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As I write this I get news of the death of Lalith Kotelawala, an outstanding entrepreneur. He was born with a silver spoon in his mouth as he was the only son of Justin Kotelawala, a pioneer Sri Lankan businessman and the younger brother of Sir John Kotelawala. Justin K started a successful insurance company in the face of competition from British insurers who dominated the field before independence. He also set up a finance company which catered to the rising native middle class in addition to owning large swathes of real estate partly acquired by his marriage to an heiress from one of Colombo’s richest families.
Gamani Corea was his nephew being his aunt’s only son. However with the change of regime in 1956 Lalith K, Justin’s son, lost most of his fortune due to the take over of the family insurance company and other assets. He had to start from scratch and build up his own companies including a Bank – the Seylan Bank and a finance company-Golden Key – both of which became very successful. His diversified group named Ceylinco entered into tourism, gem and jewellery, health and many other fields which had not been exploited by Sinhala businessmen.
His great success and penchant for publicity brought challenges to the Kotelawala business house for the second time. Lalith’s publicly declared appetite for political leadership either as President or Minister of Finance in a UNP regime brought on him the wrath initially of Nivard Cabraal and later the Rajapaksas who were in no mood to brook such a rich and powerful rival who had impeccable UNP credentials.
I had no qualms about supporting him as Investment Minister especially when he wished to set up a five star hotel in the “golden mile” of hotels on Galle road. He had successfully negotiated with the Hyattt group to partner him in this enterprise. Since his businesses were cash rich at this stage he saw no difficulty in financing this mega venture. He invited me and a few others to inaugurate this venture by participating in the groundbreaking ceremony. The building was just intruding onto the Colombo skyline when calamity hit him.
When the real economy contracts and legitimate business returns decline, small time savers are badly affected and they tend to go to get rich schemes and risky financial institutions which give them a bigger return. Lalith’s Finance company “Golden Key” provided such a refuge with high interest payments and a trustworthy name (Kotelawala) to guarantee the safety of their investments. Another problematic factor was that many politicians of the MR government saw in Lalith’s company a safe haven for their ill gotten gains away from the prying eyes of the tax authorities.
It must be said that he too was complicit in that he would have pandered to those crooks happy in the knowledge that big money was flowing into his coffers which would help to sustain his ever increasing promises of interest payments which were way higher than what was offered by the regular banking system. It soon became a Ponzi scheme. No wonder then that the Governor of the Central Bank was apprehensive of these developments. His objections were summarily dismissed by Lalith leading to a verbal battle between him and Cabraal. That undid him in the end. MR preferred to stand by Cabraal.
Lalith’s bravado irked many powerful politicians who were afraid he would take to “the family business” of politics like his uncle Sir John. MR who first befriended him, abandoned him when the Central Bank warned him of a possible financial catastrophe. This became a reality when a senior politician who had amassed a large sum of ill gotten money and deposited it with “Golden Key” was assassinated by the LTTE. Soon after that tragedy his relatives pulled out their money sending the finance company into a liquidity crisis.
The manager of the company whom Lalith trusted had released the money without informing him. There was a run on the company as soon as news of a large scale withdrawal became public. On previous such occasions the Central Bank would intervene to prevent a collapse. But in this case they did not and Golden Key had to be liquidated leaving tens of thousands of small depositors penniless. It was a mega scandal and with his wife embroiled in a money laundering charge Lalith fell from grace.
He was remanded in Welikada prison with his health ruined and his reputation in tatters. Later I visited him several times in his home to find that he was a broken man. With his premature death a pioneer mega local investor was lost and the local investment scenario received a heavy blow.
At about this time a dispute flared up between the President and Karu Jayasuriya. Numerous complaints were directed to MR that Karu as Minister of Public Administration was favouring UNP official, particularly Grama Sevakas, who were appointees of the UNP from the time of JRJ and Premadasa. If there was one thing MR was sensitive about it was the need to keep his backbenchers happy. On the other hand, Ranil succeeded in luring Karu back with the promise of making him the Deputy leader of the UNP.
Karu who was a great believer in Sai Baba and other assorted soothsayers, realized that he could not make much headway in the PA which was already full of ambitious and unscrupulous politicians. Karu’s departure led to a mini reshuffle and I was sent back to the Ministry of Public Administration while my friend, Anura Yapa, became the new Minister of Investment Promotion.
Back in my old Ministry I found that the northern war was intensifying with our armed forces regaining the initiative for the first time. This was largely due to the efforts of Gotabaya and Sarath Fonseka who at that time had the confidence of the President. MR used all his famous PR skills to ensure that he got the adulation of the public for the advances of the army. He visited the newly liberated areas and encouraged the soldiers for which he deserved the highest praise as none of his predecessors had visited the battle front.
Says Chandraprema, “The President visited Vakarai on February 3, 2007 soon after the area had been cleared. This ready willingness to visit the war zone despite the risk of attacks from infiltration teams was what gave the armed forces the feeling that this was a President to whom the war was a national priority and not just a regrettable necessity”. He posed for a photo op with the Special Forces that liberated Vakarai and visited a Kovil. The Hindu priest who garlanded him was shot dead a few days later by the LTTE showing that MR had bravely taken a mighty risk.
The rolling successes of the army meant that my Ministry had to bend its energies to maintain civil administrations in the North and East. It became challenging because the LTTE were forcing the inhabitants in the contested northern areas to follow them while retreating in the Vanni leaving “ghost towns” behind. The LTTE had even carried away furniture and roofing from homes in order to create a mobile “human shield” to save themselves from attacks by the armed forces. They also used civilians to dig large trenches along the way to impede the advance of heavy weapons and transports of the army moving into the LTTE held areas.
I was in touch with my Government Agents who had a difficult time often caught in the crossfire between the army and the LTTE. The I TTE brutalized the public servants. For instance the AGA of Tirukkovil in the east was murdered by the LTTE because he did not help the insurgents. But once the army secured strategic points like Kilinochchi and Vauniya the local administration was able to function effectively again. The Tamil parties raised issues in Parliament, probably on the instigation of the LTTE, and I had to answer them in the House after consulting my GAs and Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
Gota was always courteous and keen to brief us about the latest developments in the theatre of battle. We had to keep in mind that the LTTE was keen to recruit public servants to their cause. When a joint committee was to be setup after the signing of the Indo-Lanka agreement, the LTTE insisted on appointing an AGA of ‘Trincomalee – Pathmanathan, who was a hall mate of mine at Peradeniya, as their nominee and Chairman of the committee. Since we refused to recognize a public servant as a nominee of the LTTE this project was abandoned despite the best efforts of the Indian High Commission.
After the clearing of the east and establishing the local administration there, the army launched a pincer attack on the extensive LTTE held territory in the Vanni. One army group extended the defence line from the west of Vavuniya towards Mannar bringing that area under government control. The army initially faced stiff resistance from LTTE fighters. The traditional army approach of moving in large formations on a broad front which was the “Sandhurst trained” army leaders strategy was not working since the LTTE could break through the thinly manned army lines.
Chandraprema describes well the change of tactics under SF and GR which brought success to the army; “The army had learnt the hard way during the ‘decade of darkness’ in the 1990s that moving in large formations presents an easy target for LTTE artillery. After assessing where they went wrong in the past operations, the army stopped operating in traditional formations like platoons, companies and battalions and split up instead into small groups, the eight-man team being the norm. After the monsoon ‘stand still’ the army resumed its advance along the hinterland of western Vanni. Another task force operated along the coastal belt and captured the strategic town of Silavaturai which had earlier been a major camp of the army to prevent smuggling and illicit immigration, being the closest to the Port of Colombo.”
However the next objective of capturing LTTE bases Adampan and Anandakulam in the “rice bowl” was an arduous undertaking. To break the impasse the army followed the tactic of opening up many fronts to break up the LTTE forces which earlier had the opportunity of deploying in strength on a few strategic points. After heavy fighting, Adampan was captured in May 2008. By the end of November 2008 the vital point of Pooneryn was captured and the threat to the Jaffna encampment from LTTE long range artillery was eliminated thereby releasing the troops in Jaffna fort for the Mullaitivu offensive.
On January 2, 2009 the symbolically crucial town of Kilinochchi was captured and the fighting moved to Muhamalai which was considered a “jinx” for the army which had in the past failed to go beyond it. This time around the army adopted a strategy of attrition wearing down the LTTE formations through RPG attacks and close range encounters. Another set of troops came down from Jaffna and breached the LTTEs second line of defence of Muhamalai. By the first week of January 2009 Muhamali was in army hands and troops could move down to Elephant Pass via Palai where the LTTEs resistance was overcome. The LTTE cadres then retreated towards the jungles of Mullaitivu where the final battles were destined to take place.
Once the LTTE together with their hostage Tamil civilians, were driven into an increasingly small quadrant in Mullaitivu, they launched a publicity and diplomatic campaign to stop hostilities and rescue the remaining leaders and their families including Prabhakaran and his wife and children. It was a multipronged effort which included mobilizing the UN, the diaspora and NGOs, the UK and USA and especially India. It was a formidable combination and it stands to the credit of MR and GR that they dlid not succumb to their threats as well as blandishments.
In many ways it was MR’s finest hour. Each of these interlocutors were fully engaged and it was made clear that no compromise was possible. Credit must be given also to the Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama who resisted the advice of his officials and fully backed MR in his approach to the interlocutors. The biggest pressure came from India. Fortunately the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo Alok Prasad stood by the Sri Lankan government and the “Troika” of three representatives of each side which met regularly kept each other informed of the ground situation.
The Secretary-General of the UN sent his special envoy Satish Nambiar to broker a ceasefire. MR and GR stood firm against it and dismissed the possibility of sending a UN fact finding mission to Mullaitivu. The NGOs were represented by a high level delegation led by Bernard Kouchner of France and David Milliband of the UK. Fortunately MR was able to call their bluff by taking a tough stand that their advice was not warranted by the facts on the ground.
An interesting side line was MR’s decision not to dignify their visit. He moved to Chandrikawewa which was close to his ancestral home in Medamulana. In this he was influenced by his experiences with Gaddafi in Libya. When he visited Libya, Gaddafi, a Bedouin, had pitched camp in the desert and MR was received in that encampment. He emulated Gaddafi and the visiting firemen from Europe had to be driven, sweating profusely in their western clothes to the humid dry zone hotel veranda for their audience with MR.
It was not a lesson that they would easily forget. By a coincidence both these selfish do gooders were not able to achieve their ambitions of high office in their countries and faded ultimately from public view. All these interlocutors were under the impression that the civilians trapped in the quadrant were attacked by our army. Actually the reverse was the case. The army literally held their fire and when the civilians began to cross the lagoon they were welcomed and even fed on army rations which were meant for the soldiers.
It was the LTTE that tried to prevent the civilians from leaving them as their human shield was being eroded. Fortunately Indian officials who monitored the evacuation saw this and stood by us even though Tamilnadu which was facing an election, as expected, used the Sri Lanka situation as a popular rallying cry. To help in this dire situation we agreed to issue a statement that heavy artillery would not be used to fire on the shrinking LTTE quadrant. These were astute and professionally sound Foreign Ministry moves for which MR, GR and Bogollagama should be given the credit.
There is another “inside story” which attests to MR’s luck during this period. When the post of Sec. Gen. of the UN fell vacant with the retirement of Kofi Annan, Jayantha Dhanapala was a candidate to succeed him. He had the backing of the west because he had handled discussions on the non -proliferation of strategic weapons to their satisfaction. US President Bill Clinton supported him. “This pro west tilt alarmed the Non Aligned countries and India promoted Sashi Tharoor as a rival candidate. Jayantha’s candidature was dead in the water as MR had been persuaded by local businessmen to throw our country’s support behind Ban Ki Moon who eventually got the job. It was no secret that the South Koreans threw a lot of money around to get this job for their countryman since they had been poorly received in the UN system.
MRs decision turned out to be a lucky one as Ban Ki Moon adopted a soft line with our government. After he and MR issued a joint statement the UN did not bully the Sri Lankan government. All in all this episode was handled astutely and the war was concluded on our terms. Prabhakaran and nearly all of the top leadership were killed together with large numbers of their terrorist fighters. It was the only instance at that time in the whole world where terrorism was comprehensively defeated.
Speaking at a meeting to felicitate GR at that time I drew attention to the need to tell the world about the humane way in which the civilians who crossed the lagoon were treated. The Sunday Observer of May 27, 2012 reported the following: “Senior Minister of International Monetary Cooperation said Sri Lanka’s humanitarian mission of rescuing over 150,000 Tamil civilians from the clutches of the LTTE’ was the greatest humanitarian operation in modern times. He said, “our heroic forces crossed the lagoon at Pudumathalan and went through difficult terrain to cross the earth bund built by the LTTE. Then they facilitated the crossover of 150,000 civilians to the government controlled area. It was a heroic effort and one of t he greatest of humanitarian operations”.
He said that our case has not been properly presented to the global community. “We are only talking about what happened at the Nandikadal lagoon. Nobody talks about what happened at the lagoon in Pudumathalan”.
(This book is available at the Vijitha Yapa Bookshop)
(Excerpted from vol. 3 of the Sarath Amunugama autobiography)
Holding the scales evenly and meeting with Chief Minister CBK
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The seizure of 471 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, or ‘ICE’, concealed inside a container, at the Port of Colombo, is being rightly treated as a significant Customs success. Yet the seizure should also provoke a more uncomfortable question. How long can Sri Lanka continue trying to secure a 21st century trading hub with an inspection system designed around methods that belong to another era?
The answer cannot simply be more inspections, more paperwork or more officials opening more containers. Colombo handles enormous volumes of containerised cargo, much of it legitimate. A single container can contain tonnes of goods, packed into hundreds of individual packages. When contraband represents only a fraction of the cargo, physical examination alone becomes an exercise in probability.
The challenge is not merely finding the needle in the haystack. It is determining which haystack is worth searching in the first place.
The Asian Development Bank identified this problem years ago. Its technical assistance assessment found that Sri Lanka’s trade logistics procedures suffered from a “lack of a modern risk management system and other modern customs tools”, combined with “insufficient use of automated systems”, contributing to cargo queues at the Port. It also found that the movement of cargo to and from Customs examination yards, which had poor access, contributed to congestion. These were not casual observations. They formed part of an ADB-supported programme intended to modernise Sri Lanka’s trade logistics system.
The findings were even more uncomfortable. The ADB identified “inadequate use of modern customs tools”, excessive documentation, insufficient automation, inadequate cooperation among border agencies, the absence of a port facilitation system, weaknesses in inland cargo clearance and inadequate capacity. It also reported that Customs risk rules were written in such a way that “80% of the consignments are targeted”. A system in which such a large proportion of cargo becomes subject to targeting inevitably risks undermining the very principle of risk-based Customs control. The more everything becomes suspicious, the less meaningful suspicion becomes.
The ADB-supported feasibility study for a new Customs inspection facility was initiated in 2020, with its final report submitted in December 2021. The study considered alternative locations before Kerawalapitiya emerged as the preferred site. The objective was not simply to construct another yard. The ADB Terms of Reference required the consultants to determine the physical and operational feasibility of the facility, assess potential demand, identify infrastructure requirements and prepare a comprehensive cost estimate. They were also required to identify the government stakeholders involved and “the time allocated for review and approvals”. The irony is difficult to miss. Years after the feasibility exercise, Sri Lanka is still discussing how to bring the facility into operation.
The proposed Kerawalapitiya Customs Verification Centre therefore represents something larger than another infrastructure project. It is a test of whether the Sri Lankan state can convert policy into implementation. According to reporting in 2024, the proposed facility was designed to accommodate around 3,000 containers. Yet the project remained caught in administrative and financial uncertainty years after the feasibility work had been completed. Government land was subsequently allocated and the government moved towards a hybrid public-private partnership model. The question now is why such a basic modernisation programme should have taken so long to progress.
This is where the private sector cannot simply be treated as an ideological inconvenience. Sri Lanka’s public sector has demonstrated repeatedly that it can commission studies, establish committees, formulate strategies and announce projects. The more difficult test is delivering complex infrastructure on time, within budget, and according to measurable standards. A modern Customs inspection centre requires sophisticated scanning equipment, electronic tracking, data systems, cybersecurity, maintenance and continuous technological upgrading. These are precisely the areas in which properly regulated private-sector participation can bring capital, expertise and operational discipline.
That does not mean privatising Customs. The authority to inspect, seize, investigate, impose duties and enforce the law must remain with the state. But there is no compelling reason why every piece of infrastructure, technology platform and operational service surrounding those sovereign functions, must be designed and delivered exclusively through traditional government mechanisms.
The government has already moved in this direction. Cabinet approved the establishment of the Kerawalapitiya Customs Verification Centre and subsequently approved a process to select a private partner under a hybrid public-private partnership model. The policy question is therefore no longer whether private-sector involvement is possible. It is whether the Government can structure that involvement transparently enough to prevent a new system from simply reproducing old weaknesses under a different ownership arrangement.
That requires radical transparency. The public should know who is selected, how the contract is awarded, what the operator is required to deliver, what technology will be installed, what performance standards will apply and what penalties will follow failure. The Government should publish a timetable with identifiable responsibility for every stage. Otherwise, “public-private partnership” risks becoming another phrase that conceals rather than solves institutional delay.
The technology must also be substantially more ambitious than a larger physical yard. The ADB found that existing cargo seals were “not tamper-proof” and that existing devices did not provide live tracking or alerts concerning tampering or diversion. A modern Kerawalapitiya
centre should integrate non-intrusive inspection, electronic cargo tracking, intelligence databases, automated risk profiling and secure digital records. Artificial intelligence may assist image analysis, but it should supplement trained Customs judgement rather than become an excuse to outsource accountability to algorithms.
The principle should be simple. Sri Lanka does not need 100 percent physical examination of containers. It needs 100 percent visibility of risk. That means legitimate traders should not be punished because the system cannot distinguish them from high-risk consignments. Low-risk cargo should move quickly. Suspicious containers should receive scanning and targeted examination. High-risk shipments should receive intensive inspection. The result should be stronger border security alongside faster trade, not security achieved by paralysing commerce.
The recent drug seizure demonstrates that Customs officers can and do intercept major threats. But individual successes cannot substitute for institutional reform. If Sri Lanka waits for every new seizure to trigger another debate about Customs weaknesses, it will remain trapped in a reactive cycle.
The ADB study has already identified the weaknesses. The government has already identified the land. The feasibility work has already been undertaken. The partnership model has already entered the policy process. What is missing is decisive implementation. Kerawalapitiya should, therefore, become a test of governmental accountability. Sri Lanka does not need another promise to modernise Customs. It needs a functioning facility, modern technology, transparent procurement and a deadline that cannot quietly disappear into another government file.
The real scandal would not be that criminals occasionally attempt to exploit weaknesses in a complex trading system. The real failure would be knowing where those weaknesses are, knowing how to fix them and still taking years to do so.
(Nirmala de Fonseka is a former Director of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority, and currently works as a consultant specialising in logistics management)
In Parliament last week, Deputy Minister Anil Jayantha responded to MP Ravi Karunanayake’s question regarding the future of Sri Lankan exports to the EU market by stating that, “It is expected to examine and report on possible options for securing long-term and sustainable market access to the EU through a deeper economic arrangement, including a possible comprehensive trade agreement, in the event of Sri Lanka graduating from the GSP+ scheme if it is classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank for three consecutive years. Sri Lanka has recorded upper-middle-income status in 2026.” The deputy minister had also referred to the conclusion of negotiations on the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and its impact on Sri Lankan exports.
This is alarming, given that the plans remain in a very early stage of development. The negotiations on the India–European Union Free Trade Agreement were concluded in January 2026. Sri Lanka should have engaged with the European Commission soon afterwards to discuss the FTA’s potential impact on Sri Lanka, and this should have been a key item on the agenda of the joint commission meeting between the European Commission and Sri Lanka in February. (see my article on this at https://island.lk/an-innocent-bystander-or-a-passive-onlooker/). Unfortunately, the joint press release following the meeting makes no reference to this critical issue.
Even at this late stage, considering a comprehensive trade agreement is undoubtedly a positive development. Particularly because after the expiration of GSP benefits, an FTA is Sri Lanka’s sole pathway to retaining preferential access to the EU market. But FTAs typically take years to negotiate. The EU-India FTA, for example, followed a long process that began in 2007. Negotiations officially concluded on
January 27, 2026. The agreement is expected to be signed in December 2026, with full implementation targeted for early 2027.
Now, let’s explore what other nations can teach us about this.
Indonesia is the latest country to “graduate” from the EU’s GSP arrangement. Indonesia achieved upper-middle-income status in 2020, briefly fell back due to economic shifts, and regained it in 2024, maintaining that status ever since. As a direct result of this sustained economic growth, Indonesia will graduate from the EU’s Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP) on January 1, 2027. To safeguard its long-term competitiveness in the EU market ahead of this transition, the country has been negotiating the Indonesia–European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement since official talks began in July 2016. Following 19 rounds of talks, negotiators wrapped up the agreement in September 2025, though it remains unsigned; Indonesia is now rushing to complete both signing and ratification before the GSP deadline.
The Philippines and Sri Lanka were both reclassified as upper-middle-income countries on July 1, 2026. As a GSP Plus beneficiary, the Philippines anticipated that the economic development could
negatively affect its preferential market access to the EU and, to counter this, the country resumed stalled EU-FTA negotiations in 2024, which had paused during President Duterte’s regime over human rights issues. Having already secured substantial agreement on core terms, the formal trade pact is expected to be finalised in 2027, ahead of the country’s graduation from the GSP.
After briefly holding upper-middle-income status from July 2019 to July 2020, Sri Lanka fell back to the middle-income group due to the pandemic and economic crisis. Sri Lanka was reclassified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank in July 2026. This milestone starts the countdown to graduate from the EU’s GSP. If Sri Lanka keeps upper-middle-income status, it will exit the GSP programme by July 2029 — or by July 2030 if a transitional extension applies. Consequently, Sri Lanka’s exports to the European Union will face Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rates by 2030.
How prepared is Sri Lanka to transition out of the EU’s GSP Plus scheme?
The weekend newspaper reports on the preparatory arrangements for the FTA negotiations and lists FTA negotiations planned to pursue, but does not include a possible FTA with the EU. Sri Lanka should have begun exploring alternative paths to secure long-term, sustainable market access to the EU back in 2019, when the country briefly achieved upper-middle-income status. This should have included negotiating a comprehensive trade agreement to cushion the graduation from GSP+. Unfortunately, our trade policy experts have been entirely asleep at the wheel both then and in the years since.
It is also perplexing that influential trade bodies, such as the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and the Joint Apparel Association Forum, remain silent on this impending crisis. While they are currently vocal regarding the potential impacts of the 22nd Amendment and the Prevention of Terrorism Act on Sri Lanka’s GSP+ status, they have failed to alert or advise the government about the need for a long-term strategy to preserve a level playing field in the EU market. These bodies should take the lead immediately. The stakes are far higher now than they were in 2010, when GSP+ was withdrawn. Then, Sri Lanka transitioned from GSP Plus to the standard GSP framework. This time, the country faces a direct shift to MFN tariffs – the European Union’s least favourable tariff option. (The writer can be reached at [email protected] )
Continue Reading Features Fighting crime while safeguarding democracy now and in the future Published
The government’s determination to tackle corruption, drug trafficking and organised crime is one of the most important challenges it has taken upon itself. The scale of the problem is evident from recent seizures of drugs at sea and at the airport, which indicate the enormous dimensions of the illicit drug trade. The street value of some consignments has reportedly approached staggering sums, running into hundreds of millions of dollars. The financial resources available to those involved in this trade must be immense. Their ability to corrupt individuals and institutions cannot be underestimated. The revelations of the involvement of persons connected with previous governments, their families and even members of the security forces in the drug trade are particularly disturbing. This is not simply a problem of law enforcement. It is a threat to the integrity of the State itself. The government appears to be approaching this challenge more systematically and seriously than any government in the past.
In two public engagements this past week, the President explained the government’s position. The first was a gathering of Buddhist monks and members of other religious communities, at Temple Trees to mark the first anniversary of Ratama Ekata, the national anti-drug programme. The purpose was to brief religious leaders on progress and enlist their support in carrying the message to communities throughout the country. The second was a trade union conference in Colombo, where the President responded to concerns about the proposed anti-terrorism and anti-crime legislation. At both, the President drew a distinction between two groups opposing the proposed laws. One consisted of criminal groups and those who give them patronage and protection. The other consisted of civil society organisations and human rights groups raising concerns from the perspective of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law. The President said the government was prepared to listen to this second group and discuss the legislation with them, and that these were issues on which discussion and consensus needed to be obtained.
The Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill (PSTB) would replace the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979, while the Prevention of Organised Crime Bill (POC Bill) would give the authorities new powers against organised crime. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has personally taken up the task of answering criticism from opposition parties, civil society and international human rights organisations. This shows that the two bills form central pillars of the government’s programme to restore the integrity of the State. However, concerns expressed regarding these two draft laws are substantial. In a 31-page communication made public this week, five United Nations human rights mandates warned that the POC Bill could increase the risk of torture and arbitrary detention. They pointed to police custody of 72 hours before a Magistrate’s review and detention for up to a year in police stations on ministerial authorisation. They also cited the admissibility of confessions to senior police officers, police access to phone records without court approval, surveillance of encrypted communications, and the possibility that trade unionists and protesters could fall within the law.
The President’s offer to reduce the 72-hour period to 48 hours, made in the course of a public speech, is a welcome sign of flexibility. The better test is whether the final text reaches the 24-hour norm of ordinary criminal procedure, or whether detention beyond it requires judicial approval. Sri Lanka’s experience under the PTA shows why this matters. Laws meant for exceptional threats can acquire a much wider application in practice. Bitter experience over nearly four decades has shown that people can spend years in detention without being charged, only eventually to be released without any charges being brought against them. The years they lose in detention can never be returned. They may lose the best and most productive years of their lives, their livelihoods and family relationships, without ever being found guilty of an offence. No subsequent release can compensate them for such a loss. This is precisely the kind of injustice that laws must be designed to prevent, rather than create the conditions in which it can occur.
There is a fundamental principle at stake. The liberty of individuals cannot be entrusted to the unfettered discretion of public officials or security forces. Whenever the State seeks to deprive a person of liberty, the judiciary must have an effective and decisive role. This is not a question of showing leniency towards those suspected of serious crimes. It is recognition that the power to arrest, detain and restrict the liberty of individuals is among the most important powers exercised by the State, and therefore requires the strongest safeguards. Law enforcement authorities must have the powers necessary to investigate and prosecute crime, but they cannot be the sole judges of how long a person may be deprived of liberty. That responsibility must remain firmly anchored in an independent judiciary. The State has a duty to protect society from criminals, but it also has an equally important duty to protect the innocent from the misuse of State power. The credibility of its efforts to combat crime depends on its ability to do both.
The role of the courts therefore needs to be strengthened in both bills. Decisions concerning prolonged detention, access to legal representation, the admissibility of confessions and restrictions on personal liberty should be subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny. The courts must have the authority to examine the necessity and proportionality of measures taken by the police and executive authorities, rather than merely endorse decisions already made by them. The breadth of certain definitions also raises questions about whether individuals could be brought within the ambit of the law on the basis of their associations or other characteristics rather than evidence of criminal conduct. A system in which members of the security establishment can exercise extensive powers while judicial officers have limited ability to intervene would weaken the constitutional safeguards that protect all citizens.
The President’s willingness to engage with civil society and human rights critics is a positive indicator. So is his assurance that the bills will not be rushed through Parliament, but considered only after comprehensive discussion and wider consensus. He has directed the Minister of Justice to engage with stakeholders. The fact that the Supreme Court is considering the PSTB, and that both bills have been challenged on constitutional grounds, provides another important avenue for scrutiny. The government has indicated that it will consider the Court’s determination and proposals for amendment. These developments offer a chance to improve the legislation rather than turn the debate into a confrontation between the government and its critics. The test of the government’s commitment to good governance will be whether it incorporates reasonable criticism into the final laws, including changes to provisions it originally thought necessary.
An aspect of good governance is to bring about changes that will stand the test of time. The government needs to demonstrate that it has effective mechanisms for ensuring that future legislation is subjected to independent scrutiny, meaningful consultation with the Bar Association, trade unions, media bodies, civil society and opposition parties, and rigorous human rights assessment before it reaches Parliament. The credibility of a government is measured not only by its determination to combat crime or its willingness to listen to criticism, but also by the care with which it exercises its legislative powers. Legislation should be built on sound legal foundations, informed public consultation and democratic consensus, rather than corrected only after its weaknesses have become matters of public controversy. Consensus may take longer to build, but the resulting changes are more likely to be accepted, respected and sustained. The challenge is not simply to enact laws that are strong enough to confront organised crime today, but to establish laws and institutions that will protect society and individual liberty under governments of the future.
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Wins for Dialog Axiata and Green Miracle Grand on Wednesday
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Prospect of ‘spaceport’ on Sri Lanka’s east coast
Batting frailties give Sri Lanka food for thought
Why the Jaffna Man Eats So Much Murunga
Sarojini Kadirgamar –a lady for all seasons
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