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Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s recent combative ‘Head-to-Head’ interview with British-American Mehdi Hasan on Al Jazeera has opened a can of worms. As to why Hasan raised the Batalanda Presidential Commission report, during a 49-minute interview conducted at the London’s Conway Hall, with a clearly pro LTTE audience, remains a mystery. This must be yet another notorious way to show how even-handed they are as in the case of its coverage of Russia, China, Palestine or Ukraine for their gullible viewers.
Recorded in February and aired in March 2025, the interview is definitely the most controversial the UNP leader, who is also an Attorney-at-Law, ever faced during his political career; always used to getting kid glove treatment, especially after taking over the party in 1994.
The continuing public discourse on Batalanda should provoke a wider discussion on Sri Lanka’s response to separatist Tamil terrorism, since the cold blooded murder of Jaffna SLFP Mayor Alfred Duriappah, which signalled the beginning of the LTTE terror campaign that ended in May 2009 with the crushing military defeat of the Tigers on the banks of the Nathikadal lagoon, as well as two southern insurgencies in 1971 and 1987-1990.
As Nandana Gunatilleke (one time JVP General Secretary and ex-MP), Dr. Wasantha Bandara (ex-JVPer and close associate of the slain JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera), Indrananda de Silva (ex-JVPer, incumbent Central Committee member of Frontline Socialist Party [FSP] and ex-military photographer) and Uvindu Wijeweera (Rohana Wijeweera’s son and leader of Dewana Parapura) agreed during the recent Hiru ‘Balaya’ discussion, conducted by Madushan de Silva, the Batalanda operation was in line with the overall counter-terrorist/insurgency strategy of the then government.
The issues at hand cannot be discussed at all without taking into consideration the JVP terrorism that, at one-time, almost overwhelmed the UNP’s unbroken rule, since 1977, carried out while openly brushing aside most of the universally accepted genuine parliamentary norms. The country’s second Republican constitution, promulgated by the UNP regime with a 5/6 majority in Parliament, in 1978, had been amended no less than 13 times by the time they were finally ousted in 1995. This was mainly to facilitate their continuous rule. Unfortunately, all stakeholders have sought to take advantage of Batalanda, thereby preventing a proper dialogue. Quite surprisingly, none of the guests, nor the interviewer, bothered, at least, to make a reference to the JVP bid on President J.R. Jayewardene’s life in Parliament on the morning of July 18, 1987. At the time, JVPer Ajith Kumara, working in the House as a minor employee, hurled two hand grenades towards JRJ, with the then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa seated next to JRJ. While one government MP lost his life, several others suffered injuries, including then National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, whose spleen had to be removed.
At one point, Gunatilleke declared that they assassinated UNP MP for Tangalle Jinadasa Weerasinghe on July 3, 1987, in response to the government killing well over 100 people, in Colombo, protesting against the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord on July 29, 1987. The parliamentarian was killed near the Barawakumbuka-Welangahawela bridge on the Colombo-Rathnapura-Embilipitiya Road. The UNPer was killed on his way home after having declined Premier Premadasa’s offer to make an SLAF chopper available for him to reach home safely.
Against the backdrop of MP Weerasinghe’s assassination and the grenade attack on the UNP parliamentary group that claimed the life of Keethi Abeywickrema (MP for Deniyaya), the government had no option but to respond likewise. The operation, established at the Batalanda Housing scheme of the State Fertiliser Corporation, constituted part of the counter-insurgency strategy pursued by the UNP.
Those who called Batalanda complex Batalanda torture camp/ wadakagaraya conveniently forgot during the second JVP inspired insurgency, the military had to utilize many public buildings, including schools, as makeshift accommodation for troops. Of course the UNP established Batalanda under different circumstances with the then Industries Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe providing political authority. Batalanda had been an exclusive police operation though the Army had access to it whenever a requirement arose.
Those who had been suddenly withdrawn from the Northern and Eastern Provinces, to meet the rapidly evolving security threat in the South, required accommodation. FSP CC member Indrananada de Silva had received unhindered access to Batalanda in his capacity as a military photographer and the rest is history.
As to why Indrananda de Silva switched his allegiance to the FSP should be examined, taking into consideration his previous role as a trusted military photographer, formerly a Lance Corporal of the Military Police. An influential section of the JVP, led by Kumar Gunaratnam, formed the FSP in April 2012 though it didn’t receive the much anticipated public support. Both Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke, who aligned himself with the UNP, found fault with the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) over its handling of the Batalanada issue.
Paramilitary operations had been an integral part of the overall counter-insurgency campaign, directed at the JVP responsible for approximately 6,600 killings. Among those death squads were PRRA primarily drawn from the SLMP (Sri Lanka Mahajana Party) and SRRA (the socialist Revolutionary Red Army). PRRA had close links with the Independent Student Union (ISU) whose leader Daya Pathirana was slain by the JVP. The vast majority of people do not remember that Daya Pathirana, who led the ISU during the turbulent 1985-1986 period, was killed mid-Dec. 1989. The second insurgency hadn’t started at that time though the JVP propagated the lie that they took up arms against the UNP government following the signing of the Indo-Lanka peace accord on July 29, 1987.
In addition to PRRA and SRRA, the government made use of paramilitary groups, namely Kalu balallu, Ukkusso, Rajaliyo, Kaha balallu, Kola koti, Rathu Makaru, Mapila, Gonussa, Nee, Keshara Sinhayo, Le-mappillu and Kalu koti.
The UNP also involved some elements of Indian trained Tamil groups (not of the LTTE) in paramilitary operations. Such operations, that had been backed by respective Cabinet Ministers, were supervised by local law enforcement authorities. Paramilitary operations had been in line with psychological warfare that was meant to cause fear among the JVP, as well as the general population. Military operations that had been combined with paramilitary actions received the blessings of the political leadership at the highest level. In the case of Batalanda (1988-1990) President J.R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa knew of its existence.
Even after the eradication of the top JVP leadership, by Nov. 1989, police, military and paramilitary operations continued unabated. Former JVPers appearing on ‘ Balaya’ agreed that counter-insurgency operations were actually brought to an end only after D.B. Wijetunga succeeded President Ranasinghe Premadasa after the latter’s assassination on May Day 1993.
After the LTTE resumed war in June 1990, just a couple of months after the withdrawal of the Indian Army (July 1987-March1990), the UNP authorized paramilitary operations in the northern and eastern areas. Members of TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF as well as EPDP were made part of the overall government security strategy. They operated in large groups. Some paramilitary units were deployed in the Jaffna islands as well. And these groups were represented in Parliament. They enjoyed privileged status not only in the northern and eastern regions but Colombo as well. The government allowed them to carry weapons in the city and its suburbs.
These groups operated armed units in Colombo. The writer had the opportunity to visit EPDP and PLOTE safe houses in Colombo and its suburbs soon after they reached an understanding with President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Overnight at the behest of President Premadasa, the Election Department granted these Tamil groups political recognition. In other words, armed groups were made political parties. The Premadasa government accepted their right to carry weapons while being represented in Parliament.
It would be pertinent to mention that thousands of Tamil paramilitary personnel served the government during that period. There had been many confrontations between them and the LTTE over the years and the latter sought to eliminate key paramilitary personnel. Let me remind you of the circumstances, the EPRLF’s number 02 Thambirajah Subathiran alias Robert was sniped to death in June 2003. Robert was engaged in routine morning exercises on the top floor of the two-storeyed EPRLF office, on the hospital road, Jaffna, when an LTTE sniper took him out from the nearby Vembadi Girls’ high school. The operation of the Norway managed Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) made no difference as the LTTE removed Robert who led the party here in the absence of leader Varatharaja Perumal, the first and the only Chief Minister of the North-Eastern Province.
In terms of the CFA that had been signed by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, in Feb. 2002, the government agreed to disarm all paramilitary personnel. Many wouldn’t remember now that during Premadasa’s honeymoon with the LTTE, the Army facilitated the LTTE onslaught on paramilitary groups in selected areas.
During the ‘Balaya’ discussion, the contentious issue of who shot JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera came up. Nandana Gunatilleke, who contested the 1999 Dec. presidential election. as the JVP candidate, pointing to an article carried in the party organ that dealt with Wijeweera’s assassination said that he wrongly named Gaffoor as one of the persons who shot their leader whereas the actual shooter was Muthaliff. The headline named Thoradeniya and Gaffoor as the perpetrators.
Declaring that he personally wrote that article on the basis of information provided by Indrananda de Silva, Gunatilleke named Asoka Thoradeniya and Tuan Nizam Muthaliff of the Army as the perpetrators of the crime. Thoradeniya served as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in the Maldives during the Yahapalana administration, while Muthaliff was killed by the LTTE in Colombo in late May 2005. The shooting took place at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. Muthaliff was on his way from Manning town, Narahenpita, to the Kotelawala Defence University.
The programme was told that the JVP had over the years developed close relationship with Thoradeniya while Indrananda de Silva accused Dr. Wasantha Bandara of duplicity regarding Muthaliff. How could you recognize Muthaliff, slain by the LTTE, as a war hero as he was actually one of the persons who shot Rohana Wijeweera, the latter asked.
At the time of his assassination, Muthaliff served as the Commanding Officer, 1 st Regiment Sri Lanka Military Intelligence Corps. The then parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa was among those who paid last respects to Maj. Muthaliff.
At the time of Rohana Wijeweera’s arrest, Muthaliff served as Lieutenant while Thoradeniya was a Major. Indrananda de Silva strongly stressed that atrocities perpetrated by the police and military in the South or in the northern and eastern regions must be dealt with regardless of whom they were conducting operations against. The former JVPer recalled the Army massacre in the east in retaliation for the landmine blast that claimed the lives of Northern Commander Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and a group of senior officers, including Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne, in early Aug. 1990 in Kayts.
Dr. Wasantha Bandara warned of the Western powers taking advantage of what he called false narrative to push for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
It would be pertinent to mention that the LTTE also used the underworld as well as some corrupt Army personnel in planning high profile assassinations. Investigations into the assassination of Muthaliff, as well as Maj. Gen. Parami Kulatunga, killed in a suicide attack at Pannipitiya, in June 2006, revealed the direct involvement of military personnel with the LTTE.
Indrananda de Silva disclosed that soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake won the presidential election last September, the FSP, in writing, requested the JVP leader to inquire into killings during that period, including that of Rohana Wijeweera. The FSPer alleged that President Dissanayake refrained from even acknowledging their letter. Indrananda de Silva emphasized that Al Jazeera never disclosed anything new as regards Batalanda as he exposed the truth years ago. The former JVPer ridiculed the ruling party tabling the Batalanda Commission report in the wake of Wickremesinghe’s Al Jazeera interview whereas the matter was in the public domain for quite some time.
Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke exchanged words over the latter’s declaration that the JVP, too, was subjected to investigation for violence unleashed during the 1987-1990 period. While the FSPer repeatedly declared that those who carried out directives issued by the party were arrested and in some cases killed, Nandana Gunatilleke took up the position that the party should be held accountable for crimes perpetrated during that period.
The interviewer posed Nandana Gunatilleke the question whether he was betraying his former comrades after joining the UNP. Nandana Gunatilleke shot back that he joined the UNP in 2015 whereas the JVP joined UNP as far back as 2009 to promote retired Army Chef Sarath Fonseka’s presidential ambition even though he wiped out the JVP presence in Trincomalee region during the second insurgency.
Nandana Gunatilleke is adamant that the party should accept responsibility for the killings carried out at that time. The former JVPer declared that Vijaya Kumaratunga (Feb. 16, 1988), first Vice Chancellor of the Colombo University (March 08, 1989) Dr. Stanley Wijesundera, Ven. Kotikawatte Saddhatissa thera (Aug. 03, 1988) and Chairperson of the State Pharmaceutical Corporation Gladys Jayewardene (Sept. 12, 1989) were among those assassinated by the JVP. SPC Chairperson was killed for importing medicine from India, the former Marxist aligned with the UNP said, while actor-turned-politician Kumaratunga’s assassination was attributed to his dealings with President J.R. Jayewardene.
According to Nandana Gunatilleke, except for a few killings such as General Secretaries of the UNP Harsha Abeywickrema (Dec 23, 1987) and Nandalal Fernando (May 20, 1988), the vast majority of others were ordinary people like grama sevakas killed on mere accusation of being informants. The deaths were ordered on the basis of hearsay, Nandana Gunatilleke said, much to the embarrassment of others who represented the interest of the JVP at that time.
One quite extraordinary moment during the ‘ Balaya’ programme was when Nandana Gunatilleke revealed their (JVP’s) direct contact with the Indian High Commission at a time the JVP publicly took an extremely anti-Indian stance. In fact, the JVP propagated a strong anti-Indian line during the insurgency. Turning towards Dr. Wasantha Bandara, Gunatilleke disclosed that both of them had been part of the dialogue with the Indian High Commission.
It reminds me of the late Somawansa Amarasinghe’s first public address delivered at a JVP rally in late Nov. 2001 after returning home from 12 years of self-imposed exile. Of the top JVP leadership, Somawansa Amarasinghe, who had been married to a close relative of powerful UNP Minister Sirisena Cooray, was the only one to survive combined police/military/paramilitary operations.
Amarasinghe didn’t mince his words when he declared at a Kalutara rally that his life was saved by Indian Premier V.P. Singh. Soft spoken Amarasinghe profusely thanked India for saving his life. Unfortunately, those who discuss issues at hand conveniently forget crucial information in the public domain. Such lapses can be both deliberate and due to negligence.
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A leaked US diplomatic cable, dated July 15, 2009, signed by the then Geneva-based US Ambassador, Clint Williamson, cleared the Sri Lankan Army of crimes against humanity during the Vanni offensive. The cable, addressed to the US State Department, was based on a confidential conversation Ambassador Williamson had with the then ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacque de Maio, on July 9, 2009. Ambassador Williamson wrote: “The army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at an increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it didn’t amount to genocide. He (Maio) could cite examples of where the army had stopped shelling when the ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the army actually could have won the military battle faster with higher civilian casualties, yet chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths. He concluded, however, by asserting that the GoSL failed to recognize its obligation to protect civilians, in spite of its approach resulting in higher military casualties.”
Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) leader Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam recently declared, in New Delhi, that their biggest challenge was to convince the BJP government to take a much bigger interest in the question of accountability and on the question of a political solution.
The Tamil Guardian quoted Ponnambalam as having said: “They’re both two sides of the same coin.” The Island reproduced the Tamil Guardian report in its 6 Nov. edition (https://island.lk/sri-lanka-sees-tamil-nationhood-as-a-threat-to-buddhism-ponnambalam-tells-delhi-conference/)
This coming from Gajendrakumar, who, along with his late father Kumar Ponnambalam and grandfather, the legendary G.G. Ponnambalam, longtime residents of Colombo, with substantial wealth here and abroad, especially in owning prime real estate, even to this day, have no shame in wooing for a separatist Eelam, most probably to hoodwink the gullible Tamil masses to vote for him as their hero at future elections.
Several readers expressed serious concerns over the views expressed by the Jaffna District lawmaker. Retired Maj. Gen. Chagie Gallage, one of the notable battlefield strategists and outspoken Gajaba regiment veteran, was among them. “The country couldn’t turn a blind eye to this sort of propaganda,” Gallage declared, emphasising the responsibility on the part of those who benefited from the eradication of the LTTE to counter such lies. “An end to forcible conscription of children is sufficient to justify the eradication of the group,” he said, alleging none of those shedding crocodile tears today bothered to ask the LTTE to give up innocent human shields.
TNPF is not represented in Parliament. Ponnambalam contested the last parliamentary election on the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) ticket. He is the only ACTC lawmaker in the current Parliament. The Tamil nationhood, MP Ponnambalam had referred to at the onset of the fiery speech, spanned across some parts of the world, Tamil Nadu included. The so-called Tamil nationhood is not exclusively tied to Sri Lanka.
The late J.N. Dixit, one-time Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka (1985 to 1989), pointed out in his memoirs ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun to Yashwant Sinha’ the late Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi feared the emergence of Tamil separatism in India if she refused to support, what Dixit called, aspirations of Sri Lanka Tamils (Chapter: An Indo-centric practitioner of realpolitik/p 147).
The involvement of the Australian Tamil Congress and the United States Tamil Action Group in the New Delhi conference revealed the despicable overall strategy of those who believed in the LTTE’s capacity to force the battlefield stalemate to their advantage.
The Norway-led almost one-sided peace process, during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s presidency, gave the LTTE an ample opportunity to advance its separatist agenda, thanks to the then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s utterly irresponsible blind approach to a negotiated settlement. The LTTE quit the negotiating table in April 2003. That move made the war inevitable. It would be pertinent to remind that Ponnambalam had been a Jaffna district MP at the time the LTTE quit the negotiating table, while safely living in Colombo much of the time, as was the case with most Tamil leaders, including M.A. Sumanthiran, a resident of Wellawatte. So while maligning Sri Lanka with highly exaggerated claims, like existence of mass graves at every available opportunity, especially when they are abroad, those same Lankan Tamil leaders, however, still feel quite safe here and not India. And we must say we are proud to have them living among us as our brothers, despite all the nasty things they accuse us of. Even if we grant that some of their animosity is justified, there is no necessity to kill each other to settle issues, other than to work things out peacefully for the benefit of us all. Both Sinhalese and Tamils, especially the latter, must decide whether we want the permanent chaos, that is India with its innumerable caste/race/religious divisions, or do we bury the hatchet between the two major races to settle problems that beset us here, albeit without external interference.
Ponnambalam represented the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) that had recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people and thereby backed Velupillai Prabhakaran’s initiative. The ITAK parliamentary group consisted of 15 MPs, including one National List member. However, those who entered Parliament on the ITAK ticket were recognised as members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) consisting of ex-Indian sponsored terrorist groups and the ITAK.
The LTTE advanced its terror campaign in the run-up to the 2004 parliamentary poll. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, the LTTE actions directly benefited the TNA. The LTTE undermined other political parties in the fray. Their objective was clear. They wanted the largest possible ITAK group in Parliament to back the war effort. Twenty-two were elected on the ITAK ticket at the parliamentary polls held in early April 2004. That effort was successful with the LTTE stuffing ballot boxes for ITAK candidates as was clearly observed by EU election monitors in their post-election report. Ponnambalam was among the elected group. Throughout the Eelam War IV (Aug. 2006 to May 2009), ITAK/TNA fiercely backed the LTTE. They remained loyal to the LTTE as its units gradually retreated until the group suffered a humiliating defeat at Anandapuram, in April 2009, before the total collapse several weeks later.
Against the backdrop of the devastating split in the LTTE, caused by its Eastern Commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, aka Karuna Amman, rebelling against their supreme leader Prabhakaran, alleging discrimination against Easterners, in 2004, ahead of the parliamentary polls, ITAK/TNA remained committed to the LTTE macabre cause. After the armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion, Ponnambalam quit the TNA. He formed the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) in 2010. The TNPF fielded candidates at the 2010 and 2015 parliamentary polls but couldn’t even secure a single seat. Ponnambalam returned to Parliament again in Aug 2020.
Qualified as a Barrister-at-Law, in the UK, in 1997, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam received Sri Lanka qualification as an Attorney-at-Law, two years later, before entering active politics, in the wake of his father Kumar Ponnambalam’s assassination, in early January 2000.
Ponnambalam conveniently forgot the responsibility on the part of India, as well as the Tamil community, for the crimes committed in Sri Lanka and India. Tamil Guardian report on Ponnambalam’s speech, made no reference to the Indian military intervention, deaths of over 1,200 Indian soldiers in Sri Lanka, thousands of Tamils, both LTTE and civilians, killed by the foreign army, elimination of Tamil political leadership by the LTTE and the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in May 1991, just over a year after India ended its disastrous military mission here.
The BJP wouldn’t be deceived by unfounded claims, such as Ponnambalam’s Delhi declaration that the Sri Lankan State considered the very potential of Tamil nationhood as a threat to Buddhism and was hell-bent on dismantling it.
BJP leader and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, having repeatedly paid tribute to Indian officers and men who perished in Sri Lanka and twice paid floral tributes to the Indian military memorial near Parliament, would be averse to anti-Sri Lanka rhetoric. Unfortunately, some Tamil politicians have sought to depict a bleak picture of the country, though the Northern and Eastern Provinces achieved impressive post-war success. After Modi assumed the premiership, in 2014, India gradually changed its Sri Lanka strategy and New Delhi’s overall approach cannot be discussed, forgetting the role they played in President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2022 and the facilitation of the JVP/NPP victory at the presidential and parliamentary polls in Sept. and Nov., 2024, respectively.
No one will be able to entice New Delhi by propagating that the Sri Lankan State was pursuing a hostile attitude towards Tamil Hindus. Much to the discomfort of those seeking to arouse communal feelings, the Tamil community in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, for the first time in post-independence history, voted overwhelmingly for the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) at the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2024.
The emergence of the NPP as the dominant power in the predominantly Tamil speaking regions has troubled ITAK and other Tamil parties. The deterioration of ITAK/TNA began after the eradication of the LTTE. Once the dominant political power that worked with the LTTE gradually declined and was reduced to eight seats at the last parliamentary poll.
The Democratic Tamil National Alliance (DTNA), consisting of parties that broke away from the ITAK-led TNA, won a seat with Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) leader Selvam Adaikkalanathan winning in Vanni.
Independent candidate Dr Ramanathan Archuna won a seat in Jaffna, probably at the expense of M.A. Sumanthiran, PC, who could have made a significant contribution in Parliament. Archuna has caused chaos with repeated declarations, both in and outside Parliament, that the Tamil Diaspora funded the NPP campaign. The influence of the Tamil Diaspora, too, has deteriorated over the years, though European political parties bent backwards to appease the voters of Sri Lankan origin. But, foreign governments, to a certain extent, have lost interest in accountability issues, though on and off statements are made and concerns expressed over the delay in addressing long standing issues. However, accountability issues are no longer a priority as repeatedly indicated by India. The post- Aragalaya Indo-Sri Lanka relationship/partnership underscored by seven MoUs finalised in April 2025, including one on defence, followed by three defence MoUs signed in Sept, this year, as well as transfer of Colombo Dockyard Ltd. (CDL) controlling shares to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), affiliated with the Indian Defence Ministry, marked a fundamental shift towards New Delhi.
With the NPP emerging as the dominant political power in the Northern and Eastern regions, the Tamil parties seemed to be on the back foot. Lawmaker Ponnambalam’s recent bid to cause concern among the Indian establishment over perceived Sinhala Buddhist threat to Tamil Hindus seemed a desperate move that failed to convince their own.
Ponnambalam returned to Parliament in August 2020, as the leader of Ahila Ilankai Thamil Congress. The party also secured one National List slot. Ponnambalam accommodated Selvarasa Gajenthiran, who quit the TNA, along with him, in 2010, on the National List.
Ponnambalam attacked the wartime political leadership and the war-winning armed forces. Alleging that the Tamil community had been subjected to genocide, Ponnambalam demanded international accountability. The MP dismissed whatever proposals meant to address the issues through domestic mechanisms.
Ponnambalam attacked President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s policy statement. The lawmaker targeted the following section in particular: “It is equally important to precisely interpret the mandate given by the people. We respect the trust that the people have placed in me and the Prime Minister and the newly elected people’s representatives. We have a clear understanding of the expectations with which the people gave such a powerful mandate to the government. We will leave no room for such expectations to be dashed for any reason. It should always be remembered that the prime responsibility of a people’s representative is to serve the public. We will be sensitive to fulfilling the needs of the people, keeping in mind that all these positions are responsibilities and not privileges.”
Ponnanmalam declared that President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s mandate (2019 November presidential and 2020 August parliamentary polls) did not extend to the North-East region. Ponnambalam depicted the vote received by all Tamils, including Ramanathan and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) Douglas Devananda, elected to the new Parliament, as one that overwhelmingly endorsed self-determination of the Tamil speaking people. Ponnambalam justified international intervention on the basis of the Tamil community being deprived of the security it deserved.
Declaring them (Tamil lawmakers) received a mandate for Tamil rights to be recognised, Ponnambalam declared: “two nations exist in this country.”
“Sovereignty can never be a defence. This country has gone through a war and the whole world says that heinous crimes have been committed and the state is the number one accused party,” Ponnambalam declared, adding “Under no circumstances can any President, or any country, for that matter, try to hide behind the concept of sovereignty, to prevent accountability for heinous crimes. The victims of these heinous crimes stand as Tamils… the major victims stand as Tamils and they have consistently said that genocide has been committed and that they want international accountability.”
When Ponnambalam went on and on repeating war crimes allegations, in Parliament, former Presidents and Commanders-in-Chief, Mahinda Rajapaksa and Maithripala Sirisena, as well as war-winning Army Chief Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka, were present. Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa, too, was present.
It would be pertinent to ask lawmaker Ponnambalam whether, as a member of the TNA, he endorsed the party’s decision to vote for the then common presidential candidate General Sarath Fonseka at the January 26, 2010 presidential election. Did the TNA decision to join the UNP-led coalition, comprising the JVP, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC) et al, was unanimously approved by all constituents of the TNA?
Now that Ponnambalam reiterated genocide allegations, he owed an explanation why the Tamil community overwhelmingly endorsed Fonseka at the presidential election after accusing him and his army of committing genocide. Fonseka comfortably won all electoral districts, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, though the South ensured Mahinda Rajapaksa secured a second term, with a staggering 1.8 mn majority. Mahinda Rajapaksa polled 6,015,934 votes (57.88%) whereas Fonseka received 4,173,185 votes (40.15%). Fonseka comfortably won the predominantly Tamil electoral districts of Jaffna, Vanni, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Digamadulla and Nuwara-Eliya.
The 2010 presidential election was held less than a year after the armed forces eradicated the LTTE. Blindly accusing the Sri Lanka army of war crimes, and genocide, seemed ridiculous, after having voted for the very man who conducted the ground offensive that brought the LTTE to its knees, in May 2009.
The truth is that the LTTE and the TNA really believed they could overwhelm President Mahinda Rajapaksa far more easily than Wickremesinghe. In spite of serious reservations, the TNA backed the LTTE’s move. Particularly, the Northern electorate boycotted the 2005 Nov. presidential election. The then top UNPer Malik Samarawickrema told the writer if not for that boycott, engineered by the LTTE, Wickremesinghe could have won the presidential poll. That may have very well been the case.
Having dug its own grave, the LTTE faced a relentless three-year military onslaught. The LTTE resumed large-scale operations in August 2006 and the counter offensive didn’t stop until Prabhakaran was isolated and killed on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.
The armed forces eradicated the LTTE in May 2009. In the following year, the TNA backed the very man who led the campaign against the LTTE at the presidential poll.
The war crimes and genocide allegations should have been reexamined after Fonseka won the Northern and Eastern provinces. Unfortunately, successive governments lacked interest and a cohesive plan to counter lies. In spite of exposure of calculated lies meant to humiliate Sri Lanka and increase international pressure, successive governments shirked their responsibility to counter those lies toe to toe in the face of propaganda against the country being primarily launched with the backing of the so-called international community, meaning the powerful West.
Sri Lanka never took tangible measures against those who propagated lies as part of an overall strategy. Some still couldn’t stomach the LTTE’s annihilation. Wigneswaran’s calculated lie is a case in point. Wigneswaran, and a section of the Tamil media, in August 2016, accused the military of killing over 100 LTTE combatants, in custody, by poisoning them. The PTI and NDTV were among the international media which reported unsubstantiated allegations.
Accusers placed the number of such deaths at 104. Accusations were made while the US Pacific Command’s ‘Pacific Angel’ exercise was underway, in the Jaffna peninsula.
Despite being a retired Supreme Court Judge, the highest legal body in the country, Wigneswaran raked up a brazen lie by brashly declaring that the US Air Force’s medical team, in Jaffna, would examine the former rehabilitated LTTE cadres, who, he alleged, had fallen sick because they were injected with poisonous substances, at government detention, or rehabilitation camps.
The US conveniently refrained from making its position clear on Wigneswaran’s claim when the writer raised the issue with the US Embassy in Colombo.
Responding to several questions The Island posed, regarding ex-LTTE cadres being poisoned, the US Embassy said: “Operation Pacific Angel is providing assistance, based on the specific needs of the local communities. Among the nearly 70 members of this multilateral assistance programme – including some medical staff and engineers from Bangladesh, Nepal, and the Maldives, as well as the United States – are over 40 doctors, providing basic medical services: dental procedures; physical therapy; general medical assistance; and optometry. These are the only services being provided.”
The writer asked the US Embassy whether it could confirm that US Pacific Command personnel, conducting medical tests on ex-LTTE cadres, allegedly poisoned by the previous government; whether they would be moved to overseas medical facility for further tests; whether the GoSL had been informed of the development; when did the TNA request the US intervention and whether the US military had conducted similar tests in other countries. For obvious reasons, the US refrained from responding to The Island queries.
The New Indian Express quoted Wigneswaran as having said that the US Air Force’s medical team would examine ex-LTTE cadres who had been sick because they were injected with poisonous substances by the Sri Lankan armed military while they were undergoing detention, or rehabilitation. Wigneswaran, according to the New Indian Express, had told the NPC (Northern Provincial Council) that he had mentioned the plight of the former combatants in his conversation with the US Ambassador, Atul Keshap, and asked if the USAF team could examine them and give an independent report.
Wigneswaran’s allegations died a natural death. Neither the TNA, nor the US, ever discussed the issue publicly.
With the latest New Delhi talk, Ponnambalam appeared to have taken the campaign against Sri Lanka to a new level.
Sasanka Perera (The writer is on X as @sasmester)
Sri Lankan social and mainstream media have shown considerable euphoria over oral observations made by the Indian Supreme Court on the Katchatheevu island in early October 2026. It stems primarily from a collective sense of relief and validation over the ownership of the island because Sri Lanka has faced intense political posturing, domestic pressure from Tamil Nadu politicians, and legal challenges in India demanding the retrieval of the island. But nothing new or pathbreaking has emerged from the Indian Supreme Court on this issue. What is clear is that ownership of Katchatheevu is a settled issue irrespective of its continued reemergence in Indian courts and in Tamil Nadu political performances.
The Katchatheevu issue must be understood in its historical context, with legal clarity, strategic sensibility and a large dose of commonsense in which Sri Lankans are generally wanting. Neither an oral observation by India’s Supreme Court nor the Indian government’s continued adherence to existing maritime agreements constitutes a new, final judicial determination of sovereignty. More importantly, even an unequivocal recognition of Sri Lanka’s territorial rights would not remove the wider asymmetries of power between the two countries of which our political leaders must be extremely mindful when dealing with India.
What did India’s Supreme Court Decide?
The most recently reported proceedings, i.e. of 6 October 2026, concern several petitions challenging the 1974 India–Sri Lanka maritime boundary agreement and the subsequent 1976 agreement regulating fishing in each country’s maritime zones. The principal case, A.K. Selvaraj v. Union of India, was filed in 2008. The wider proceedings include Writ Petition (Civil) No. 430 of 2013; special leave petitions and a petition filed in 2021. Former Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa was also among the petitioners in the litigation. The petitioners challenge the legality of recognising Katchatheevu as lying on Sri Lanka’s side of the maritime boundary, arguing, among other things, that the transfer of Indian territory required constitutional and parliamentary procedures.
On 6 October 2026, Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva heard the matter. The Court orally observed that Indian fishermen needed to be sensitised against entering Sri Lankan waters. It also questioned whether the Indian government was engaging Sri Lanka over the treaties. At the Attorney General’s request, the matter was adjourned to 2 February 2027. No final judgment on sovereignty was delivered. This state of affairs is crucial. An oral observation during a hearing is not a binding determination of territorial sovereignty. Nor does an adjournment amount to the dismissal of the petitions or an endorsement of every argument advanced by either side.
The Indian government’s position is nevertheless significant. According to publicly available information, the Attorney General of India informed the Court that the Indian government had no intention of reopening the 1974 and 1976 agreements, while concerns regarding Indian fishermen would continue to be pursued through diplomatic channels. This establishes the Indian government’s continuing commitment to the existing settlement. It is not a fresh concession of sovereignty made in response to a final Supreme Court ruling. However, it is entirely possible that the Indian government’s position could be influenced by future political developments, while the agreements themselves remain the operative bilateral framework at the moment.
Katchatheevu’s history is far more complex than the dominant popular Indian assertion that the island was Indian territory until it was handed over to Sri Lanka in 1974. British colonial administrations in India and Ceylon disputed aspects of the island’s status, and the available historical record contains evidence invoked by both sides. The proprietary interests claimed by the Raja of Ramnad, historical leases and British administrative records have featured prominently in Indian arguments. The 1904 Madras High Court case, Annakumaru Pillai v. Muthupayal, and a 1922 Imperial Records Department report have been cited by Indian commentators as evidence supporting the historical Indian claim. However, proprietary rights, fishing practices and administrative jurisdiction are not automatically equivalent to sovereign ownership over territory.
The 1921 negotiations between British India and Ceylon are particularly important. The two colonial administrations discussed a fisheries boundary in the Palk Strait. The Indian delegation agreed to a proposed line without prejudice to any territorial claim India might make to Katchatheevu. The reservation demonstrated that the island’s status was contested rather than conclusively resolved by that exercise. Subsequent correspondence from the Government of India in 1923 is also relevant to the historical debate. It has been cited in discussions of the government’s assessment of the competing claims. Nevertheless, the 1921 negotiations and the associated correspondence should not be presented as a conclusive international judicial ruling in Ceylon’s favour.
The more decisive development came after independence, in 1974 and 1976. In June 1974, India and Sri Lanka concluded the ‘Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters.’ Article 1 established the maritime boundary, placing Katchatheevu on the Sri Lankan side. Article 4 provided that each country would exercise sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over the waters, islands, continental shelf and subsoil on its respective side of the boundary. Article 5 preserved access for Indian fishermen and pilgrims to visit Katchatheevu as previously practiced, without requiring Sri Lankan travel documents or visas for these purposes. That provision, however, did not expressly grant fishing rights for Indians in Sri Lankan waters. The 1976 agreements subsequently clarified the exclusion of fishing vessels and fishermen from each country’s maritime zones, subject to the agreements’ specific provisions.
Both the 1974 and 1976 agreements were empowered in practice and were subsequently registered with the United Nations. They constitute the central legal instruments governing the present boundary.
Interestingly, debates on this issue in Sri Lanka and India often overlook the case of the Wadge Bank, a vast, ecologically rich submarine plateau located about 80 kilometers south of Kanyakumari. Although it lies outside India’s territorial waters, it falls within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Fishermen from both nations had commercially fished these waters since at least the 1920s, if not earlier. However, under the 1976 maritime agreement between the two countries, the region was formally recognised as part of India’s EEZ, and Sri Lankan fishing vessels were barred from the area starting around 1979. In essence, this served as a crucial trade-off: Sri Lanka secured full sovereignty over Katchatheevu along with surrounding fishing rights, while its fishers were completely barred from the far more resource-rich Wadge Bank.
What do the Earlier Legal Cases Establish?
The 1974 settlement did not end Indian domestic challenges to the island’s status. In Brij Khandelwal v. Union of India (1974), the Delhi High Court considered petitions filed by Brij Khandelwal and Shyama Charan Gupta challenging the Indian government’s agreement concerning Katchatheevu. The petitioners argued that Indian territory could not be ceded without the necessary constitutional procedures. The Court dismissed their petitions, finding that they had not established the requisite personal legal interest to obtain the relief sought. But this should not be misrepresented as an international adjudication conclusively resolving all historical questions of ownership.
The case remains important because it illustrates that the legality of the 1974 settlement was contested in India from the outset. However, these contestations did not result due to lack of clarity in legal positions. Instead, they resulted as a consequence of Indian nationalism and popular territoriality in the way these feelings manifested among people. These are subjective sentiments and always open to emotional and political manipulation which no law can control. As a result, subsequent challenges have continued to raise constitutional arguments, including whether the agreement required a consti
The broader constitutional question is not trivial. In ‘Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves’ (1960) the Supreme Court of India held that ceding Indian territory to a foreign state could require a constitutional amendment. Petitioners have invoked this principle in challenging the Katchatheevu agreements. But the application of the Berubari precedent to this particular maritime boundary settlement is a matter for judicial determination. It cannot be assumed that every argument advanced by the petitioners has already been accepted.
The crucial point for Sri Lanka is that these domestic Indian proceedings have not, to date, displaced the bilateral agreements. Equally, the latest Supreme Court hearing has not created a new determination confirming or rejecting Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Until a final judgment is delivered, the petitions remain pending.
For Sri Lanka, the principal diplomatic achievement is not that India has suddenly conceded a prevised Sri Lankan sovereignty over a disputed territory. Such a reading would be a misinterpretation. What is important here is that the Indian government continues to treat the existing maritime settlement as operative despite recurrent domestic political pressure to revisit it. This position reinforces the stability of Sri Lanka’s maritime jurisdiction. It also demonstrates that Indian electoral rhetoric and the Indian government’s official diplomatic position need not always coincide — even though they have at times. For instance, in 2024, in the run-up to the country’s elections, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Home Minister Amit Shah publicly criticised these agreements arguing they amounted to Katchatheevu being ceded to Sri Lanka by the then-Congress government. Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar also supported these claims in public at the time.
Yet the recent Sri Lankan euphoria surrounding Katchatheevu risks obscuring the distinction between territorial sovereignty and strategic autonomy. The hype in Sri Lanka, particularly seen across social media supportive of the present government, comes from the extreme naivety with which most Sri Lankans — including political leaders and officials — view international relations and relations between Sri Lanka and India in particular.
A state may recognise another country’s borders while pursuing policies that substantially increase its influence over that country’s economic choices, infrastructure, energy systems and external relationships. This is where the Sri Lankan government and the country’s citizens must look beyond the immediate euphoria of the Indian Supreme Court observations.
In this situation, despite the rhetoric of convenience of populist Indian politicians, Sri Lanka should certainly welcome India’s official adherence to the maritime agreements without mistaking it to be a guarantee of future strategic restraint. The legal settlement of Katchatheevu and the wider balance of power are separate questions. One concerns territorial jurisdiction. The other concerns the practical ability of a sovereign state to determine its own economic and strategic future. Sri Lanka must continue to insist that the 1974 and 1976 agreements be respected, while addressing fishing disputes through diplomacy, legal enforcement and arrangements that protect the livelihoods of our own distraught coastal communities. It should avoid allowing never-ending fishing disputes to become a pretext for reopening already settled territorial questions.
The lesson of Katchatheevu is ultimately larger than the island itself. Sovereignty is not secured merely by having one’s territorial rights acknowledged by a powerful neighbor. It also depends on the institutions, economic resilience, political leadership and diplomatic capacity that enable a country to exercise those rights in practice. Sri Lanka has sound reasons to value the existing maritime settlement and India’s continued commitment to it. But the latest Supreme Court proceedings have not produced a final judicial verdict on ownership, and the Indian government has not newly conceded the island as a result of such a verdict. Nevertheless, the agreements remain the legal foundation of the settlement, while the pending litigation leaves constitutional arguments within India unresolved.
For Sri Lanka, the wisest response is neither triumphalism nor suspicion for its own sake. What is earnestly needed is a clear-eyed and independent foreign policy that welcomes cooperation, resists unnecessary confrontation and refuses to confuse economic corporation with the surrender of strategic choice.
Katchatheevu may be a small, even relatively inconsequential island, but the questions it raises about sovereignty, power and the future of Sri Lanka’s independence are anything but trivial.
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