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Since President AKD took office, Sri Lanka has not attended any of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summits at the political leadership level. There have been three of those: the 16 th Summit in Russia in 2024, the 17 th Summit in Brazil in 2025, and the 18 th held in September 2026, in neighboring India.
What’s inexplicable is that Sri Lanka formally submitted an application for membership of the BRICS in 2024. The government’s decision was announced by Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath after Cabinet approval had been obtained for it in October 2024. However, President AKD who was personally invited by President Putin, declined the invitation to spend just two days at the summit. Instead, he sent the Foreign Secretary, who submitted the application. Sri Lanka failed to gain membership, but the application has not been formally rejected.
While several countries vied to get membership of the BRICS, it was surely predictable that Sri Lanka was not going to be handed membership in absentia! As the Russian Ambassador to Sri Lanka told a Colombo audience, it takes more than just an application to obtain the privilege:
“Ambassador Dzhagaryan stated that he has not seen much interest at the moment and therefore requested Sri Lanka to take some practical steps, if it is serious about joining BRICS.” He also gave some friendly advice: “He urged Sri Lankan officials to engage diplomatically with all BRICS nations, particularly Brazil, to pursue membership.” He explained that “While Russia and China support Sri Lanka’s interest in joining BRICS, the final decision rests collectively with all member countries, including Brazil, which currently chairs the bloc”. (https://pulseline.lk/uncategorized/lack-of-political-will-delays-sri-lankas-entry-into-brics-says-russian-ambassador/)
This was said at an event held at the Bandaranaike Centre for nternational Studies (BCIS) in May 2025. The next BRICS summit was to be held just a few weeks away in early July 2025, in Brazil. This sound advice fell on deaf ears. Sri Lanka decided not to go to Brazil. That’s pure genius.
In 2024, BRICS initiated a new category called BRICS Partner States, for those countries that did not obtain full membership. Since then, 10 countries have obtained partnership status: Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
The full members of BRICS are Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa being the original five members, and subsequent additions, Egypt, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The next BRICS summit was in India, this month. We could have lobbied for partnership status at least, had we gone to India. By this time though, Sri Lanka was truly out in the cold. There is no confirmation that there was an invitation to attend from Prime Minister Modi. In Delhi, Sri Lanka was not even outside looking in, it wasn’t there at all.
The Delhi Declaration at the 18 th Summit reflects the consensus of the BRICS nations, which Sri Lanka could have endorsed had it been a partner country. Or is it the case that these aspirations, such as strengthening multilateralism, multipolarity, and the central role of the United Nations are no longer viewed as in keeping with Sri Lanka’s national interest and endorsing it was not a preference or even an option? Just a small extract gives the flavor of the declaration:
“On the landmark occasion of the 20th anniversary of BRICS, we reiterate our commitment to reforming and improving global governance by promoting a more just, equitable, agile, effective, efficient, responsive, representative, legitimate, democratic and accountable international and multilateral system in the spirit of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits.
Bearing in mind the need to adapt the current architecture of international relations to better reflect the contemporary realities, we reiterate our commitment to strengthening multilateralism and multipolarity and to upholding international law, including the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) in their entirety and interconnectedness in a balanced and inclusive manner, as its indispensable cornerstone, and the central role of the UN in the international system in which sovereign states cooperate to maintain peace and security, advance sustainable development, ensure the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and promote cooperation based on the spirit of solidarity, mutual respect, justice and equality while respecting national circumstances, diversity of national systems and development pathways, with the aim to build a brighter shared future for the international community based on mutually beneficial cooperation.” (https://www.brics2026.gov.in/brics-document/)
Sri Lanka has also sought membership of the new BRICS bank, for development financing. Predictably, it has not yet got very far with that either. For a country in an economic crisis, this administration is exceptionally negligent in ensuring its best chances at securing sources of funding from its traditional friends.
This laissez-faire attitude to building relationships with Global South multilateral institutions, is surely not without cost. It contrasts with the remarkable enthusiasm that the NPP government displays in rushing to establish connections with institutions in the West.
Upul Joseph Fernando writing in the Mawrata reported the following:
“A few days before the BRICS Summit in India, the head of the U.S. Maritime Administration, Laura Di Bella, and Commissioner Robert J. Harvey visited Sri Lanka. After meeting senior government officials, they toured the Colombo Port and attended an International maritime conference.
“Prior to this visit, the Governor of the Western Province and the Deputy Minister of Ports had attended the U.S. Forum on Indian Ocean Ports and Supply Chains in Washington. They also held discussions with U.S. officials.
“Following these engagements, the U.S. Maritime Administration chief and the commissioner visited Sri Lanka. During their visit, the Minister of Ports requested U.S. assistance for the construction of the second West Container Terminal and to expand Colombo Port’s breakwater system. The two sides held discussions on these matters.” https://mawratanews.lk/news/while-the-usa-eyes-colombo-port-sri-lanka-misses-the-brics-summit/
Sri Lanka which is aspiring to become a transshipment hub, spotting the opportunity to better position itself as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab are mired in conflicts, cannot be faulted. A healthy injection of 15 million USD to digitalize the Colombo port cannot be scoffed at either.
However, if it is seen that Colombo is throwing in its lot with one part of the world at the expense of its relationship with its partners in the part of the world to which Sri Lanka actually belongs, it may signal consequences and changes that we didn’t see coming.
The request made to NATO for assistance to modernize the Sri Lankan Military by the Secretary Defence elicited much commentary, especially since this was a first for Sri Lanka. For the most part NATO countries withheld ‘offensive’ military assistance to Sri Lanka during its war against the Tigers, and the country had to turn to its Asian friends for training and equipment. NATO is also in direct confrontation now against a long-time friend of Sri Lanka and member of BRICS, Russia. This turn of events is of legitimate concern.
Sri Lanka’s experience of its recent history, and the western perception of the conduct of the war that ended in 2009, still haunts certain UN forums. Allegations of war crimes are spearheaded by the member countries of NATO. While credible cases of excesses cannot be stopped from being discussed internationally, what if some of the more exaggerated claims of the pro-LTTE diaspora trigger a sudden withholding of support? Even more worrying, what if other demands that have nothing to do with human rights but Great Power rivalry, crop up?
Despite these worries, a former officer of the military recently wrote in the Daily Mirror that this move by the NPP government “…tells us that Sri Lanka is looking beyond traditional bilateral defence relationships as it considers how to modernize its security architecture.” He continues to commend the choice:
“The United States has an established interest in maritime security, freedom of navigation, disaster response, humanitarian assistance and regional stability.
“Sri Lanka does not need strategic isolation.
“The current interest from India, China, the United States, Japan, France, Türkiye and NATO should therefore not be viewed as a competition for Sri Lanka. It should be viewed as an opportunity for Sri Lanka to build a modern, resilient and technologically capable state, while remaining firmly in control of its own strategic choices.”https://www.dailymirror.lk/news-features/Sri-Lankas-Strategic-Balancing-Act-Opportunity-or-New-Geopolitical-Trap/131-350325
While Sri Lanka has never aspired to isolation, it has been cognizant that in order to “remain firmly in control of its strategic choices”, it has to consider its policy choices carefully. Being a small island, there have been times that governments have found that they had no choice at all, such as when India objected to allowing a Chinese submarine in Sri Lankan waters.
Was it a choice for the AKD government, when it let an Iranian ship with around 100 sailors not at war with any country, to be blown to bits by an American submarine, while just off our territorial waters? Who made such a choice?
Sri Lanka knew, together with other global south countries, that in the current global and economic order, the safer option lies in partnerships and alliances within region, with similar notions of global equilibrium. Its membership of the Non-Aligned Movement for instance, helped it to punch above its weight, and prevail at certain contestations at the UN.
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy positioning affects more than just one area of concern.
Recently, a retired Ambassador, bemoaning the continuing censure of Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council wrote that “The core systemic flaw of the UNHRC lies in its structural asymmetry.”
This is factually false . The voting members at the UNHRC are carefully selected according to “equitable geographical distribution”. This means that the Global South countries have a higher number of votes than those of the North! As long as our Foreign Policy establishment continues to blame non-existing structural asymmetries and obstacles to Sri Lanka’s woes at the UN, they would never be able to strategize a realistic success at those forums.
The ex-Ambassador writes that in order to avoid what he calls “diplomatic entrapment” at the UNHRC, Sri Lanka should recall the historical context and continues to elaborate on it, but avoids mentioning the one time in our diplomatic history that Sri Lanka actually got the better of efforts to censure it at the same venue. Instead, he writes:
“Rather than receiving international validation for this massive rescue mission, the nation that ended the largest-ever humanitarian hostage crisis was later penalized by external critics who completely inverted the narrative.” https://www.ft.lk/columns/Geneva-double-standard-Why-Sri-Lanka-remains-in-UNHRC-crosshairs/4-797283
In 2009, at the 11 th Special Session on Sri Lanka, days after the war ended, some countries of the Global North did try to “invert the narrative” but despite that, Sri Lanka did in fact receive “international validation for this massive rescue mission” and also a commendation for “the nation that ended the largest-ever humanitarian hostage crisis”.
As long as retired Ambassadors and the foreign policy establishment, for whatever reason, are reluctant to acknowledge the singular diplomatic victory at the most difficult time, they will not study the process that led to that overwhelming victory, glean its lessons and therefore be able to strategize similar victories in Geneva.
They will not learn that our membership of NAM and the active lobbying of its members in Geneva ensured that the winning resolution was submitted not in isolation, but indeed as a NAM resolution with all its 118 members signing off on it.
They will not know that the Sri Lankan Ambassador/Permanent Representative worked actively to ensure that all member countries of the BRICS, which only had its inaugural meeting in June 2009, supported Sri Lanka’s resolution. They will not learn that the UN Permanent Representative of South Africa, battled her own Foreign Ministry under pressure from the Tamil Diaspora, to vote for Sri Lanka. She had personally urged the Sri Lankan Ambassador to take on the difficult task of chairing the Durban Review Conference on Racism, because she trusted his integrity and negotiating skills at a tricky moment of the Conference. Having done so, she also trusted the Ambassador’s narrative on Sri Lanka at the Council, however hard the West tried to invert it.
Those who ignore that win, will not accept that the UN is not an abstract entity that is structurally incapable of being persuaded of a different point of view, even when there is evidence of an unambiguous victory by a Sri Lankan team at a vote, to prove the contrary.
Policy decisions made by governments affect people, ordinary people. Perceptions of our human rights record affect our economics, GSP plus facility, being just one, military assistance being another. When we do not make use of every global forum to build relationships, to intervene in the system of global governance to ensure better decisions, put a face to the name and persuade other leaders at every forum of Sri Lanka’s case in whichever domain, there is a cost. Having incurred it, it is a pity that Sri Lanka is reduced to offering excuses, rather than course correct to win.
Three bands, a new identity: Sri Lankan wolf snake recognised as distinct species
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The Communist Party of Sri Lanka has warned that ‘Israel and other foreign powers are planning to establish “spaceports” on Sri Lanka’s East Coast’ and claimed ‘the NPP government is getting involved in US space domain activities’ ( The Island , October 29, 2026).
Whether these warnings warrant serious consideration or not, certain immutable facts relating to Sri Lanka’s policy of a neutral state cannot be ignored. One such fact that has guided this government is its foreign policy of neutrality requires ‘that neutral space comprises the national territory of the neutral state, its territorial waters and its national air space’, and as such its territory including its territorial waters and air space is NOT NEGOTIABLE. This policy has been adhered to during the ongoing Middle East conflict, where the US sought permission to land two aircraft and the government declined permission on grounds of neutrality.
In such a context, for any officers, military or civil, to participate in discussions that compromise principles of neutrality amounts to a violation of government’s policy of neutrality reiterated by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath. Therefore, any discussions relating to prospective ‘spaceports’ is taboo.
PRINCIPLES and DUTIES of a NEUTRAL STATE
Based on an ICRC Publication on Neutrality, June 2022.
The introduction of this publication states: ‘The sources of the international law of neutrality are customary international law and, for certain questions, international treaties, in particular the Paris Declaration of 1856, the 1907 Hague Convention No. V respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, the 1907 Hague Convention No. XIII concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977.’
‘The territory of a neutral state is inviolable. It is prohibited to commit any act of hostility whatsoever on such territory. Neutrality describes the formal position taken by a state which is not participating in an armed conflict or which does not want to become involved. This status entails specific rights and duties. On the one hand, the neutral State has the right to stand apart from and not be adversely affected by the conflict. On the other hand, it has a duty of non-participation and impartiality.
Neutral space comprises the national territory of the neutral state, its territorial waters and its national air space. Neutral persons are nationals of neutral states. They lose their neutral status if they commit hostile acts against a belligerent. Individuals may join the armed forces of a belligerent party, but then they also lose their neutral status. They still have all the guarantees of protection that a member of those forces would enjoy, and therefore are entitled to POW status if they are subsequently captured. If, however, they can be defined as mercenaries, whom we covered in an earlier lesson, they do not have the right to be considered as combatants or POWs.
As long as their home state maintains normal diplomatic relations with the belligerent state they are living in or visiting, neutral persons are to be treated in the same way as they would be in peacetime. They remain under diplomatic protection. If there are no such diplomatic relations, neutral persons are entitled to be treated as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention. It makes no difference to their status if they are civilians or members of the armed forces of the neutral State to which they belong.’
3. THE DUTIES OF NEUTRAL STATES (Ibid)
‘Policy and instructions – the neutral State must also take measures to ensure and enforce the protection of its neutrality in the neutral space for which it is responsible in relation to the belligerent parties and, in particular, their armed forces. To obtain neutral status, the State does not have to make a formal declaration, nor do other States or parties formally have to recognise such status. A formal declaration will only have the effect of making neutral status better known.
The armed forces of the neutral state also require clear instructions on how they are to operate in relation to the defence of their territory and in dealing with incursions. For isolated and accidental violations of neutral space, the instructions might include the need to issue warnings or give a demonstration of force. For increasingly numerous and serious violations, a general warning might be called for and the use of force stepped up.
Particular obligations – the neutral State must ensure respect for its neutrality, if necessary, using force to repel any violation of its territory. Violations include failure to respect the prohibitions placed on belligerent parties with regard to certain activities in neutral territory, described above. The fact that a neutral State uses force to repel attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act. If the neutral state defends its neutrality, it must however respect the limits which international law imposes on the use of force. The neutral state must treat the opposing belligerent states impartially.
This obligation does not mean that a state is bound to treat the belligerents in exactly the same way. It entails a prohibition on discrimination.
It forbids only differential treatment of the belligerents which in view of the specific problem of armed conflict is not justified. Therefore, a neutral state is not obliged to eliminate differences in commercial relations between itself and each of the parties to the conflict at the time of the outbreak of the armed conflict. It is entitled to continue existing commercial relations. A change in these commercial relationships could, however, constitute taking sides inconsistent with the status of neutrality.
A neutral state must never assist a party to the armed conflict, in particular it must not supply warships, ammunition or other war materials directly or indirectly to a belligerent power, but otherwise its trade with the belligerent States remains unaffected.’
The material presented above embodies internationally recognised practices that should be adopted by a neutral state.
Stated above are the PRINCIPLES and DUTIES of a NEUTRAL STATE as recognised under International Law. Therefore, it is the duty of all states to recognise and respect the rights of States, such as Sri Lanka that have declared neutrality as its policy in its relations with other States.
If members of the current Sri Lankan government are engaged in discussions with foreign governments relating to issues that compromise its policy of neutrality, they should cease forthwith for reasons stated above. Furthermore, the government needs to formally make its members, particularly those in the military who engage with foreign government representatives to develop relationships and further their agendas, aware of the stakes involved.
Continue Reading Features America votes for change: What 2026 midterms mean for Trump and the world Published
by Colonel Nalin Herath (Retd), RSP
The 2026 United States midterm elections have delivered a significant political message. By taking control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Democrats have changed the political balance in Washington and introduced a new dimension to President Donald Trump’s second term. This is more than an electoral setback for the Republican Party. It is a reminder that even a president with considerable political influence is ultimately answerable to the electorate. The results reflect growing public dissatisfaction with the direction of the country. Economic pressures, the cost of living, concerns over government accountability and the consequences of the conflict with Iran featured prominently in the political debate. Voters who supported Trump’s return to the White House in 2024 have now demonstrated that electoral support is neither permanent nor unconditional.
Midterm elections are traditionally viewed as a referendum on the sitting president. This election has reinforced that political reality. Pres Trump made himself central to the Republican campaign, effectively inviting voters to assess his leadership. The outcome suggests that a substantial section of the electorate wanted a different direction. The Democratic victory, however, should not be interpreted as an unconditional endorsement of every Democratic policy. It is equally a reflection of dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration. American voters have expressed their preference through the constitutional process, and the political establishment must respond accordingly.
A new balance of power in Washington
The Democratic takeover of both chambers of Congress will fundamentally change the legislative environment. The House can exercise greater oversight through investigations, hearings and control of legislative proceedings. The Senate can influence legislation, scrutinise presidential appointments and determine the progress of important national initiatives. Trump remains President, with his constitutional executive powers intact. However, the next two years are likely to require considerably more negotiation and political compromise. The possibility of legislative deadlock is also real. A divided government can strengthen institutional checks and balances, but it can also delay decisions on taxation, immigration, public spending and national security. The challenge will be to ensure that political competition does not become an obstacle to effective governance.
The consequences extend well beyond American domestic politics. The United States remains a central actor in international security, global trade, technology, finance and diplomatic affairs. Political changes in Washington therefore have consequences for countries far beyond its borders.
First, America’s relationships with traditional allies will remain under scrutiny. European countries and NATO members will be watching whether Washington maintains consistency in its security commitments and international partnerships. Second, strategic competition with China will continue to shape American foreign policy. Although there is considerable bipartisan support for maintaining America’s strategic position in the Indo-Pacific, differences may emerge over trade, military spending, technology restrictions and diplomatic engagement. Third, the Middle East will remain a major foreign policy challenge. The political consequences of the conflict with Iran, including its economic and security implications, will place additional pressure on the administration to explain its strategic objectives and the costs of its international engagements. For countries in the Indian Ocean, these developments deserve particular attention. America’s engagement with regional maritime security, freedom of navigation, strategic partnerships and regional connectivity will remain important considerations.
What does this mean for American democracy?
Perhaps the most important dimension of this election is institutional. American democracy is built around the separation of powers, electoral accountability and the ability of different political institutions to constrain one another. The midterm results demonstrate that congressional control can change even when the presidency remains in the hands of the opposing party. However, electoral accountability alone cannot resolve the deeper divisions within American society. Political polarisation, economic inequality, immigration debates, public confidence in institutions and the influence of technology on political discourse remain significant challenges. The question is whether political leaders can move beyond electoral confrontation and rebuild a degree of public trust.
The midterm outcome will inevitably accelerate political preparations for the 2028 presidential election. Both parties will begin reassessing their leadership, political strategies and electoral coalitions. For Trump, the remaining two years of his presidency will involve governing with a Congress controlled by the opposition. For Democrats, the responsibility will be to demonstrate that electoral success can translate into effective governance. Neither party can afford to treat the outcome as a permanent political settlement. American politics remains dynamic, and the next presidential election will be shaped by developments that have yet to unfold.
The 2026 midterms offer a wider lesson for democracies everywhere. Political authority is not simply secured through electoral victories; it must be sustained through public confidence, institutional credibility and the ability to respond to people’s concerns. For the international community, the central question is not whether America will remain powerful. Its economic, military, technological and diplomatic resources will continue to make it a major global power. The more important question is how consistently it will exercise that power.
A country that remains politically divided at home may find it increasingly difficult to provide predictable leadership abroad. Equally, a functioning system of checks and balances can strengthen institutional accountability and reinforce democratic legitimacy. The American electorate has delivered its message. The responsibility now rests with both political parties to demonstrate that democracy is not merely about winning elections, but about governing in the interests of the nation. Ultimately, America’s future will be determined not only by who occupies the White House, but also by how effectively its institutions work together.
(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board).
Continue Reading Features The Prisoner of Zenda , where suspense grips reader Published
I have thus far in this series dealt with mystery stories. These inevitably involve suspense, though the converse does not hold true, and there are lots of stories full of suspense in which there is no mystery. Having for half a year now looked at mysteries, I thought of moving to the other sort, where there may be no mystery but where the suspense grips one.
by Anthony Hope in 1894 heralded a cult of what has been termed Ruritanian novels, set in what would in those days have seemed in England tempestuous remote regions of Europe. It was predominantly the Balkans that fitted this characterisation, an area in which, after the Turks retreated, Austria and Russia fought for influence, the former backed by a newly united Germany under Prussia, the latter moving into alliance with France and through that England.
The plot of The Prisoner of Zenda is compelling, and led to it being filmed several times over. The first time was in 1937, with then heart throb Ronald Colman as the hero Rudolf Rassendyl and Douglas Fairbanks also a heart throb as the dynamic villain Rupert of Hentzau.
Fifteen years later, Stewart Granger became the hero and James Mason Rupert. Deborah Kerr was the heroine, the role taken by Madeleine Carroll previously. And both films had wonderful actors in support, Raymond Massey and David Niven in 1937 and in 1957 Louis Calhern, who had played Julius Caesar in the celebrated film that starred James Mason and John Gielgud and Marlon Brando.
Hope was barely known by my contemporaries at Oxford, for he had passed out of fashion in the brave new world that emerged, not after the Second World War, but a decade later when a British Prime Minister could claim, in all seriousness, that his people had never had it so good. But I was lucky to find that the father of one of my friends, who was a philosophy don at Christ Church, was an aficionado of Hope, and we much enjoyed talking about him, and about much else, which I suspect the rest of his family thought very old fashioned.
But even from him I could not get a copy of the book, and now I cannot remember where, twenty years later, I finally found it. But where I first read it came back to me vividly as I read it for a second time, hugely enjoying it again. This was in the little room in the guesthouse at Sabaragamuwa University which had been left at my disposal. My driver Kithsiri had the staff room at the back, while I could house visitors in the other two rooms down below. This did not happen too often, after the first early years of showing off the place to friends.
The window of my bedroom looked out on the staff canteen, and year after year whoever ran it would bring me a cup of coffee at 6 o’clock, which I drank whilst lying in bed. Indeed, I spent most of my time in the house in that large double bed for, though I sometimes marked papers at the dining table upstairs, it was just as easy to do this in bed. And when I did not have such work, I would read there till long after the canteen lights went out.
It was there that, in a night or two, I finished The Prisoner of Zenda . For its plot was compelling, involving the dramatic adventures of the young Englishman Rudolf Rassendyl, who tells the story, having gone to Ruritania because of a family legend about a close connection between his family and the Ruritanian royal family. This was that a former king had, while in England before taking up his throne, had an affair with a Rassendyl lady.
The kingdom of Ruritania, the setting of The Prisoner of Zenda , is clearly in the Balkans, which had become a centre of intrigue in the struggles of European nations for dominance by 1894, when the novel appeared. Later Ruritanian novels, as tales of intrigue set in that region which followed were called, sometimes involved struggles for international influence there but Hope himself dwelt only on internal intrigues, the machinations of royalty and their hangers on for power and also for romance.
Royalty in Ruritania however also involved the English, for as a result of the affair of earlier years the heir to the Rassendyll Earldom was in fact an Elphberg, the family name of the royal family of Ruritania. But the characteristic red hair of the Elphbergs appeared only sporadically. Rudolph had it, which is what motivated him to explore travel to Ruritania, but once there he found that he was the spitting image of its new king, who was shortly to be crowned.
But the future King Rudolph’s half-brother Black Michael has other ideas, and drugs the king so that he cannot get to the coronation. And when his loyal companions discover this, they persuade Rassendyl, who has been drinking with the king the previous night, to take his place. That impersonation works well, and Rudolf receives the adulation of the citizens, but then what had been intended as a masquerade for a night has to be protracted, for the king is kidnapped by his brother and kept a prisoner in the Castle of Zenda.
The good guys then have to try to rescue the king while keeping the impersonation secret, most vitally from the king’s cousin Princess Flavia, who was meant to marry the king but has been averse to him though now she falls in love with Rassendyl and he with her.
The situation is compounded by a French lady. Antoinette de Mauban, who is in love with Black Michael, but warns Rassendyl about his stratagems, in part because she is comparatively decent, in part because Michael plans, if he eliminates both Rudolphs, to marry Flavia himself. And then to complicate matters further, one of Black Michael’s henchmen, Rudolph of Hentzau, is not so loyal as not to try to seduce Antoinette himself. He tries to involve Rassendyl in a plot to eliminate Michael, so they can share the spoils as he sees them, but of course Rassendyl turns him down. But then Rupert gets carried away, not perhaps by lust so much as by his love of devilry, and in the ensuing melee, Rassendyl having been able to bribe his way into the castle, the king is rescued.
Unlike the other henchmen, Rupert survives to take centre stage along with Rassendyl in the sequel. But otherwise all ends well, with everyone having a piece of the action, including the ill-treated king. Or rather, the king having recovered, there is also sadness for Rassendyl and Flavia, for they have to part so she can do her duty for the king and country.
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