 2009, before the total collapse several weeks later.
Against the backdrop of the devastating split in the LTTE, caused by its Eastern Commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka Karuna Amman, rebelling against their supreme leader Prabhakaran, alleging discrimination against Easterners, in 2004, ahead of the parliamentary polls, ITAK/TNA remained committed to the LTTE macabre cause. After the armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion, Ponnambalam quit the TNA. He formed the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) in 2010. The TNPF fielded candidates at the 2010 and 2015 parliamentary polls but couldn’t even secure a single seat. Ponnambalam returned to Parliament again in Aug 2020.
Qualified as a Barrister-at-Law, in the UK, in 1997, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam received Sri Lanka qualification as an Attorney-at-Law, two years later, before entering active politics, in the wake of his father Kumar Ponnambalam’s assassination, in early January 2000.
Ponnambalam conveniently forgot the responsibility on the part of India, as well as the Tamil community, for the crimes committed in Sri Lanka and India. Tamil Guardian report on Ponnambalam’s speech, made no reference to the Indian military intervention, deaths of over 1,200 Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka, thousands of Tamils, both LTTE and civilians, killed by the foreign army, elimination of Tamil political leadership by the LTTE and the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991, just over a year after India ended its disastrous military mission here.
The BJP wouldn’t be deceived by unfounded claims, such as Ponnambalam’s Delhi declaration that the Sri Lankan State considered the very potential of Tamil nationhood as a threat to Buddhism and was hell-bent on dismantling it.
BJP leader and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, having repeatedly paid tribute to Indian officers and men who perished in Sri Lanka and twice paid floral tributes to the Indian military memorial near Parliament, would be averse to anti-Sri Lanka rhetoric. Unfortunately, some Tamil politicians have sought to depict a bleak picture of the country, though the Northern and Eastern Provinces achieved impressive post-war success. After Modi assumed the premiership, in 2014, India gradually changed its Sri Lanka strategy and New Delhi’s overall approach cannot be discussed, forgetting the role they played in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2022 and the facilitation of the JVP/NPP victory at the presidential and parliamentary polls in Sept. and Nov., 2024, respectively.
No one will be able to entice New Delhi by propagating that the Sri Lankan State was pursuing a hostile attitude towards Tamil Hindus. Much to the discomfort of those seeking to arouse communal feelings, the Tamil community in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, for the first time in post-independence history, voted overwhelmingly for the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) at the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024.
The emergence of the NPP as the dominant power in the predominantly Tamil speaking regions has troubled ITAK and other Tamil parties. The deterioration of ITAK/TNA began after the eradication of the LTTE. Once the dominant political power that worked with the LTTE gradually declined and was reduced to eight seats at the last parliamentary poll.
The Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA), consisting of parties that broke away from the ITAK-led TNA, won a seat with Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) leader Selvam Adaikkalanathan winning in Vanni.
Independent candidate Dr Ramanathan Archuna won a seat in Jaffna, probably at the expense of M.A. Sumanthiran, PC, who could have made a significant contribution in Parliament. Archuna has caused chaos with repeated declarations, both in and outside Parliament, that the Tamil Diaspora funded the NPP campaign. The influence of the Tamil Diaspora, too, has deteriorated over the years, though European political parties bent backwards to appease the voters of Sri Lankan origin. But, foreign governments, to a certain extent, have lost interest in accountability issues, though on and off statements are made and concerns expressed over the delay in addressing long standing issues. However, accountability issues are no longer a priority as repeatedly indicated by India. The post- Aragalaya Indo-Sri Lanka relationship/partnership underscored by seven MoUs finalised in April 2025, including one on defence, followed by three defence MoUs signed in Sept, this year, as well as transfer of Colombo Dockyard Ltd. (CDL) controlling shares to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), affiliated with the Indian Defence Ministry, marked a fundamental shift towards New Delhi.
With the NPP emerging as the dominant political power in the Northern and Eastern regions, the Tamil parties seemed to be on the back foot. Lawmaker Ponnambalam’s recent bid to cause concern among the Indian establishment over perceived Sinhala Buddhist threat to Tamil Hindus seemed a desperate move that failed to convince their own.
Ponnambalam returned to Parliament in August 2020, as the leader of Ahila Ilankai Thamil Congress. The party also secured one National List slot. Ponnambalam accommodated Selvarasa Gajenthiran, who quit the TNA, along with him, in 2010, on the National List.
Ponnambalam attacked the wartime political leadership and the war-winning armed forces. Alleging that the Tamil community had been subjected to genocide, Ponnambalam demanded international accountability. The MP dismissed whatever proposals meant to address the issues through domestic mechanisms.
Ponnambalam attacked President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s policy statement. The lawmaker targeted the following section in particular: “It is equally important to precisely interpret the mandate given by the people. We respect the trust that the people have placed in me and the Prime Minister and the newly elected people’s representatives. We have a clear understanding of the expectations with which the people gave such a powerful mandate to the government. We will leave no room for such expectations to be dashed for any reason. It should always be remembered that the prime responsibility of a people’s representative is to serve the public. We will be sensitive to fulfilling the needs of the people, keeping in mind that all these positions are responsibilities and not privileges.”
Ponnanmalam declared that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s mandate (2019 November presidential and 2020 August parliamentary polls) did not extend to the North-East region. Ponnambalam depicted the vote received by all Tamils, including Ramanathan and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) Douglas Devananda, elected to the new Parliament, as one that overwhelmingly endorsed self-determination of the Tamil speaking people. Ponnambalam justified international intervention on the basis of the Tamil community being deprived of the security it deserved.
Declaring them (Tamil lawmakers) received a mandate for Tamil rights to be recognised, Ponnambalam declared: “two nations exist in this country.”
“Sovereignty can never be a defence. This country has gone through a war and the whole world says that heinous crimes have been committed and the state is the number one accused party,” Ponnambalam declared, adding “Under no circumstances can any President, or any country, for that matter, try to hide behind the concept of sovereignty, to prevent accountability for heinous crimes. The victims of these heinous crimes stand as Tamils… the major victims stand as Tamils and they have consistently said that genocide has been committed and that they want international accountability.”
When Ponnambalam went on and on repeating war crimes allegations, in Parliament, former Presidents and Commanders-in-Chief, Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala Sirisena, as well as war-winning Army Chief Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, were present. Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa, too, was present.
It would be pertinent to ask lawmaker Ponnambalam whether, as a member of the TNA, he endorsed the party’s decision to vote for the then common presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka at the January 26, 2010 presidential election. Did the TNA decision to join the UNP-led coalition, comprising the JVP, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) et al, was unanimously approved by all constituents of the TNA?
Now that Ponnambalam reiterated genocide allegations, he owed an explanation why the Tamil community overwhelmingly endorsed Fonseka at the presidential election after accusing him and his army of committing genocide. Fonseka comfortably won all electoral districts, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, though the South ensured Mahinda Rajapaksa secured a second term, with a staggering 1.8 mn majority. Mahinda Rajapaksa polled 6,015,934 votes (57.88%) whereas Fonseka received 4,173,185 votes (40.15%). Fonseka comfortably won the predominantly Tamil electoral districts of Jaffna, Vanni, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Digamadulla and Nuwara-Eliya.
The 2010 presidential election was held less than a year after the armed forces eradicated the LTTE. Blindly accusing the Sri Lanka army of war crimes, and genocide, seemed ridiculous, after having voted for the very man who conducted the ground offensive that brought the LTTE to its knees, in May 2009.
The truth is that the LTTE and the TNA really believed they could overwhelm President Mahinda Rajapaksa far more easily than Wickremesinghe. In spite of serious reservations, the TNA backed the LTTE’s move. Particularly, the Northern electorate boycotted the 2005 Nov. presidential election. The then top UNPer Malik Samarawickrema told the writer if not for that boycott, engineered by the LTTE, Wickremesinghe could have won the presidential poll. That may have very well been the case.
Having dug its own grave, the LTTE faced a relentless three-year military onslaught. The LTTE resumed large-scale operations in August 2006 and the counter offensive didn’t stop until Prabhakaran was isolated and killed on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.
The armed forces eradicated the LTTE in May 2009. In the following year, the TNA backed the very man who led the campaign against the LTTE at the presidential poll.
The war crimes and genocide allegations should have been reexamined after Fonseka won the Northern and Eastern provinces. Unfortunately, successive governments lacked interest and a cohesive plan to counter lies. In spite of exposure of calculated lies meant to humiliate Sri Lanka and increase international pressure, successive governments shirked their responsibility to counter those lies toe to toe in the face of propaganda against the country being primarily launched with the backing of the so-called international community, meaning the powerful West.
Sri Lanka never took tangible measures against those who propagated lies as part of an overall strategy. Some still couldn’t stomach the LTTE’s annihilation. Wigneswaran’s calculated lie is a case in point. Wigneswaran, and a section of the Tamil media, in August 2016, accused the military of killing over 100 LTTE combatants, in custody, by poisoning them. The PTI and NDTV were among the international media which reported unsubstantiated allegations.
Accusers placed the number of such deaths at 104. Accusations were made while the US Pacific Command’s ‘Pacific Angel’ exercise was underway, in the Jaffna peninsula.
Despite being a retired Supreme Court Judge, the highest legal body in the country, Wigneswaran raked up a brazen lie by brashly declaring that the US Air Force’s medical team, in Jaffna, would examine the former rehabilitated LTTE cadres, who, he alleged, had fallen sick because they were injected with poisonous substances, at government detention, or rehabilitation camps.
The US conveniently refrained from making its position clear on Wigneswaran’s claim when the writer raised the issue with the US Embassy in Colombo.
Responding to several questions The Island posed, regarding ex-LTTE cadres being poisoned, the US Embassy said: “Operation Pacific Angel is providing assistance, based on the specific needs of the local communities. Among the nearly 70 members of this multilateral assistance programme – including some medical staff and engineers from Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, as well as the United States – are over 40 doctors, providing basic medical services: dental procedures; physical therapy; general medical assistance; and optometry. These are the only services being provided.”
The writer asked the US Embassy whether it could confirm that US Pacific Command personnel, conducting medical tests on ex-LTTE cadres, allegedly poisoned by the previous government; whether they would be moved to overseas medical facility for further tests; whether the GoSL had been informed of the development; when did the TNA request the US intervention and whether the US military had conducted similar tests in other countries. For obvious reasons, the US refrained from responding to The Island queries.
The New Indian Express quoted Wigneswaran as having said that the US Air Force’s medical team would examine ex-LTTE cadres who had been sick because they were injected with poisonous substances by the Sri Lankan armed military while they were undergoing detention, or rehabilitation. Wigneswaran, according to the New Indian Express, had told the NPC (Northern Provincial Council) that he had mentioned the plight of the former combatants in his conversation with the US Ambassador, Atul Keshap, and asked if the USAF team could examine them and give an independent report.
Wigneswaran’s allegations died a natural death. Neither the TNA, nor the US, ever discussed the issue publicly.
With the latest New Delhi talk, Ponnambalam appeared to have taken the campaign against Sri Lanka to a new level.
Sasanka Perera (The writer is on X as @sasmester)
Sri Lankan social and mainstream media have shown considerable euphoria over oral observations made by the Indian Supreme Court on the Katchatheevu island in early October 2026. It stems primarily from a collective sense of relief and validation over the ownership of the island because Sri Lanka has faced intense political posturing, domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians, and legal challenges in India demanding the retrieval of the island. But nothing new or pathbreaking has emerged from the Indian Supreme Court on this issue. What is clear is that ownership of Katchatheevu is a settled issue irrespective of its continued reemergence in Indian courts and in Tamil Nadu political performances.
The Katchatheevu issue must be understood in its historical context, with legal clarity, strategic sensibility and a large dose of commonsense in which Sri Lankans are generally wanting. Neither an oral observation by India’s Supreme Court nor the Indian government’s continued adherence to existing maritime agreements constitutes a new, final judicial determination of sovereignty. More importantly, even an unequivocal recognition of Sri Lanka’s territorial rights would not remove the wider asymmetries of power between the two countries of which our political leaders must be extremely mindful when dealing with India.
What did India’s Supreme Court Decide?
The most recently reported proceedings, i.e. of 6 October 2026, concern several petitions challenging the 1974 India–Sri Lanka maritime boundary agreement and the subsequent 1976 agreement regulating fishing in each country’s maritime zones. The principal case, A.K. Selvaraj v. Union of India, was filed in 2008. The wider proceedings include Writ Petition (Civil) No. 430 of 2013; special leave petitions and a petition filed in 2021. Former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa was also among the petitioners in the litigation. The petitioners challenge the legality of recognising Katchatheevu as lying on Sri Lanka’s side of the maritime boundary, arguing, among other things, that the transfer of Indian territory required constitutional and parliamentary procedures.
On 6 October 2026, Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva heard the matter. The Court orally observed that Indian fishermen needed to be sensitised against entering Sri Lankan waters. It also questioned whether the Indian government was engaging Sri Lanka over the treaties. At the Attorney General’s request, the matter was adjourned to 2 February 2027. No final judgment on sovereignty was delivered. This state of affairs is crucial. An oral observation during a hearing is not a binding determination of territorial sovereignty. Nor does an adjournment amount to the dismissal of the petitions or an endorsement of every argument advanced by either side.
The Indian government’s position is nevertheless significant. According to publicly available information, the Attorney General of India informed the Court that the Indian government had no intention of reopening the 1974 and 1976 agreements, while concerns regarding Indian fishermen would continue to be pursued through diplomatic channels. This establishes the Indian government’s continuing commitment to the existing settlement. It is not a fresh concession of sovereignty made in response to a final Supreme Court ruling. However, it is entirely possible that the Indian government’s position could be influenced by future political developments, while the agreements themselves remain the operative bilateral framework at the moment.
Katchatheevu’s history is far more complex than the dominant popular Indian assertion that the island was Indian territory until it was handed over to Sri Lanka in 1974. British colonial administrations in India and Ceylon disputed aspects of the island’s status, and the available historical record contains evidence invoked by both sides. The proprietary interests claimed by the Raja of Ramnad, historical leases and British administrative records have featured prominently in Indian arguments. The 1904 Madras High Court case, Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, and a 1922 Imperial Records Department report have been cited by Indian commentators as evidence supporting the historical Indian claim. However, proprietary rights, fishing practices and administrative jurisdiction are not automatically equivalent to sovereign ownership over territory.
The 1921 negotiations between British India and Ceylon are particularly important. The two colonial administrations discussed a fisheries boundary in the Palk Strait. The Indian delegation agreed to a proposed line without prejudice to any territorial claim India might make to Katchatheevu. The reservation demonstrated that the island’s status was contested rather than conclusively resolved by that exercise. Subsequent correspondence from the Government of India in 1923 is also relevant to the historical debate. It has been cited in discussions of the government’s assessment of the competing claims. Nevertheless, the 1921 negotiations and the associated correspondence should not be presented as a conclusive international judicial ruling in Ceylon’s favour.
The more decisive development came after independence, in 1974 and 1976. In June 1974, India and Sri Lanka concluded the ‘Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters.’ Article 1 established the maritime boundary, placing Katchatheevu on the Sri Lankan side. Article 4 provided that each country would exercise sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the waters, islands, continental shelf and subsoil on its respective side of the boundary. Article 5 preserved access for Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit Katchatheevu as previously practiced, without requiring Sri Lankan travel documents or visas for these purposes. That provision, however, did not expressly grant fishing rights for Indians in Sri Lankan waters. The 1976 agreements subsequently clarified the exclusion of fishing vessels and fishermen from each country’s maritime zones, subject to the agreements’ specific provisions.
Both the 1974 and 1976 agreements were empowered in practice and were subsequently registered with the United Nations. They constitute the central legal instruments governing the present boundary.
Interestingly, debates on this issue in Sri Lanka and India often overlook the case of the Wadge Bank, a vast, ecologically rich submarine plateau located about 80 kilometers south of Kanyakumari. Although it lies outside India’s territorial waters, it falls within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Fishermen from both nations had commercially fished these waters since at least the 1920s, if not earlier. However, under the 1976 maritime agreement between the two countries, the region was formally recognised as part of India’s EEZ, and Sri Lankan fishing vessels were barred from the area starting around 1979. In essence, this served as a crucial trade-off: Sri Lanka secured full sovereignty over Katchatheevu along with surrounding fishing rights, while its fishers were completely barred from the far more resource-rich Wadge Bank.
What do the Earlier Legal Cases Establish?
The 1974 settlement did not end Indian domestic challenges to the island’s status. In Brij Khandelwal v. Union of India (1974), the Delhi High Court considered petitions filed by Brij Khandelwal and Shyama Charan Gupta challenging the Indian government’s agreement concerning Katchatheevu. The petitioners argued that Indian territory could not be ceded without the necessary constitutional procedures. The Court dismissed their petitions, finding that they had not established the requisite personal legal interest to obtain the relief sought. But this should not be misrepresented as an international adjudication conclusively resolving all historical questions of ownership.
The case remains important because it illustrates that the legality of the 1974 settlement was contested in India from the outset. However, these contestations did not result due to lack of clarity in legal positions. Instead, they resulted as a consequence of Indian nationalism and popular territoriality in the way these feelings manifested among people. These are subjective sentiments and always open to emotional and political manipulation which no law can control. As a result, subsequent challenges have continued to raise constitutional arguments, including whether the agreement required a consti
The broader constitutional question is not trivial. In ‘Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves’ (1960) the Supreme Court of India held that ceding Indian territory to a foreign state could require a constitutional amendment. Petitioners have invoked this principle in challenging the Katchatheevu agreements. But the application of the Berubari precedent to this particular maritime boundary settlement is a matter for judicial determination. It cannot be assumed that every argument advanced by the petitioners has already been accepted.
The crucial point for Sri Lanka is that these domestic Indian proceedings have not, to date, displaced the bilateral agreements. Equally, the latest Supreme Court hearing has not created a new determination confirming or rejecting Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Until a final judgment is delivered, the petitions remain pending.
For Sri Lanka, the principal diplomatic achievement is not that India has suddenly conceded a prevised Sri Lankan sovereignty over a disputed territory. Such a reading would be a misinterpretation. What is important here is that the Indian government continues to treat the existing maritime settlement as operative despite recurrent domestic political pressure to revisit it. This position reinforces the stability of Sri Lanka’s maritime jurisdiction. It also demonstrates that Indian electoral rhetoric and the Indian government’s official diplomatic position need not always coincide — even though they have at times. For instance, in 2024, in the run-up to the country’s elections, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah publicly criticised these agreements arguing they amounted to Katchatheevu being ceded to Sri Lanka by the then-Congress government. Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar also supported these claims in public at the time.
Yet the recent Sri Lankan euphoria surrounding Katchatheevu risks obscuring the distinction between territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The hype in Sri Lanka, particularly seen across social media supportive of the present government, comes from the extreme naivety with which most Sri Lankans — including political leaders and officials — view international relations and relations between Sri Lanka and India in particular.
A state may recognise another country’s borders while pursuing policies that substantially increase its influence over that country’s economic choices, infrastructure, energy systems and external relationships. This is where the Sri Lankan government and the country’s citizens must look beyond the immediate euphoria of the Indian Supreme Court observations.
In this situation, despite the rhetoric of convenience of populist Indian politicians, Sri Lanka should certainly welcome India’s official adherence to the maritime agreements without mistaking it to be a guarantee of future strategic restraint. The legal settlement of Katchatheevu and the wider balance of power are separate questions. One concerns territorial jurisdiction. The other concerns the practical ability of a sovereign state to determine its own economic and strategic future. Sri Lanka must continue to insist that the 1974 and 1976 agreements be respected, while addressing fishing disputes through diplomacy, legal enforcement and arrangements that protect the livelihoods of our own distraught coastal communities. It should avoid allowing never-ending fishing disputes to become a pretext for reopening already settled territorial questions.
The lesson of Katchatheevu is ultimately larger than the island itself. Sovereignty is not secured merely by having one’s territorial rights acknowledged by a powerful neighbor. It also depends on the institutions, economic resilience, political leadership and diplomatic capacity that enable a country to exercise those rights in practice. Sri Lanka has sound reasons to value the existing maritime settlement and India’s continued commitment to it. But the latest Supreme Court proceedings have not produced a final judicial verdict on ownership, and the Indian government has not newly conceded the island as a result of such a verdict. Nevertheless, the agreements remain the legal foundation of the settlement, while the pending litigation leaves constitutional arguments within India unresolved.
For Sri Lanka, the wisest response is neither triumphalism nor suspicion for its own sake. What is earnestly needed is a clear-eyed and independent foreign policy that welcomes cooperation, resists unnecessary confrontation and refuses to confuse economic corporation with the surrender of strategic choice.
Katchatheevu may be a small, even relatively inconsequential island, but the questions it raises about sovereignty, power and the future of Sri Lanka’s independence are anything but trivial.
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